What I have understand with the 30 day limit, is that the authorization granted 
must be granted for a maximum of 30 days.
Eg, one token, regardless of if its random or static, may either be single-use 
or allow a maximum of 30 days where the system considers domain as "validated".

And a token must either be a random value, the hash of certificate CSR, or the 
hash of certificate SPKI.
In the CAB forum guidelines version 1.4.5, I don't see something that require a 
timestamp, however, they recommend a timestamp in the hash.

The idea is that you should be able to automate set up DNS-01 once, and then is 
set once for all.

-----Ursprungligt meddelande-----
Från: ilariliusva...@welho.com [mailto:ilariliusva...@welho.com] 
Skickat: den 13 november 2017 12:23
Till: Sebastian Nielsen <sebast...@sebbe.eu>
Kopia: acme@ietf.org
Ämne: Re: [Acme] One suggestion for ACME, and also one question about CAA

On Mon, Nov 13, 2017 at 11:31:49AM +0100, Sebastian Nielsen wrote:
> First, I want to make a suggestion, and that is possibility for a 
> permanent domain authorization.
> 
> The CABF says that it is permitted to use SPKI hash or CSR hash as 
> authentication token, without any nonce.

Such token would be valid for one use only unless timestamped. And even if 
timestamped, it would be limited to 30 days at most.

> Since SPKI hash is static for the same public key, and the CSR hash is 
> static if you use the same CSR all the time, it would be permitted as 
> a pre-authorization.

The token would still change, see above.

> Thus avoiding a unnecessary restart of the name server each renew.

Use DNS dynamic updates. There is 20 year old RFC(!) describing one way of 
doing that. And then there are many DNS-server specific ways.
And automating DNS-01 requires such API anyway.


If talking about HTTP-01, it does not require server restart/reload in anything 
I know of. And TLS-SNI-02 is insane without special server support (which 
presumably eliminates restarts/reloads too).


-Ilari

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