The caching of authorization documentation is controlled by the PKI policy (for the WebPKI, the CA/BF Baseline Requirements), not by the ACME spec. The BRs say that documentation relating to Domain Control Validation (aka ACME Authorizations) must be obtained no more than 398 days prior to issuing the Certificate. Let's Encrypt shortens that to 30 days in its CP/CPS; I believe some other ACME CAs do the same.
On the one hand, I don't think those requirements would apply to private key proof-of-possession authorizations. On the other hand, I don't think there would be any compelling reason for a CA to cache keypair PoP authzs for any shorter nor for any longer than DCV authzs. So I suspect that in practice they would be treated similarly, yes. Aaron On Mon, Aug 14, 2023 at 8:20 PM Seo Suchan <tjtn...@gmail.com> wrote: > If we make keypair as identifier, would it's authorization be valid and > cached for 30 days like other auths? for kem keys perspective it doesn't > know what it's agree for, so it's in effect authorizing ACME account for > post that key onto certificate. > 2023-08-12 오전 2:47에 Aaron Gable 이(가) 쓴 글: > > Oh that's fun, I like that idea. > > Making it explicit: Introduce a new identifier type "keypair-KEM". When > included in a newOrder request, an identifier of that type would have a > value that is the full KEM public key. The Server would then create an > Authorization for that identifier, and the Challenge object(s) for that > Authorization would contain a ciphertext encrypted to that public key. The > Client would then POST to the Challenge URL with a body containing the > plaintext (very similar to the non-empty Challenge POST body from > draft-ietf-acme-onion-00's onion-csr-01 validation method). > > Very similar flows could be adopted for other keypair types as well. > > The only additional requirement I see is that, especially for those other > keypairs, the CA would have to verify that the public key in the CSR > matches the public key provided in the Order. > > Aaron > > On Fri, Aug 11, 2023 at 10:26 AM Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek= > 40digicert....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > >> I was thinking (a) happens in (1), and (c) happens in (3), but I haven't >> done enough >> (or any) analysis to see if that can be made to work. >> >> The other possibility is to treat PoP as another identifier that must be >> validated >> in (2), which might be cleaner. Dunno. Treating it as a validation step >> instead of >> a finalization step feels more correct anyway. >> >> "The use of ACME for other identifiers will require further >> specification in order to describe how these identifiers are encoded >> in the protocol and what types of validation challenges the server >> might require." >> >> This might be one of those times. >> >> -Tim >> >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: Russ Housley <hous...@vigilsec.com> >> > Sent: Friday, August 11, 2023 1:20 PM >> > To: Tim Hollebeek <tim.holleb...@digicert.com> >> > Cc: IETF ACME <acme@ietf.org> >> > Subject: Re: [Acme] Internet-Draft: PQC Algorithm negotiation in ACME >> > >> > Tim: >> > >> > I understand the large organization problem. With KEM PoP, you need >> these >> > things in order: >> > >> > a) subject provides the KEM public key >> > >> > b) server forms a ciphertext using the provided KEM public key and >> sends it >> > to the subject >> > >> > c) the subject recovers the plaintext using the KEM private key and >> send it to >> > the server >> > >> > These do not fit cleanly into the ACME order finalization process, >> which is just >> > one round trip. >> > >> > Russ >> > >> > >> > > On Aug 11, 2023, at 1:10 PM, Tim Hollebeek < >> tim.holleb...@digicert.com> >> > wrote: >> > > >> > > Returning it as part of the protocol makes more sense to me than >> trying to >> > stuff it into DNS. One could imagine including it as part of some sort >> of >> > extension in the CSR that optionally proves possession (if desired), for >> > example. >> > > >> > > One of the challenges we often have with issuance protocols is that >> the part >> > of the organization that controls the keys and is setting up servers is >> often >> > different from the part of organization that can change DNS, and they >> can't >> > always coordinate their work for reasons that should be familiar to >> anyone >> > with the misfortune of ever working for a large company. >> > > >> > > -Tim >> > > >> > >> -----Original Message----- >> > >> From: Acme <acme-boun...@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Russ Housley >> > >> Sent: Friday, August 11, 2023 12:57 PM >> > >> To: IETF ACME <acme@ietf.org> >> > >> Subject: Re: [Acme] Internet-Draft: PQC Algorithm negotiation in ACME >> > >> >> > >> Thinking about KEM PoP in the context of ACME. The subject must >> > >> provide the KEM subject public key as part of the certificate >> > >> request. A new challenge could be defined (for example, dns-kem-00) >> > >> where the token is a KEM ciphertext, and the subject needs to put the >> > >> corresponding plaintext in to DNS. This proves possession of the KEM >> > >> private key as well as administrative control over the domain. >> > >> >> > >> This does not totally match the flow in RFC 8555, which is: >> > >> >> > >> 1. Submit an order for a certificate to be issued >> > >> >> > >> 2. Prove control of any identifiers requested in the certificate >> > >> >> > >> 3. Finalize the order by submitting a CSR >> > >> >> > >> 4. Await issuance and download the issued certificate >> > >> >> > >> The KEM public key would need to be provided in step 1. I guess it >> > >> is not a big deal for the KEM public key to be repeated in step 3, as >> > >> long as the ACME server checked for a match. >> > >> >> > >> Russ >> > >> >> > >> _______________________________________________ >> > >> Acme mailing list >> > >> Acme@ietf.org >> > >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Acme mailing list >> Acme@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme >> > > _______________________________________________ > Acme mailing listAcme@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme > >
_______________________________________________ Acme mailing list Acme@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme
