Hi, The DN will overwrite the client-provided username (if any) when the SslTransport writes it.
On 8/3/06, Kelly Campbell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Sepand, One possible gotcha I haven't heard anyone bring up that we should address is to make sure that someone can't just "fake" the DN in the username field through a normal login and make the system think it's authenticated with the certificate. -Kelly On 8/3/06, Hiram Chirino <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Hi Sepand, > > 4.1 and 4.0 branches are not that different yet. If you need your > solution for 4.0, go ahead and do it. Chances are we will only apply > it only to 4.1 (since this a new feature). > > On 8/3/06, Sepand M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Thanks Hiram. That sounds great. > > > > I guess my last question is: what branch do I work off of? Personally, > > I would like to build my stuff on a stable release (4.0.1), but I've > > looked at the svn logs and you guys seem to be pretty active around > > the stuff I want to change so I'm not sure how my changes could be > > reintegrated once I'm done. > > > > Any thoughts? > > > > On 8/3/06, Hiram Chirino <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Sepand, > > > > > > Do what you need to to get you project done, you cand send us tidbit > > > as you get it done and we can work on merging it back to the main > > > branch. The great thing is that you have a use case that we want to > > > support, so if you put something together that work for you, I don't > > > see why it would not just go whole hog into the main branch. > > > > > > On 8/3/06, Sepand M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > Hi guys, > > > > > > > > Here are a few things: > > > > 1) I cannot use LDAP. We don't use it now, and don't want to later. I > > > > understand if you want to use it, but I can't. > > > > > > > > 2) From what I understand (and my understanding isn't too bad at this > > > > point), SSL sockets with needClientAuth just verify the client's cert > > > > against the CA. This means that the socket only does authentication > > > > and the rest is up to the broker (which seems perfect). > > > > > > > > 3) The other ideas we're getting like separating the user from the > > > > connection (which I don't fully understand) seem like they are > > > > overkill. To be done properly, they would need significant (not > > > > drastic, but significant) architectural rework (look at things like > > > > UserIDBroker, and how the user ID is currently obtained from the > > > > connection with the producer ID registration stuff) and are fairly > > > > independent of the SSL thing. > > > > > > > > > > Yeah I think this is overkill too. > > > > > > > So here's my plan: I want to implement my original idea (it's in this > > > > thread a few posts up) with (at most) the addition of a > > > > subject/principal back end for authorization. I say at most because > > > > I've been working on my idea for a while and know exactly how to do > > > > it; adding the subject/principal thing is a good design choice but I'm > > > > hesitant to persue it since I don't know much about it and I have a > > > > deadline (and therefore, would rather avoid having to read about it). > > > > > > > > If someone knows their stuff regarding to JAAS and is willing to work > > > > on it, I would be very glad to incorporate that into the design. If > > > > not, I must begin working on my implementation by the end of the week > > > > (hopefully sooner). > > > > > > > > I would *REALLY* like to work with you guys, but I have deadlines to > > > > meet. I would also hate it if my work didn't make it into the > > > > project's main branch, but I would totally understand if you decided > > > > to go with your own ideas. > > > > > > > > On 8/3/06, Hiram Chirino <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > On 8/3/06, David Jencks <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On Aug 2, 2006, at 4:35 PM, Sepand M wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Ok. So from what I've read, we're trying to separate the authorization > > > > > > > part from the SSL socket and let the broker handle it. > > > > > > > This sounds great. It would take more work (not so great since I have > > > > > > > a deadline), but it would be a "proper" solution. > > > > > > > From what I know of JAAS, the subject/principals fully represent > > > > > > > identity. So attaching them to Connection info would be a good idea. > > > > > > > That way, the Transport's job would be to authenticate and the Broker > > > > > > > could handle authorization completely. This would also mean that any > > > > > > > communication system could be used without having to change the Broker > > > > > > > (as long as the Transport can authenticate and create proper > > > > > > > subjet/principals). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The one thing I will note is that we are changing the ActiveMQ > > > > > > > architecture in that currently, the Brokers are doing both > > > > > > > authentication and authorization (e.g. The Brokers are currently doing > > > > > > > the user name and password validation). > > > > > > > I think, however, that this is necessary because without our change, > > > > > > > there would need to be a new broker for every new, authenticated, > > > > > > > communication system. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Please tell me if you agree (in which case I'll start looking at > > > > > > > implementation details). > > > > > > > > > > > > I thought about this some more and wonder if it would be appropriate > > > > > > to consider using the full corba csiv2 framework or a reasonable > > > > > > facsimile. I think it would. Very briefly here is what it gives you: > > > > > > > > > > > > -both ends of the communication channel have policies specifying what > > > > > > they can provide and require for security: they negotiate a common > > > > > > policy. > > > > > > > > > > > > The policy can specify: > > > > > > > > > > > > - security level of channel (basically unprotected or ssl) > > > > > > > > > > > > - validation of identity of server and client, by user/pw or > > > > > > certificate chain > > > > > > > > > > > > - validation of identity of user by a variety of mechanisms including > > > > > > user/pw, cert chain, and trusting the client. > > > > > > > > > > > > Perhaps the most important point here is that the identity of the > > > > > > user and the client may not be the same: this would typically be the > > > > > > case when the client is a broker forwarding messages it got from > > > > > > somewhere else. Here the ssl connection with client certificates > > > > > > would be used to establish the identity of both brokers but the user > > > > > > who originated the message would also be communicated and used in > > > > > > authorization decisions. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Seem like a bit of overkill but the whole separating the identity of > > > > > the user from the identity of the connection bit is interesting. > > > > > Could something similar be accomplished if each message was signed by > > > > > the user before it was sent into the messaging system? > > > > > > > > > > > In other situations where the message sender is a single-user client > > > > > > the client certificate can be used to establish the identity of both > > > > > > the client and user. > > > > > > > > > > > > thanks > > > > > > david jencks > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > Regards, > > > > > Hiram > > > > > > > > > > Blog: http://hiramchirino.com > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Regards, > > > Hiram > > > > > > Blog: http://hiramchirino.com > > > > > > > > -- > Regards, > Hiram > > Blog: http://hiramchirino.com >
