Here we go again. Cheerskep is teaching lesson one in philosophy, the lesson that brings criticality to "naive realism".
Re Einstein, he was a theorist. Today we call it theoretical physics. Cheerskep. Please! WC --- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Derek writes: > > "that raises the very interesting question of how > works that were not created > as 'art' have become 'art'. I refer you to Malraux > for the answer. (No > other theorist, amazingly, has even discussed the > problem!)" > > I can name one other very minor theorist who's > discussed it: Cheerskep. Many > times, in fact, all in my attempt to throw a > ridiculous light on listers' > assumption of an absolute metaphysical status for > "Art". > > The current argument between many of the listers > about whether or not XXX > "was/IS" "science", and YYY "was/IS" "art" reflects > the delusion vividly. Recall > Frances's robotic repetition that if her chimerical > panel of experts "deem" > something art, that makes it "BE" art. > > Though listers waver a great deal, I'm persuaded > they think of their dispute > as not just about whether or not to CALL something > "art" or "science". They > actually believe there is a metaphysical > fact-of-the-matter concerning whether > xxx "IS" art or yyy "IS" science. It dizzies me to > see smart people believing > that with an inaudible "pop!" a work that "was not" > art now "becomes" art -- > like, say, a new star being created in the heavens. > > And notice, the form of their argument is to summon > up what they think of as > "reasons" for believing that something IS art or > science. This implies there > are somehow mind-independent metaphysical standards > somewhere that a work must > satisfy to BE art or science. For example, some > listers feel we have to know > what the creator thought he was doing when he > created the work, what his > motivations were. Some might say that if he was just > trying to placate the gods, the > work could not BE art. Others, if told by a portrait > painter that he was just > trying to make something that looked like the > sitting subject so he could > turn a dollar, might say the painting could not then > BE art. > > Some listers talk about "bad art", but other listers > will claim that a work > is either art or rubbish, so the notion of "bad art" > is ridiculous. > > Some listers would apparently claim that nothing > could "be" art until "THE > concept" of artness, or "our current concept", was > conceived by someone -- or > does it take a community of experts to conceive of > it? Then, presumably, a > creator would have to have the aim of doing "that > thing" to have his work BE art. > The counter-assertion that there is no "THE" concept > of art -- people's notions > of it vary wildly -- consistently falls on deaf > ears. "Everyone knows what > art IS, they just have a tough time putting it into > words. In any case, there > simply is no question that art IS." > > Some years ago, Bruce Attah posted on our forum the > nine characteristics > that, he said, when manifest in a work were what > made it BE art (very like > Aristotle's muddled claim that a "thing's" > "properties" are what "make it BE what it > IS".) Attah would no doubt claim he was exposing > the metaphysical truth -- > he felt he was discerning factual stuff about the > metaphysical category/quality > of artness. But Attah's "definition" was finally > exposed as no more than his > own personal preference for certain characteristics > he wanted in works he > would CALL art. But stipulative decisions have no > ontic power. For example, Attah > insisted that to BE art an object had to be a > "thing" -- which he described as > "a hard object that can be looked at" -- that is > "made". When it was pointed > out to him that Benedetto Croce held that an "act of > art" can take place > solely in the mind -- as when an artist imagines a > painting in detail, a composer > imagines a musical work, a poet thinks up a poem > without writing it down -- > Attah was in a bind. Croce was asserting that a > notional entity can be art -- > even though there is no hard "thing" that is "made". > > Attah could say, "I don't call that art!" But that > didn't work for him > because he believed he was showing what art IS, not > simply what people variously > CALLED art. Or he could simply insist, "That's NOT > art!" and maybe stamp his foot > for emphasis. Asked "How do you know?" he would have > to be circular and say > because a work has to be a thing made. > > Confronted with someone who claimed the alleged > mind-independent quality of > "artness" and the category of all artworks, and the > quasi-Platonic "form" of > "art" were all chimeras, he would dismiss the > adversary out of hand. He'd say, > "Of course art IS!" -- just like other listers > claiming that sin IS, and > science IS. "You could look science up in the > dictionary!" You could also look up > 'angel', 'hell', and 'unicorn'. > > The most dizzying aspect of the current forum debate > is seeing smart, grown > men asserting that art IS this, and science IS that, > without ever describing > what they have in mind with either word. > > Wiliam Conger does take a couple of stabs at > describing his notion of > "science", but never his notion of "art". A long > look at William's -- or anyone's > -- notion of "science" might help listers wrap their > minds around the idea that > maybe "art" is indeed solely a notion with no > "corresponding" non-notional > entity. > > William is not alone in feeling experimentation is a > necessary element of > science: Dream up a hypothesis, then test it with an > experiment satisfying cert > ain demands of "the scientific method". But this > would push William into the > uncomfortable position of asserting that Einstein > was not doing "science" when he > came up with his special theory of relativity -- > without ever testing it > himself. Indeed no one did, since the means weren't > at hand at the time. Consider > the wrangle: "Einstein wasn't doing science. That > was cosmology." "That was > science." "Was not." "Was!" "Wasn't!" It's > breath-taking to see people believing > they are talking about an "is-ness" here, and not
