I like everything you write here (and nicely, too) except the last few sentences. I don't think museums are so free from everyday pressures and just follow their curators' aesthetic scents, no matter how odd. They respond to market pressure because the market is never fully detatched from taste or aesthetics. The question is, which interest leads, the art or the market? Since the 1960s it's been the market (contrasted by few and short lived altruistic anti-market movements that are soon enough subsumed into the market). WC
--- On Thu, 11/6/08, Michael Brady <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: Michael Brady <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: Appreciating art > To: [email protected] > Date: Thursday, November 6, 2008, 9:02 AM > On Nov 6, 2008, at 9:27 AM, William Conger wrote: > > > But another distinction remains to be queried: What > is the > > difference between like and appreciate? Is it one of > kind or one of > > degree? Does appreciate require taste (guided by > "True Docents")? Is > > liking simply a preference that may or may not involve > good taste. > > Can liking be a matter of bad taste (False Docents)? > I think these > > questions are pertinent but I'm not sure how to > answer them. I said > > earlier that I tend to agree with Gombrich's view > that "there are no > > wrong reasons for liking an artwork" (possible > paraphrase). For > > him, some liking, even bad taste or tasteless liking > was at least a > > first access to art. Perhaps he would've agreed > that it was a > > prejudice that disabled prejudice. He did think that > any liking may > > or may not be really salient to an artwork's > central or fullest > > content -- I mean with all the implications of > historical, formal, > > cultural, and personal content. > > > > My own view is that "appreciation" is very > low on the scale from > > liking to aesthetic engagement because it does not > evoke inherently > > aesthetic content even if it can be assigned such > content by True > > Docents. > > Greenberg made the distinction between liking a given work > of art and > appreciating it, that is, between having some kind of > affective > feeling for a work (liking it) and evaluating its quality > (appreciating it). Indeed, he made the point that a person > of taste > and discernment (himself) can like a small piece of kitschy > sculpture > on a side table, directly across the room from a work of > high quality > (a Newman, as I recall). > > Liking is an impulse of our emotional connection to > something and > someone; appreciation (as its etymological root suggests) > is an > evaluation of the quality of a thing. We may like a thing > for many > reasons not closely related to its artistic quality, from > nostalgia to > something in the representation you like or its size or its > materials. > > Good taste is part of the practice of appreciation, of > evaluating of > quality. The term "good taste," btw, suffers some > drive-by > condescension from critics who claim that it is merely a > habit of the > socially self-conscious, i.e., those who know and care > about whether > the shoes are Prada or not; or worse, a systematic > codification of > approved objects that culls out the less worthy (people of > bad or > pedestrian or vulgar taste) from the more worthy. You know, > like art > museums that exhibit big, ugly modern works of art and > claim that the > works are good, i.e., tasty, so that the exhibit shows how > good the > museum's tastes are to other, more prestigious museums, > while > simultaneously demonstrating to the general public that > they (the > public) lack taste if they do not like the show. > > > | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | > Michael Brady > [EMAIL PROTECTED]
