Frances to Michael with apologies for my long reply... If your excellent question is correctly understood by me, you seem to be wondering about the term "object" as to what it is, and what it may stand for, and in what capacity it may do so. In common everyday life the term "object" is often opposed to such subjects of mind as images and ideas. In pragmatist philosophy however all sensed stuff is a phenomenal object, whether it is phanerical and mystical or physical and material or psychical and mental. This can be the source of some ambiguity and irritation and confusion. It is pressing therefore when considering what might be said of an architectural object when the same object can be held as an object of art and also held as an object of science. It is not surprising however when similarly considering what might be said of a probable truth when both a fictive conditional proposition like "Sherlock Holmes was a detective working in England." and a factive categorical proposition like "Bertrand Russell was a philosopher working in England." can equally be deemed as true.
In my attempt to explain what objects are by resorting to the exploratory metaphysical findings of pragmatism, the world indirectly "seems" to be evolving as one of phenomena and then by way of seeming representation. Such phenomena as representamen that are not signs are represented to feelings as things, and then to senses as objects and then as signs of objects and then as signers of objects. If any aspect of the world is to be felt or sensed or known, whether that aspect is supernatural and ephemeral or is phenomenal and corporeal or is ethereal and extraterrestrial and spiritual, it must be done so only by way of phenomena that are representamen and that are objects and signs to signers. The mechanisms of matter and the organisms of life in the world are naturally fated to do no other. The natural aspect of the world is one of evolving phenomena. If representation occurs, such phenomena will become continuent things, and if representation further insists then such continuent phenomena may also become existent objects. All continuent phenomenal things are felt by phenomenal things as say mechanisms of matter through representation, and those things that can potentially be sensed by say organisms of life are then done so as real facts, which factuality makes things into existent phenomenal objects, and all objects are represented as signs and as signs of other objects to objects as signers. In nature, phenomenal objects have the inclined purpose to evolve in a direction as signs, and then act as signs of other objects to signers, the least of which signers and signs may be the originating object itself, and all by the fated cosmic process of telic design. Phenomenal things as represented continua are attributed by natural mechanisms of matter as pure atomic essences. Phenomenal objects as represented existentia are manifested by natural organisms of life as crude organic substances, and then if evolution takes organisms that far as say humans then the existentia will be exemplified by them as brute genetic presences. The phenomenal stuff of the world is given uncontrolled to sense, which stuff seems to be represented by sense as an ordinary phenomenal object. Any such ordinary object can further be related to sense as an extraordinary object of art or of tech or of science. It would be my guess here that some degree of knowledge would be required on the part of the signer to be aware of these phenomenal relations. The stuff of the whole wide world is thus sensed in each particular instance as being an ordinary object. An object found to be known of art is one that likely has the power in its form to become an extraordinary object. Art is also preparatory to tech. An object held to be known of tech is one that likely has the power in its fact to belong with an extraordinary object. Tech is also contributory to science. An object deemed to be known of science is one that likely has the power in its force to behave as an extraordinary object. Science is also consummatory of tech and art. As an extraordinary object of art, the form of the architectural object must clearly do something that the form of any other ordinary object fails to do or do as well. Its form must have some unique force, such as in predicting a reasonable purpose for its function. Architecture as an extraordinary aesthetical object of art is one emotionally felt to be represented with the formal power to reflect worthy values and to evoke intense responses. The feeling is one likely derived from perceptual sentience and experience. As an extraordinary object of science, the test of the architectural object must clearly do something that the test of any other ordinary object fails to do or do as well. Its test must have some unique result, such as in predicting a reasonable reason for its function. Any good object suspected of being like architecture can be used as a represented inductive sample upon which to conduct empirical tests with tools in labs under controls so as to get some true results, such as what might make similar objects architecture. Architecture as an extraordinary logical object of science is one intellectually known to be represented with the instrumental power to reveal worthy truths and to validate reasonable realities. The knowledge is one likely derived from conceptual inference and intelligence. If the same architectural object is to be an object of either art or science, then it will also likely be held as an epistemic object of knowledge, because any learned expert must think and know to some degree that the object is of art or science. The epistemic method for determining the object as art would be the normative science of aesthetics. The epistemic method for determining the object as science would be the normative science of logics. It is my guess that the aesthetical knowledge of the architectural object being art would be mainly perceptual knowledge, which entails at least sentience and experience. It is my further guess that the logical knowledge of the architectural object being science would be mainly conceptual knowledge, which entails at least inference and intelligence. You wrote... Frances: "...addresses architecture as an object of science, and not as an object of art..." What are the differences that you discern between these two, art and science, particularly when you speak of architecture being an "object" of one or the other?
