In light of what is  often presented as Modernisms demonstration that there
is no clearly defined class of objects that might be identified as art, it
seems reasonable to accept the proposition that art is an  assemblage of
contradictory elements which simultaneously come to exist as a category, a
practice, and a concept.  Reciprocally, these come to be the subject of
various  be an analytic tools and disciplines seeking to  generate  and
substantiate varied bodies of  knowledge. The un-bounding (de-historization/
de-regulation) of art (and culture) creates an environment in which the minor,
anti-authoritarian discourses associated with dada, Surrealism, Futurism and
Constructivism concerning  how art and aesthetics  have been used to advance
the view that  art may be used as a mode of social -engagement: as a  means
for the reformation of both tacit and social knowledge.  This intent  was
represented  as a means  to re-establish  art's specificity of purpose if not
form, by advancing art (now thought of as a practice) and critical culture per
se, as constituting a  socio-cultural laboratory in which an endless array of
differing concepts, experiences and point of views could be synthesized,
combined, realized, or tested. To advance this view of art,  it was necessary
to abandon the either/ or logic of positivism in which one term needs to
succumb to the other the Derridean notion of deference (differentiation and
deferral) such oppositions are now understood as forming co-existent
frameworks came to be implicitly, embraced and with it emerged notions of
fluidity, indeterminacy, and multi-disciplinarity.

Consequently, within the frame of post-Modernisms explicit conceptualization
of the practices of art  and its making, the opposition between conceptual
(general) and material (specific) no longer seemed relevant because the
ontological status of an artwork no longer tended to be bound to the
particular ways it maybe interpreted (Danto). As such it is no longer
necessary to differentiate art as being either an objects that produces
special experiences (as in Kantian and phenomenological aesthetics), or as a
particular system of symbolic representations (as in Hegel, Cassirer, and
Goodman.) Likewise, the assertion that works of art are received in a purely
subjective manner (as Hume suggests) can no longer be thought to providing an
objective. Reciprocally, by expanding the conceptions of both critical
analysis and subjective interpretation, the primarily affect of modernisms
assault upon a traditional positivist understanding of language,
communication, and aesthetics in the context of art resulted in a
comprehension of the disjunction between art as signifier and signified as
consequence of the necessary differences and consequential tensions that exist
between medium and message, form and content.

The further dismantling of dichotomies, and the reconciliations of differences
gave further impetus to the ongoing attempt to determine what role art may
play in a secular culture committed to abandoning metaphysics and ideology.
The acceptance of this approach within modernism lead to an acceptance of the
work of art as a conflicted self resulted in arts thematization, and
schematization of art itself. Within late Modernism, these views were used to
re-address the notion that art could be employed as a means to provide a
corrective to instrumentality by reflecting upon and transforming our logics
(as Merleau-Ponty and Adorno argue). As such art came to thought to be
essential for the education of sensibility and judgment (as advanced by Dewey)
and because it is playful in character (Gadamer) representing an open-ended
process that cannot be contained (Derrida) within our increasingly
instrumental society art. Given these qualities art preserves just enough
autonomy so that it by it very nature it may be thought of as having a
genuinely political dimension and at times serve as a tool of subversion
(Benjamin, Rancihre). In this context, its effable and emergent forms and
content is therefore is projected as being capable of supplying a basis for
historical and cultural identities (in Hegels sense of being reflective of
that domain within which we recognize the self.)
Sent: Monday, May 24, 2010 9:51 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: "I regret that, in our attempt to establish some standards, we
didn't  make them stick. We couldn't find a way to pass them on to another
generation, really."

This presumed split shows up in such terms as skilled and
deskilled, suggesting that the traditional art practice of acquiring skills
in, say, drawing from nature (extracting art from nature)  contrasts with the
view that since art is an idea about nature (awareness of cultural projection
of art)  it does not need the filter -- and thus the distortion --of drawing
skills.  This has even led to the elimination of
 skill-based teaching in art schools -- perceptual drawing for instance.  To
me this reveals the fakery of so much modernist-postmodernist art theory.

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