In a message dated 1/20/11 12:31:48 AM, [email protected] writes:
> Have you read Roy Harris? I'd love to read your specific critique of his > theory > (best source is his Signs, Language, Communication). > I have read Harris, though not volumes of him. You may recall I posted this back Oct 1, 2010; "From what you say, it's certainly true that Roy Harris and I have certain beliefs in common. But what put me off back then was his own summary of "Integrationism", which you can find at "http://www.royharrisonline.com/integrational_linguistics/integrationism_int roduction.html" I confess I'd now have to reread that piece to be specific about why I was convinced he has it wrong. I'm not unwilling to do that, but fitting it in is the problem. Perhaps another word about what my own position is will indicate to you -- who is much more familiar with Harris -- where he and I depart, So: You write: " Re Parthenon, what about "my Parthenon"? Together with the historic Parthenon on the Acropolis, that makes a nest of two." Granted, they may be treated as part of a single nesting doll., even though the "actual" physical, material, Parthenon in Athens is distinct from your notion. Indeed, to the extent that "material" and "notional" entities are quite different "sorts", your notion and the material structure are not even of the same "sort". The material iron structure in Paris that we call the 'Eiffel Tower' we might conversationally say is the same "sort" of entity as the material Parthenon. (Also granted: I am here assuming that notion -- "consciousness" -- is not material. I concede there is a physicalist view that denies my dualistic one. In any case, none of that affects the argument here.) Going back to my "nesting doll" analogy, let's start with the word 'Parthenon'. The doll inside it is our mental image, our notion, of the Parthenon. We don't get many dolls inward before we are directed to the material Parthenon in Athens, which is not a word and not a notion. To "make sense of" our notion, we can do no better than point at the physical thing. (This puts aside such questions as, "How about that rocky debris on the ground, stuff fallen from its roof, is that part of the Parthenon?" -- questions that stem from the confusion that "is" brings into our minds.) I also summoned up the metaphorical term 'facade'. The storefronts on a Hollywood western are mere facades -- there is nothing behind them. My claim is that many, many terms in philosophy are "facade words". For examples, below each of the outer doll of words like 'denote', 'names' 'meaning', 'referent', etc, you find another doll -- but it's also made of words. Take the notion of 'having'. Consider "I have money in the bank." Allegedly there is somewhere an entity that is the action of "having". You believe that, if you go deeply enough into the nesting doll of 'having', you will finally arrive at an action-entity that is "having". But you won't. If you pursue that action of "having money in the bank", you will penultimately arrive at a description of what the bank will do if you go there to withdraw money. They will give you cash. But, you may say, they wouldn't do that unless you "have" money there. But in effect that's ignoring the objection, which is: you haven't identified the alleged action of "having". It's a chimera, just as 'own', 'possess', and 'belong to' are. Pursue them and you will end up with a kind of operational definition. The events indicated in the definition may not be chimerical: the teller will indeed give you cash. But the action of "having" that cash, of "owning" it, can never, let's call it, be pointed at. "But I have it in my pocket!" doesn't work. Only some other "real" actions can be pointed at. I'll agree here that actions and objects are entities. If by going deeply enough within the nesting doll of any word, we finally arrive at an action or object that we all can agree to "call" by the word, I'll be sastisfied with not terming it a facade word. (Again I put aside an occasion for confusion. When we delve into the "dolls" of the word 'Parthenon', we end up pointing at a material object in Athens. But then we usually err by saying the likes of, "That IS the Parthenon." No. Push now into the word 'is' there, and you find no "is-action". You do find that most of us CALL that material structure "Parthenon", but the alleged action of "being" the Parthenon is a chimera.) You add: "Now how many others? Millions? As a sign, the word Parthenon requires a context to know which "nested doll word" is appropriate." Some of the facade words there are 'sign', 'know', 'is' and 'appropriate'. If we count every language in the world, there may indeed be millions -- of facade words. For example, if you delve into the nesting doll, the outer doll of which is the word 'appropriate', you will end up with one of many arbitrary stipulative operational definitions, all of which are of the form, "I call something 'appropriate' when..." Or, rather, I hope you do. To claim, "Something IS appropriate when..." would be a mistake.
