Derrida spent his life dealing with this issue. wc
----- Original Message ---- From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Sent: Tue, March 27, 2012 2:55:26 PM Subject: Re: Nominalism There's much to be said about Forster's book on Peirce's rejection of what Peirce conceived of as "nominalism" but (as our listers will be happy to hear) there isn't room for it here. I'll settle for saying that my view, which you call "nominalism", is obviously unlike anything Peirce had in mind when he thought he was refuting "nominalism". Long ago on this forum I explained that all notion is indeterminate, indefinite, multiplex and transitory. Peirce never came close to wrapping his mind around this 21st century conception of consciousness. He ascribes to "nominalism" notions of "cognitive content", "continuity", "points", "meanings", "denotation", "truth", "knowledge", "correspondence, coherence, consensus, and instrumental reliability", "exact laws of nature", and more -- all of which are denied or obviated by my IIMT description and my more recent postings that, for example, deny there are any mind-independent "meanings". Granted, Peirce would say my position must be wrong because it in effect denies there are such things as absolute "moral truths" (or "categories" etc.) which Peirce, in his 19th century way, wanted to "prove". You may also recall, Frances, that a couple of years ago I suggested a term, "notionalism", that I felt was more accurately descriptive of my position than "nominalism".
