Michael writes:

"Cheerskep, I don't think that in the years we have all been discussing 
this
general topic that you have addressed that tertium quid, that entity that
exists between the speaker and the listener, or more accurately, between 
the
speaker's mind and the listener's mind. You have continually focused on the
NISH (notion in someone's head) and given practically no attention to how 
that
is conveyed between parties. You just declare that an Andean shepherd said
"Cleopatra" and the remote western Chinese guy thought of foopgoom."

Okay, here's how it works. When you hear any sound, this pullulating lump 
of links retrieves its unruly associations with the sound. You'll recall my 
bit about learning some Swedish. Imagine I'm holding up and apple, displaying 
it. I say:

"Apelsin! [AH-pell-see-in] Apelsin! Apelsin!"

 An hour from now, if I say "apelsin", you'll connect the sound with the 
apple-image you just stored in your head. You'd say you've learned   "the 
meaning of" a Swedish word. Language-learning is always like that. Say "Milk!" 
to a girl every time you give her a glass of the white stuff, and she'll 
recall the white stuff whenever she hears "Milk".

You'd probably say that's obvious. What's less obvious is this: You've just 
explained the "learning of a word" entirely in terms of a sound and an 
associated memory. No alleged mind-independent "real meanings" are required -- 
to account for what goes on when we learn to talk -- and then talk. 

I'm saying words don't have intrinsic meanings. I'm not the first guy to 
say that -- but those others -- they were crackpots. Now a confession. I 
tricked you: When you say "Apelsin!" to most Swedes, the image that comes to 
their
 minds is not of an apple -- it's the image of an orange! I misled -- not 
about imaginary entities called "meanings", only about the conditioned 
workings of most Swedish minds.

You've been misled about this all your life. You've been told you learn 
"meanings". You don't. You've been told a definition is a "statement of a 
meaning". It isn't. Wittgenstein said the meaning of a word is "its use" by the 
people in a given language-community. But this implies they all associate the 
same notions with a given word. They can't. Their notions are as dissimilar 
as their varying brains and experiences.

Oh? Then how come we understand one another so much when we talk?

That's because our talk-sounds often work well enough -- in the kitchen, on 
a ball field or a battlefield. Because we all link simple sounds like Milk! 
Run! Shoot! with similar raw sensations. But philosophy, politics, religion 
-- when we hear their psychedelic sounds -- 'freedom', 'art', 'salvation', 
'understanding', 'meaning' -- we conjure notions that are abstract, fuzzy, 
and various.

I suppose we could say that your "tertium quid" is shared experience 
associated with a given "word". (But since "shared" experience is never quite 
identical, what comes to our minds when we thereafter hear again a "word" - 
even 
one that we recently "learned" together -- will never be quite identical.)

As for my confusing Cleopatra with foopgoom in Xinjian province, I take it 
you're saying I should brush up on my Mandarin and Uyghur. I'll put that on 
my to-don't 
list.

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