I think it would be exciting of Chuck Macenski’s email address all of a sudden was a Mimosa domain....
From: Chuck Macenski Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 12:36 PM To: af@afmug.com Subject: Re: [AFMUG] UBNT CPE being used for Abusive actions? I don't mean to be touchy about it, but, if I had a quarter for every time someone said "I had this nano-station 5 years ago that had this issue they fixed in software so you must have that issue too", I'd have a lot of quarters. Maybe not enough to buy a Tesla, but, a lot of quarters... On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 1:26 PM, Josh Baird <joshba...@gmail.com> wrote: Um, well, airFiber IS a Ubiquiti product, so it's not that stupid. They may run different operating systems, be designed by different teams and have different feature sets, but it still says Ubiquiti on it. On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 11:17 AM, Chuck Macenski <ch...@macenski.com> wrote: I hate it when people lump airFiber into these things. I know of no security holes in airFiber that don't require you to already be logged into the unit (where you can change the configuration until your heart's content). AirFiber also supports a very simple to configure management VLAN (I don't know how it could be simpler) to keep inband managment traffic away from the IP of the unit. If that isn't enough, you can simply disable inband management and use the out-of-band management port; no one can then access the management traffic from the user traffic flows. Good morning :) Chuck On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 11:39 PM, Mathew Howard <mhoward...@gmail.com> wrote: 5.6.2, I think, fixed one of them more serious security flaws, and that was released less than a year ago... and it looks like 5.6.3 and 5.6.4 (which was released very recently) also had security fixes. I believe most of those vulnerabilities applied to the AC and airFiber firmware as well. Ubiquiti has been good about releasing fixes quickly when they find vulnerabilities, but that doesn't help if nobody bothers to update anything. On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 9:12 PM, Eric Kuhnke <eric.kuh...@gmail.com> wrote: I know about the very old firmware version for M series stuff that is vulnerable to a known worm. But let's assume you do have ubnt devices with public IPs (which is a bad idea). What's the attack surface? http, https, ssh, snmp Provided you have chosen a reasonably complex admin login and password there are no current, known remote root exploits for current (or within the past 2 years) ubnt firmware on M or AC devices, right? On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 7:00 PM, Josh Luthman <j...@imaginenetworksllc.com> wrote: Public IP on Ubnt. What else do you need to know? Josh Luthman Office: 937-552-2340 Direct: 937-552-2343 1100 Wayne St Suite 1337 Troy, OH 45373 On May 4, 2016 9:59 PM, "Eric Kuhnke" <eric.kuh...@gmail.com> wrote: The thread got this far and noone has wondered how the CPE was pwned in the first place? On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 6:55 PM, Mathew Howard <mhoward...@gmail.com> wrote: Yeah, I looked at setting it up that way at one point, but something didn't look like it was going to work quite the way I wanted it to... but I probably spent all of five minutes on it, so it may very well be possible. The way ePMP does it is really nice though... and simple. On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 8:38 PM, Josh Luthman <j...@imaginenetworksllc.com> wrote: People do it for sure. I want to say there was an example on the forums or some where... Josh Luthman Office: 937-552-2340 Direct: 937-552-2343 1100 Wayne St Suite 1337 Troy, OH 45373 On May 4, 2016 9:35 PM, "Mathew Howard" <mhoward...@gmail.com> wrote: I have our ePMP's setup to get their public IP via PPPoE, and the radio also gets a completely separate private management IP via DHCP, which is the only way you can remotely access the radio, and it doesn't even have to be in a separate vlan unless you want it to be... and it's one checkbox to configure it. I'm not sure if that can be duplicated on UBNT or not, since I haven't really tried yet, but at the very least it's a lot more complicated to configure. On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 7:04 PM, Josh Luthman <j...@imaginenetworksllc.com> wrote: It does...you just need to set it up that way. Josh Luthman Office: 937-552-2340 Direct: 937-552-2343 1100 Wayne St Suite 1337 Troy, OH 45373 On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 7:54 PM, Mathew Howard <mhoward...@gmail.com> wrote: I really wish Ubiquiti radios had a separate management vlan option (in router mode), like ePMP does... On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 6:10 PM, Josh Reynolds <j...@kyneticwifi.com> wrote: I would encourage you to put your CPEs on a management vlan, in RFC1918 space. On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 6:00 PM, SmarterBroadband <li...@smarterbroadband.com> wrote: > Hi Tushar > > > > We run all radios in NAT mode. > > > > Adam > > > > From: Af [mailto:af-boun...@afmug.com] On Behalf Of Tushar Patel > Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2016 3:34 PM > To: af@afmug.com > Subject: Re: [AFMUG] UBNT CPE being used for Abusive actions? > > > > Radios could be put on private ip so nobody from outside world can access > it. That is what we do. > > Tushar > > > > > On May 4, 2016, at 5:22 PM, SmarterBroadband <li...@smarterbroadband.com> > wrote: > > I have received a number of emails for ab...@light-gap.net saying certain of > our IP address are being used for attacks (see email text below). > > > > All IP addresses are in UBNT radios. We are unable to remote access any of > the these radios now. We see that the radio we are unable to access > rebooted a couple of days ago. A number of other radios show they rebooted > around the same time (in sequence) on the AP. We are unable to remote > access any of those either. Other radios with longer uptime on the AP’s are > fine. > > > > We have a tech on route to one of the customer sites. > > > > We think the radios are being made into bots. Anyone seen this or anything > like this? Do the hackers need a username and password to hack a radio? > I.E. Would a change of the password stop the changes being made to the > radios? Any other thoughts, suggestions or ideas? > > > > Thanks > > > > Adam > > > > Email Text below: > > > > “This is a semi-automated e-mail from the LG-Mailproxy authentication > system, all requests have been approved manually by the > system-administrators or are obviously unwanted (eg. requests to our > spamtraps). > > For further questions or if additional information is needed please reply to > this email. > > > > The IP xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx has been banned for 48 hours due to suspicious > behaviour on our system. > > This happened already 1 times. > > It might be be part of a botnet, infected by a trojan/virus or running > brute-force attacks. > > > > Our affected destination servers: smtp.light-gap.net, imap.light-gap.net > > > > Currently 7 failed/unauthorized logins attempts via SMTP/IMAP with 6 > different usernames and wrong password: > > 2016-05-04T23:48:40+02:00 with username "downloads.openscience.or.at" > (spamtrap account) > > 2016-05-04T22:47:19+02:00 with username "sp_woq" (spamtrap account) > > 2016-05-04T14:55:11+02:00 with username "info" (spamtrap account) > > 2016-05-03T21:24:22+02:00 with username "fips" (spamtrap account) > > 2016-05-03T20:57:19+02:00 with username "downloads.openscience.or.at" > (spamtrap account) > > 2016-05-03T10:13:59+02:00 with username "d10hw49WpH" (spamtrap account) > > 2016-05-03T05:34:43+02:00 with username "12345678" (spamtrap account) > Ongoing failed/unauthorized logins attempts will be logged and sent to you > every 24h until the IP will be permanently banned from our systems after 72 > hours. > > > > The Light-Gap.net Abuse Team.” > >