On Fri, Jun 13, 2008 at 10:36 AM, ihope <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Tue, Jun 10, 2008 at 12:23 PM, Ian Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> It doesn't need to use the word "MAY" specifically. The definition of >> "MAY" from R2152 is, "Performing the described action does not violate >> the rule in question." So if performing the action in question does >> not violate R101 -- on which point R101 is explicit -- then the person >> in question MAY perform it. > > Sure, but "explicitly state". I don't remember where that phrase came > from, but my argument uses it. There's also my other argument for > FALSE.
It does explicitly state it, but using synonymous terminology, which per R754 (which has precedence over R2125) should be fine. "Be it hereby proclaimed that no binding agreement or interpretation of Agoran law may abridge, reduce, limit, or remove a person's defined rights." "Every player has the right to perform an action which is not regulated." What's not explicit about that? >> I think this is a false dichotomy. For example, take this sentence >> from R2019, which structurally appears to fall into your first >> category: "An asset whose backing document is not a rule generally >> CAN be created by its recordkeepor by announcement, subject to >> modification by its backing document." Or similarly, from R2019: "The >> Wielder of Veto CAN veto an ordinary decision in its voting >> period...." Do you mean to suggest that asset creation and veto are >> not regulated by R2125(c)? (Note they may still be regulated by >> R2125(e), but that is beside the point.) > > Yep. The first of those is regulated by R2125(e), so being regulated > by R2125(c) isn't necessary, in addition to that other point I made. I > guess the second isn't actually regulated at all (except perhaps by > R2125(e)), but it is only the Wielder of Veto vetoing an ordinary > decision in its voting period that causes the decision to have a > higher quorum. So actually, I suppose anybody can veto anything, but > it usually has no effect. This seems like an even bigger stretch than my interpretation. The fact of whether a statement with a temporal condition can be worded so as to avoid using the word "while" or its synonyms has no bearing whatsoever on whether the the condition actually exists. Rather, what your criteria actually appears to discern whether the condition is dependent upon some external entity or not. For example, compare the sentence "Horses with no broken legs can race" to "Horses can race if no horse has broken legs". Both are conditional upon the same criterion -- existence of broken legs -- but the first depends only on the individual's legs while the second less permissively depends upon all horses' legs. Yet you would categorize the second as imposing regulation and the first as not. Since this appears to be nonsensical, I intend to appeal the judgement in CFJ 1989 with two support. -root
