Judgement in CFJ 2302: The text of the agreement in question reads in part: > Warrigal can join this contract if and only if the Riemann > hypothesis is false. followed by Warrigal's attempt to join this contest by announcement.
If the phrase above were in the Rules, it would indeed set up an undecidable condition and a paradox. The rules, by being unlimited in scope (R2141/2) are able to set a legal conditional contingent on wholly unknown and or unknowable "truths" without worrying or caring whether the truth of the matter can be practically resolved. On the other hand, if the phrase were used as part of a player's conditional announcement "I give Goethe 3 coins if the Riemann hypothesis is false", it would fail. Except for the case of conditional votes which are explicitly regulated, conditional action announcements are a courtesy of Agoran custom and not Rule, similar to "I do X N times". In these, the conditional is allowed to succeed if resolving it does not cause undue burden. In particular, CFJ 1460 specifically cites a Riemann Hypothesis conditional as an example of a failed (i.e. wholly thrown out) communication attempt. So, if the phrase is part of a contract, is it more like a Rule or a player's statement? It is in fact somewhere in between. In particular, while the text of a contract is judicable as a logical and legal construct, the Rules do not grant contracts the same broad ability to set game conditions on par with R2141/2. The fact that R1742/17 defines a contract as simply "agreement between one or more persons" suggests that, in general, agreements cover the sorts of things that players generally can do, and do not extend to the full scope of what rules can do. Also, it is for the good of the game, where the rules are silent, to assume that while the Rules may delegate their unlimited scope to sub-documents such as contracts, that such delegation must be relatively specific and not automatic, and a mere statement that agreements can be created and be binding does not make such agreements on par with rules in their ability to define reality. Overall, for the purposes of interpreting this CFJ, the contract+join attempt has more in common with players communicating (joint) action attempts than it has in common with Rules. Therefore, this court finds that by attempting to agree to this contract clause, Warrigal+contract together is communicating to the Agoran courts/Agora as a whole: "I join this contract iff the Riemann hypothesis is false". It is reasonable to extend the precedent of CFJ 1460, covering single statements that directly contain unreasonably difficult conditionals, to a conditional that's in part due to Warrigal's statement and in part contained in a contract. As a whole, Warrigal fails to reasonably communicate an action due to the difficulty of resolving the conditional, and so the action of joining fails. Therefore, as Warrigal is not constrained by the contract, it is TRUE that e may transfer assets. -Goethe
