> ============================== CFJ 2632 ============================== > > The Conductor CAN publish a self-ratifying report. > > ========================================================================
The key question is whether the "'SHALL do X by mechanism Y' implies 'CAN do X by mechanism Y and SHALL do X'" precedent applies here. For succinctness, at the risk of creating a new fallacy, I will refer to this precedent as ISTIC (I Shall Therefore I Can). ISTIC functions by empowering an otherwise ordinary public message. What would otherwise be simply a player publishing "I do X" instead becomes an instance of the player doing X. It grants the substance of legal fiction to mere text. Consider the hypothetical rule-text "The Conductor SHALL publish a report." Clearly ISTIC applies here; the Conductor publishes a document claiming to be a report, and the rule confers reporthood upon that document, with all the Rule-defined consequences that derive from it (e.g., whether the Conductor receives a salary). I see no fundamental difference of type between the state of being a report and the state of being self-ratifying. Both are properties of a document defined by the rules, and existing wholly as legal fictions. I can conceive of no reasonable standard by which ISTIC should apply to one and not to the other. Therefore, I judge CFJ 2632 TRUE. Pavitra
