The crux of the matter in CFJ 3407 is whether or not (the purported) Rule
2426 is a mechanism for judicial determinations, and is hence prevented
from being enacted by (2) in the last paragraph of Rule 217.
Rule 217 states:
Rules to the contrary notwithstanding, any rule change that
would (1) prevent a person from initiating a formal process to
resolve matters of controversy, in the reasonable expectation
that the controversy will thereby be resolved; or (2) prevent a
person from causing formal reconsideration of any judicial
determination that e should be punished, is wholly void and
without effect.
An argument could be made that Rule 217 merely prevents the enactment of
rules that prevent reconsideration where such reconsideration would
otherwise permitted. This seems weak, however. An alternate interpretation
is that any rule change which would present a situation where a person had
been punished (or more accurately, where the judicial determination had
been made that e should be punished) and was unable to cause formal
reconsideration of it. This interpretation seems more in keeping with the
intent, and not at odds with the formal wording, and therefore it is the
Court's opinion that it ought to prevail.
There thus remain two questions: a) does Rule 2426 present a mechanism for
judicial determinations and b) does there exist a mechanism for formal
reconsideration?
Turning first to b), it is apparent that there is no direct mechanism in
the rules. H. Goethe notes that, in the past, persons have been compensated
for an overbearing justice system by a proposal to do so. While this is
definitely a possibility, e indicates e is not sure whether this ought to
constitute reconsideration.
To resolve this issue, the Court will look to the modern system of
government and specifically to the separation of powers. In many ways,
Agora reflects this system, and as it aspires to be a successful
civilization for at least some definition of the word, it is worth
referring to. Many modern democracies have as a fundamental precept the
separation of powers. The legislative, judicial, and executive functions of
the government are split up, and each of the branches exercises some unique
authority that the others may not access. While, in some frameworks, the
separations are stronger and better defined than in others, even when an
individual performs roles in the multiple branches, those roles must be
defined, and an action can be taken only through the appropriate power.
In Agora's case, the three powers remain generally distinct. The
legislation of proposals is carried out by officers, the executive, and the
judges adjudicate disputes. While occasionally there is bleed---such as the
Clerk of the Courts administering default judgments in appeals---the three
functions have tended to remain quite distinct. Even though players may and
often do participate in all three, they almost never do so
simultaneously---as an aside, it is regrettable that participating in none
of these appears to be the preferred state of most Agoran players.
As such, it stands to reason that a proposal is not a judicial mechanism at
all. This does not, alone, exclude it from being considered as
"reconsideration" of the judicial determination. Again, however, we can
turn to a long-standing principle of English law, which finds itself
replicated across the globe and even in Agoran law. This principle is that
legislation never acts retroactively. If a judicial determination is made
to some effect, then it can be corrected or changed by new legislation, but
that only applies from the moment of its enactment forward. In Agora, this
principle is reflected in a number of ways, the strongest being the
peculiar mechanism of ratification: it does not retroactively adjust the
game state, but rather, when a document is ratified, the gamestate is
adjusted to what it would have been had the document been true. The history
is preserved.
The Court would like to be able to say that this principle applies directly
in all aspects of the Agoran judiciary, but it does not. Where the game
entertains persistent state related to a determination, that state could be
altered by proposal. A proposal could be made, for instance, assigning a
new judgment to a court case, which can hardly be described as anything but
entertaining a change of the judgment by the legislative body, and hence
the legislature would be in effect reconsidering the judgment. In the
history of the Agoran criminal law, this may or may not have had an effect
on the actual punishment imposed by the judgment, but this is moot in the
present situation---Rule 217 cares only about the determination.
Having established that a proposal can indeed cause a reconsideration, the
present case must be addressed. The act of issuing a card creates no
persistent game state other than its punishment, and as discussed above,
alleviating the punishment does not alone alter the determination. Thus it
must be concluded that there is no mechanism to reconsider the
determination of the Referee that leads em to
At this point, the Court would like to turn to the established precedent of
the Fédération Internationale de Football Association, and encourage all
players to fake injuries and pretend to be seriously offended by actions
which, if perceived from a great distance away by someone not paying close
attention to them, appear to be violations of the rules even though they
actually aren't. The Referee is equally encouraged not to attempt to
determine if the rules were actually violated when issuing Cards.
The final aspect of the case at hand is whether or not Cards represent a
judicial determination. In approaching this, there are many factors at
play. First, the Referee is not bound to consult anyone or even to offer
the opportunity for a defence to the individual who will receive the card.
Second, the Referee is not bound to determine or investigate whether the
rules have been violated and is only required to act on belief. This allows
for a "Shoot first, ask questions later." approach from the holder of that
office. Third, this is quite possibly the sort shenanigans up with which
Rule 217 will not put. Fourth, the Referee's lack of process, odd
incentives, and curious restrictions would offend anyone who suggested that
it was at all a system of justice. Fifth, the occurrences of the word
"judicial" and "justice" in the rules tend to suggest that all judicial
matters are under the purview of the Arbitor and the CFJ system.
The Referee therefore appears to the Court to be less akin to a judicial
mechanism than an administrative one. The Referee is an officer, which by
Agoran practice is generally an executive matter, and eir determinations
lack many of the characteristics commonly associated with a successful
justice system, or indeed any justice system whatsoever.
The matter is fully resolved, however, by considering the definition of the
word "just", from which "judicial" is derived. The inimitable Oxford
English Dictionary lists as a definition---and this is certainly the
appropriate definition when we speak of justice---"Consonant with
principles of moral right or of equity; righteous; equitable; fair. Of a
reward, punishment, etc.: deserved, merited;"
The Referee's Cards bear little resemblance on the face to a system of
resolving disputes that is just. On the face of it, the various cards have
guidelines as to their use, but, reading between the lines, the Referee is
not even ENCOURAGED to follow them. There is little in Rule 2426 to
indicate that the Referee is expected at all to be just in eir work.
Accordingly the Court finds that Rule 217 was not engaged in the enactment
of Rule 2426, and therefore assigns to CFJ 3407 a judgment of FALSE.
-R. H. scshunt, Prime Minister
