I submit the following thesis, entitled "On Conditional Votes and Trust
Tokens":

TL;DR (aka abstract): Conditional votes work, but with two caveats. First,
they operate prospectively and, when cast, their value is determined by
looking into the future to the end of the voting period. Hence, they are
indeterminate. Second, the default of PRESENT does not work at all, meaning
that the validity of a conditional vote is also indeterminate. Also, CFJ
3569 is FALSE because Trust Token endorsement must be direct.

This thesis and judgment is written as a reconsideration of CFJ 3569. The
statement of the CFJ is "If grok had not deregistered, e would have issued
trust tokens to both Aris and G. by eir vote on Proposal 7899."

The context of the CFJ is as follows: grok voted :Endorse Aris" on proposal
7899, but Aris's vote was "Endorse the Arbitor". G. was the Arbitor at the
end of the voting period. In effect, the CFJ is asking whether grok's
endorsement was effective of endorsing G. as well for the purpose of Rule
2452.

I originally judged CFJ 3569 to be FALSE, finding that Rule 683's condition
requiring that a "valid vote" be clearly indicate meant that conditional
votes failed altogether; since a conditional vote does not clearly indicate
a single valid vote. A number of arguments were raised in response, leading
to a Motion to Reconsider. I will summarize the critical arguments below:

>From G.:

- The judgment cited precedent that the correctness of a ballot is
evaluated at the time of its submission, but did not specify which
precedent, most precedent being around informally conditional actions (e.g.
"if I own an X, I do Y with it")
- Rule 2127 is explicitly intended to define the effect of conditionals and
get around the usual definition, by defining what "clearly specified" means
in the context of a vote. This could operate either by deferral of the
determination of clearly specified, or by operating retroactively.
- Even in absence of the above effects, Rule 2127's default of PRESENT
would apply to a ballot cast conditionally, so that such a ballot is at
least evaluated in the instant to PRESENT.

>From myself:
- If Rule 2127 had retroactive effect, then it would create the possibility
of retroactively changing the outcome of another proposal, by making a vote
conditional on a vote on a different proposal; if the latter was a
conditional then retroactively changing it could also retroactively change
the first vote. From this, paradox could arise.

>From Aris:
- Present conditionals are well-understood to succeed, under the general
built-up framework of interpreting conditional actions, as such a
conditional always identifies a vote.
- A ballot is a textual entity, containing a conditional that should be
evaluated when the ballot is evaluated, i.e. when the decision is resolved.
The ballot is merely a notice of something in the future.

To begin, I will first point to Rule 217, which states "When interpreting
and applying the rules, the text of the rules takes precedence. Where the
text is silent, inconsistent, or unclear, it is to be augmented by game
custom, common sense, past judgements, and consideration of the best
interests of the game." In regards to contiditional votes, it is clear that
all of the augmenting factors point to conditional votes functioning in
some fashion: game custom certainly establishes that they do, as do the
best interests of the game. Past judgments on conditional voting are in
line with them functioning at all, and common sense (into which one can
likely subsume legal principles of statutory interpretation) imply that
Rule 2127 (the rule defining conditional votes) would not exist if it did
not have some purpose.

So the question then is, what does the text of the rules state? CFJ 3465 is
the strongest precedent I am aware of regarding ballot evaluation. In it, I
successfully argued to the H. Judge nichdel that the correctness (note:
this is distinct from validity) of a ballot was evaluated at the time of
its submission.

I will reiterate the critical arguments here. Rule 683 states "An entity
submits a ballot on an Agoran decision by publishing a notice satisfying
the following conditions:" followed by a list of conditions. The term
"notice" is, in this context, undefined by the rules. Per usual English
interpretation, in this context, "notice" simply means a document.

Rule 683 is clear that the mechanism to submit a ballot is to publish the
notice. Publishing is defined by Rule 478 as sending a public message. It
follows that if, at the time of publication, the notice does not satisfy
the conditions set out in Rule 683, no ballot is submitted. The fact that
the notice may later satisfy the conditions is immaterial, as the notice is
not being published at that point.

So can conditional votes generally satisfy the conditions? The condition at
issue is "4. The ballot clearly identifies a valid vote, as determined by
the voting method." The definition of valid vote was discussed at length in
my previous reasons, and I will not discuss them here. Absent confounding
factors, then, it would be clear that the published notice must indeed
identify a valid vote. I do agree with Aris's arguments that the general
rules regarding conditional actions apply here. There is nothing
disallowing a notice which is conditional, at the time of its publication;
assuming the conditional is effective per the precedents on conditional
actions, such a notice does identify a valid vote once the conditional is
resolved.

Rule 2127 is, however, a confounding factor. As G. argued, it is clearly
intended to get around the usual way that conditionals can act only in the
present, and instead creates a form of future-conditional vote. Note that I
must at this point reject Aris's argument that a conditional vote is
evaluated at the time of the decision's resolution. Rule 2127 is explicit
that the conditional is evaluated at the end of the voting period, and
there is nothing in the rules or game custom to contend otherwise.

As G. noted in eir arguments, Rule 2127 states "If a vote on an Agoran
decision <https://agoranomic.org/ruleset/#Rule693> is submitted
conditionally (e.g. "FOR if <X> is true, otherwise AGAINST"), then the
selected option is evaluated based on the value of the condition(s) at the
end of the voting period, and, rules to the contrary notwithstanding, is
clearly specified if and only if the value of the condition(s) is/are
determinate at the end of the voting period. If the option cannot be
clearly identified, a vote of PRESENT is cast." Of note is the fact that it
explicitly attempts to take precedence over other rules (including 683) to
define that "the selected option... is clearly specified" under the
circumstances it provides when a conditional vote is made.

Does this apply to condition 4? After reexamining the circumstances, it
appears to me that the answer is yes. While the language used is slightly
different (option vs vote, clearly indicated vs clearly specified), and
while some of those terms are terms of art within the rules, none is
explicitly defined, so there is some leeway in interpretation here. Note
also that 2127 itself uses "clearly identified" in the following sentence,
indicating some looseness in terminology. In my original judgment, I had
not considered this line of text in the way that G.'s arguments encouraged,
and this represents the critical change in my reasoning.

Unfortunately, this still presents some difficulty, because the definition
is prospective. The direct consequence of interpreting condition 4 using
the definition specified in Rule 2127 is that the correctness of the ballot
at the time of its submission is determined by looking into the future. The
only potential save could be, as G. argued, the following sentence: "If the
option cannot be clearly identified, a vote of PRESENT is cast." This does
not directly bear on the outcome of CFJ 3569, but in the interests of
completeness and avoiding simply postponing the controversy, I will analyze
how to evaluate conditional votes below.

Having determined that a conditional vote is indeed valid provided its
condition is determinate, the only remaining questions required to resolve
this case is whether grok's vote had a determinate condition and whether
Aris and G., who both cast valid votes on the decision, were "endorsed by
[grok]'s valid vote on the Decision" (Rule 2452). It is clear that grok's
vote had a determinate condition, making it valid, and it clearly endorsed
Aris (regardless of how such it would actually be evaluated). So grok would
have issued Aris a trust token. However, did grok's vote endorse G.?

Per Rule 2127, "Casting a vote endorsing another voter is equivalent to
conditionally casting a vote whose value is the same as the most common
value (if any) among that voter's valid votes on that decision." While this
definition technically applies only to the point when the vote would cast,
it would be unreasonable to interpret the meaning of "a vote endorsing that
voter" as meaning anythong other than "a conditional vote whose value is
the same as the most common value (if any) among that voter's valid votes
on that decision." There are two reasonable ways to evalute this definition
on grok's vote then: either it is an inherent property of the vote, or it
is evaluated, like all conditionals, at the end of the voting period.

A quirk in the wording of Rule 2127 gives a hint. It defines endorsing
votes as an equivalence with a specific class of votes, rather than merely
defining what it means to endorse a player. Consequently, any conditional
vote whose value is as described in Rule 2127 is an endorsing vote,
regardless of whether or not the vote explicitly uses the word "endorse".
The terms are interchangeable

Substituting this into Rule 2452, that would mean that grok issues a Trust
Token to G. if "grok had a valid conditional vote whose value is the same
as the most common value (if any) among G's valid votes on the decision".
If we evaluate this at the end of the voting period, then a thoroughly
absurd result ensues: not only would G. be issued a trust token, but also
every other player who cast the same vote. As such, we must interpret the
definition as applying to an intrinsic property of the conditional. Thus,
we cannot consider Aris's vote when we decide whether grok's vote endorsed,
G. and so it did not. grok would not have issued G. a Trust Token, meaning
that CFJ 3569 is FALSE.

With that resolved, how then should a conditional vote be evaluated? This
is unfortunately a thorny issue. As I wrote above, whether or not the vote
is valid is effectively determined prospectively, by looking into the
future. Before digging deeper, however, I will draw attention to one key
point: the question of a ballot's correctness (i.e. whether it meets the
requirements of Rule 683) is independent from the question of how it is
evaluated in an Agoran decision. Thus, I see two remaining questions:
first, is a conditional vote with an indeterminate condition correctly
submitted, or does it fail to clearly identify a valid vote? and second,
how does one evaluate a conditional vote?

To address the first question, I quote again Rule 2127: "If a vote on an
Agoran decision <https://agoranomic.org/ruleset/#Rule693> is submitted
conditionally (e.g. "FOR if <X> is true, otherwise AGAINST"), then the
selected option is evaluated based on the value of the condition(s) at the
end of the voting period, and, rules to the contrary notwithstanding, is
clearly specified if and only if the value of the condition(s) is/are
determinate at the end of the voting period. If the option cannot be
clearly identified, a vote of PRESENT is cast." The first sentence provides
very clear conditions about when the option is clearly specified. What does
the second sentence do in this context? Does it indicate that, when the
condition is indeterminate, the selected option is clearly specified as
PRESENT?

I think that this cannot be the case, because to do so would completely
obviate the definition of "clearly specified" in the first place. Why would
the rule state that an option is not clearly specified if the conditional
is indeterminate, only to change its mind in the next sentence? This does
not actually matter, however, because the first sentence contains a
precedence claim and the second sentence does not. Per Rule 2240, this
means that the first sentence takes precedence and, consequently, the
second sentence does not modify it. If the condition is indeterminate at
the end of the voting period, the vote is not clearly specified. Per the
reasoning above, this means that the conditional ballot is not submitted.

What, then, is the meaning of the second sentence? The most reasonable
interpretation, in context, is that it is trying to say that if the
condition is indeterminate, then at the end of the voting period, we
resolve it to PRESENT rather than attempting to evaluate it. If this is the
correct interpreration, it is meaningless, because by the above we can
never get to that point. There is an alternative interpretation: the second
sentence is not providing for a way to evalauate the original conditional
ballot but instead provided for an altogether new, unconditional ballot of
PRESENT to be cast.

Unfortunately, this interpretation also fails to have any meaningful
effect. The vote counting procedure is defined in Rule 955 in terms of
valid ballots, and Rule 683 provides a clear definition: "A valid ballot is
a ballot, correctly submitted, that has not been withdrawn. During the
voting period of an Agoran decision, a player CAN by announcement withdraw
(syn. retract) a ballot that e submitted on that decision." As Rule 683 has
a lower ID number than Rule 2127, by Rule 1030, Rule 683 takes precedence.
There is thus no possibility of Rule 2127's "vote of PRESENT" actually
being a valid ballot.

So in conclusion, the answer is that a conditional vote is valid if and
only if the condition ends up being determinate. If it is not, the entire
vote fails; PRESENT is not an alternative.

Finally, the question comes of evaluating a conditional vote. Happily, I
see no reason why, for a valid vote, Rule 2127 should be anything other
than what it straightforwardly says. Provided that the conditional is valid
(i.e. determinate at the end of the voting period), it is evaluated as one
would expect, at the end of the voting period. Prior to then, however, just
like with the validity of the vote in the first place, the actual value of
the vote is indeterminate.

What are the practical implications of this? First, it is important to
distinguish between prospective and retroactive effects here. The validity
of a conditional vote is not retroactively changed at the end of the voting
period, when we finally are able to decide if it is determinate or not.
Rather, the validity *in the first place* is dependent on the future. In
some cases, this can create effectively-retroactive effects. For instance,
a subsequent, otherwise valid ballot cast by the same voter, without
withdrawing the first one, would enter the same indeterminate state of
validity, since it is valid if and only if the first ballot is invalid.

This may present situations where the game may be difficult to play, but
the concept of indeterminacy provides a shield in some cases. Rule 1023
means that the validity of the vote is indeterminate before the voting
period ends, since it cannot be determined from information reasonably
available. Rule 2127 itself provides that if a conditional vote is
indeterminate, it doesn't work. So, taking from the example in my
arguments, if a vote on one proposal is conditional on a vote on another
proposal ending later, then it necessarily fails because the condition will
be indeterminate. Likewise, Rule 2162 protects against
indeterminately-valued switches.

In conclusion, rules are hard.

-Alexis

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