8349j twg 1.0 Temporary CFJ Setup I vote AGAINST 8350j Alexis 2.0 Apologies Don't Interfere I vote AGAINST 8351* Jason 3.0 Double proposal application fix I vote PRESENT 8352e G. 2.0 zombie auction fix 1.1 I vote FOR 8353* Murphy 3.0 All that glisters I vote AGAINST 8354* Alexis, [1] 3.0 Statutory Instrumentation I vote FOR 8355* Alexis, Murphy 3.0 Temporary Suspension of Rules I vote FOR 8356l Aris 2.0 Less Democracy Means More Fun I vote AGAINST
On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 2:16 PM Aris Merchant via agora-official < agora-offic...@agoranomic.org> wrote: > I hereby distribute each listed proposal, initiating the Agoran > Decision of whether to adopt it, and removing it from the proposal > pool. For this decision, the vote collector is the Assessor, the > quorum is 7, the voting method is AI-majority, and the valid > options are FOR and AGAINST (PRESENT is also a valid vote, as are > conditional votes). > > ID Author(s) AI Title > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > 8349j twg 1.0 Temporary CFJ Setup > 8350j Alexis 2.0 Apologies Don't Interfere > 8351* Jason 3.0 Double proposal application fix > 8352e G. 2.0 zombie auction fix 1.1 > 8353* Murphy 3.0 All that glisters > 8354* Alexis, [1] 3.0 Statutory Instrumentation > 8355* Alexis, Murphy 3.0 Temporary Suspension of Rules > 8356l Aris 2.0 Less Democracy Means More Fun > > The proposal pool is currently empty. > > [1] Murphy, Aris, Gaelan > > Legend: <ID>* : Democratic proposal. > <ID># : Ordinary proposal, unset chamber. > <ID>e : Economy ministry proposal. > <ID>f : Efficiency ministry proposal. > <ID>j : Justice ministry proposal. > <ID>l : Legislation ministry proposal. > <ID>p : Participation ministry proposal. > > > The full text of the aforementioned proposal(s) is included below. > > ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// > ID: 8349 > Title: Temporary CFJ Setup > Adoption index: 1.0 > Author: twg > Co-authors: > > > Enact a new Rule of Power 1.0 entitled "Temporary CFJ Setup" with the > following text: > > Rules to the contrary notwithstanding, twg CANNOT publish a Notice > of Honour. > > twg CAN, by announcement, cause this Rule to repeal itself. > > ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// > ID: 8350 > Title: Apologies Don't Interfere > Adoption index: 2.0 > Author: Alexis > Co-authors: > > > Amend rule 2555 by replacing "who has not expunged any blots in the > current Agoran week" with "who has not, by this mechanism, expunged > any blots in the current Agoran week". > > ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// > ID: 8351 > Title: Double proposal application fix > Adoption index: 3.0 > Author: Jason > Co-authors: > > > Amend Rule 2034 by replacing the text "such a proposal existed, was > adopted, and took effect." with the text "such a proposal existed, was > adopted, and, if it had not previously taken effect, took effect.". > > [Intended to make the consequences of Assessorial mishaps significantly > easier to deal with - this will insure that a proposal does not take > effect twice if an assessment is posted twice (the first time because it > succeeded platonically, the second time because of self-ratification).] > > ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// > ID: 8352 > Title: zombie auction fix 1.1 > Adoption index: 2.0 > Author: G. > Co-authors: > > > Amend Rule 1885 (Zombie Auctions) by replacing: > For the purpose of such a auction, to transfer a zombie to a player > is to set that zombie's master switch to that player. > with: > For the purpose of such a auction, to transfer a zombie to a player > is to set that zombie's master switch to that player, and Agora CAN > perform such transfers of the appropriate lots to auction winners. > > and by inserting a line break immediately before the resulting text so > that it is a new paragraph. > > Amend Rule 2551 (Auction End) by deleting "at will". > > ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// > ID: 8353 > Title: All that glisters > Adoption index: 3.0 > Author: Murphy > Co-authors: > > > Enact a new Rule of Power 1.0 entitled "Temporary CFJ Setup" with the > following text: > > Rules to the contrary notwithstanding, twg CANNOT publish a Notice > of Honour. > > twg CAN, by announcement, cause this Rule to repeal itself. > > ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// > ID: 8354 > Title: Statutory Instrumentation > Adoption index: 3.0 > Author: Alexis > Co-authors: Murphy, Aris, Gaelan > > > =Administrative Law Reform. I. Statutory Instrumentation.= > > [This first proposal is a reform to the core rules defining what rules > are, with an aim to better supporting subordinate legal documents. The > intent is to enact very little change to the game as it is actually > played, and to operate mostly in the realm of supporting definitions.] > > If this proposal has had any provision vetoed, then the entire > proposal has no effect. If this proposal has already taken effect, > then it has no effect. > > In this proposal, "I->S" is to amend a rule within the scope specified > by replacing each instance of "an instrument" with "a statute", and > each other instance of "instrument" with "statute". This is not a > case-sensitive match, however, if the word "instrument" being replaced has > a > leading capital, then so does the replacement word "statute". > > Enact a new power-3.9 rule entitled "Statutory Instrumentation > Simultaneity", reading: > {{ > Rules to the contrary notwithstanding, the proposal which enacted this > rule CAN effect multiple rule changes, which it could otherwise effect > individually, simultaneously. When it > attempts to do so, if any single rule change it attempts is > INEFFECTIVE, then so is the entire attempt. > > If the proposal which enacted this rule effects a change to the > definition of a rule then, except for rules which are simultaneously > and explicitly enacted or repealed with that change, as appropriate, > the rules after that change are exactly the entities that were rules > beforehand. This is a definition of the interpretation of the > amendment to the rules and not, in and of itself, a rule change. > }} > > [This proposes to make multiple interlocking amendments to critical > rules defining rules and the interactions between themselves. This > mitigates a real risk that, during a series of sequential changes, the > rules would be in a nonsensical or otherwise broken state. I > considered trying to put in a special clause preserving the effect of > the current rules on rule changes for the duration of the proposal, > but that wouldn't preclude the possibility of some other aspect of the > game, such as asset holdings, doing something weird in the in-between > state. And only a > persistent rule could elegantly paper over that small weird gap in > time. I think simultaneity is the better choice.] > > Set the power of all non-rule entities, other than this proposal, to > 0. [This is an important safety as the change to the definition of a > rule would potentially cause old non-rule instruments to become rules. > Best not to consider that.] > > Apply the following rule changes simultaneously: > > {{ > Amend Rule 1688 (Power) by replacing "An Instrument is an entity with > positive Power." with "A statute is a document with positive Power." > Apply I->S throughout the remainder of the rule. > > Amend rule 2140 (Power Controls Mutability) by replacing "set or > modify any other substantive aspect of an instrument with power > greater than its own." with "set or modify any other substantive > aspect of an instrument with power greater than its own except as > otherwise provided in this rule.", applying I->S throughout the rest > of the rule, and appending a new paragraph reading "An ephemeral > instrument is bound by prohibitions and limitations specified in rules > of lower power, unless it explicitly overrides those prohibition(s) as > provided for in other rules." > > [I don't want to consider what it would mean if PCM prevents rules > from interfering with higher-powered proposal. Let's pretend this is > just clarifying something super obvious to everyone.] > > Apply I->S throughout Rule 105 (Rule Changes). > > Enact a new power-3 Rule entitled "Instruments" reading: > { > An instrument is a type of document, either ephemeral or enduring, > that is defined as such by a body of law. An instrument's text, where > otherwise permitted, can be amended from time to time. > > Rules to the contrary notwithstanding, an instrument other than a > statute CANNOT become binding on a person without eir willful consent, > however, consent can be given by implication. In particular, > consenting to be bound to an instrument can imply consent to be bound > by amendments to it and consent to be bound by other instruments. > } > > Enact a new power-3 Rule entitled "Bodies of Law" reading: > { > A body of law is a collection of related instruments and bodies of law > whose effects are collective and possibly interdependent, and which is > defined as such by a body of law. The statutes of Agora form a body of > law with unlimited scope. All other bodies of law are defined by a > different body of law, in such a way as to be able to trace their > origins back to the statutes of Agora. Two or more bodies of law may > jointly define another body of law, but only each of them clearly > expresses the intent to participate in a joint definition with each of > the others. Otherwise, the definitions are separate, distinct, and > unrelated. > > A body of law is governed by all bodies of law which, directly or > indirectly, participate in its definition, as well as any body of law > specified as governing it by any of its governing law. A body of law > is subordinate to the law that governs it, other than itself, and a > body of law is > superior to the law that it governs, other than itself. For greater > certainty, rules to > the contrary notwithstanding, the statutes of Agora govern all law and > are governed by no law except themselves, and no body of law can be > both subordinate to and superior to another. > > With respect to interactions between separate bodies of law, a body of > law is generally to be interpreted as acting harmoniously as a single > whole. The precedence between, and organization of, instruments in a > body of law are internal matters to that body of law and generally do > not affect the effect of other bodies of law, except to the extent > that they affect the body's operation as a whole. > > The definition of a body of law includes the definition if its scope, > being the areas of the game that it governs. By definition, the scope > of a body of law is no greater than the union of the scopes of the > bodies of law that define it, nor does it include anything which would > bring it into direct conflict with superior law. To the extent that a > body of law's scope is not explicitly defined by superior law, it is > as broad as possible while excluding any effect on any substantive > aspect of any body of law, besides itself, that it does not govern. > > Every instrument is a direct member of exactly one body of law; if not > specified in its definition, it is a body of law in itself. A given > fixation of text may, however, be the text of multiple instruments, > each in different bodies of law. The scope of an instrument is the > scope of the body of law it forms a part of. To the extent that the > provisions of an instrument are outside its scope, they are void and > without effect. > } > > [This is the core of the reform: a base framework for multiple > separate, scoped bodies of law. Rather than an explicit discussion of > precedence between laws, a framework of scoping is used. This proposal > does not define anything outside of rules and enacted proposals as > being instruments and thus part of this framework, in order to allow > gradual work on areas of the ruleset such as regulations and > contracts. > > The reason for "bodies of law" as separate from "instruments" is that > frequently, bodies of law express themselves collectively. The rules > of Agora, for instance, can only be properly interpreted as a whole. > Definitions of entities are often spread out, sometimes to the point > where it's nearly impossible to pinpoint a single instrument as the > source. Bodies of law capture this concept. They also allow more > flexibility to be introduced in proposals to come, such as making > clear that a body of law can modify definitions in superior law > without a conflict. We can also make rules such as Rule 2125 more > natural using this technology, see below. > > More importantly, it allows us to create contracts and similar > documents that impose obligations and have other legal effect, but > without that possibly "creeping" upwards and affecting things outside > their scope. Contracts, for instance, can be safely defined without > fear that they could be used to override lower-powered rules. > > Bodies of law can be nested. This is to allow for, say, the Rules and > Regulations to collectively act as a single body of law, but the Rules > to act as a body of law within it. In the future this could be the > basis for something like Falsifian's modules. I would rather get the > mechanism solid and well-tested before touching precedence between > rules, however. > > Governance of bodies of law cannot, however, be circular, because > while some bodies of law like the rules are self-governing, other > circularity could cause more significant problems by causing a law to > be subordinate/superior to itself, and I want to avoid thinking about > that. > > I've worked hard to prevent any sort of bootstrapping scam by which a > body of law could be brought into existence out of nowhere or > otherwise come to govern a superior body without its permission. > Please examine closely to see if I succeeded!] > > Amend Rule 2125 (Regulated Actions) to read: > { > An action is regulated by a body of law if (1) its performance is > limited, allowed, enabled, or permitted by that body of law; (2) that > body of law describes the circumstances under which it would succeed > or fail; or (3) it would, as part of its effect, modify information > for which some person bound by that body of law is required, by that > body of law, to be a recordkeepor. > > If a body of law regulates an action, then to the extent that doing so > is within its scope, that body of law prevents the action from being > performed except as described within it, including by limiting the > methods to perform that action to those specified within it. A body of > law does not proscribed any action which it does not regulate. > } > > [I'm sad about losing the SHALL NOT there. Violating that would surely > have been one of the great Agoran crimes, along with failing to > carefully consider the consequences of not reading the ruleset during > RtRW.] > > Enact a new power-3 Rule entitled "Effects of Instruments" reading: > { > An instrument's effect is defined by its text, as amended from time to > time in accordance with the law governing its operation. A > "substantive" aspect of an instrument is any aspect that affects the > instrument's operation. If an instrument's text contains clearly > marked comments then, they have no effect on its interpretation or > operation except as that instrument itself specifies, although they > remain part of its text. For the purposes of rules concerning the > methods by which actions are performed, an instrument taking effect is > such a method. > > An enduring instrument is one that it is always taking effect, to the > extent it is permitted to so by the Rules and any other applicable > instruments. An enduring instrument is always speaking; uses of the > present tense in an enduring instrument are interpreted contextually > according to the applicable rules of interpretation. > > An ephemeral instrument is one that takes effect only briefly, to > effect a number of changes on the game. When it takes effect, the > changes specified in its text are applied, provided that the > instrument is not prohibited from doing so. Unless otherwise specified > by the instrument or by its governing law, the provisions of an > instrument are applied sequentially and independently, in the sense > that the success or failure of each provision does not depend directly > on the success or failure of any other provision. > > An ephemeral instrument has no ongoing effect, except to the extent > that the changes it makes have ongoing consequences. It cannot, except > by way of an enduring instrument, extend or delay its own effect. An > ephemeral instrument CAN, where explicitly permitted to do so by the > law governing it, override the effect of an enduring instrument within > its scope by modifying, suppressing, or postponing it. Such an > override is INEFFECTIVE unless the nature and scope of the override > are clearly specified either in the governing law or, where so > authorized by the governing law, in the instrument itself. > > An instrument or body of law is not, except where it specifies > otherwise, bound by or restricted in any way by any subordinate law > and implicitly overrides and takes precedence over all provisions, > including outright prohibitions or definitions, of all subordinate > law. > } > > [This consolidates the existing rules about proposals and rules into > one place, since they will need to be reused for other instruments. It > also provides explicit override language, mainly intended to ensure > that proposals can have free reign over gamestate modification, though > that's a separate proposal. Law is not bound by any other law so as to > make clear that proposals cannot be restricted by a contract, say.] > > Amend Rule 2141 (Role and Attribute of Rules) to by replacing the > first two paragraphs with the following: > { > A rule is an enduring statute. Every rule has a power between 0.1 and > 4.0, inclusive. Rules to the contrary notwithstanding, it is > IMPOSSIBLE to enact a rule with power outside this range, or to change > the power of an existing rule to a nonzero value outside this range. > The set of all currently-existing rules is called the ruleset. > } > > Amend Rule 106 (Adopting Proposals) to read as follows: > { > When a decision about whether to adopt a proposal is resolved, if the > outcome is ADOPTED, then the proposal in question is adopted, its > power is set to the minimum of four and its adoption index, it takes > effect as an ephemeral instrument, and then its power is set to 0. > This rule defers to rules that would prevent a proposal from taking > effect. > } > > [While this proposal does not immediately define any non-rule, > non-proposal entities as instruments, the intent is that the creation > of subordinate instruments comes implicitly. Thus, for instance, a > contract can define a "sub-contract" within the scope of its own > effect, and this would be recognized within law, once contracts are > defined as instruments. Proposals ignore all subordinate law except as > specified otherwise; this is a safety provision. > > Note that the deference provision is equivalent to the existing > provision about preventing proposals from taking effect being secured, > because deference does not override power as a determiner of > precedence. So it will defer to any rule of power 3 or greater but > take precedence over any lesser-powered rule.] > }} > > Repeal the rule "Statutory Instrumentation Simultaneity" enacted > earlier in this proposal. > > ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// > ID: 8355 > Title: Temporary Suspension of Rules > Adoption index: 3.0 > Author: Alexis > Co-authors: Murphy > > > =Administrative Law Reform. II. Temporary Suspension of Rules= > > If no proposal entitled "Statutory Instrumentation" has taken effect > in the previous month, this proposal has no effect. If this proposal > has already taken effect, it has no effect. > > Amend Rule 106 (Adopting Proposals) by appending a new paragraph > reading "A proposal CAN override the effect of any rule which it > is capable of amending by specifying that it does so." > > [This is a small side proposal to allow proposals to temporarily > override rules without having to do so by the enactment and subsequent > repeal of a helper rule. It must be explicit.] > > ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// > ID: 8356 > Title: Less Democracy Means More Fun > Adoption index: 2.0 > Author: Aris > Co-authors: > > > Amend Rule 2606, "Proposal Classes", by changing the text > > "When a proposal with an adoption index greater than 2.0 is created, > its class becomes democratic." > > to read > "When a proposal with an adoption index greater than or equal to > 3.0 is created, its class becomes democratic." > > [Note that proposals can still be turned democratic with 2 Agoran Consent. > However, this reserves democratic status for proposals changing core > rules or of great public concern.] > > ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// > -- >From R. Lee