Zefram wrote: > Michael Norrish wrote: >> The Rules admit all sorts of legal fictions. The existence of units >> of currency is a good example for a start.
> Not at all. Currencies are entities defined entirely by the Rules, > and so the Rules determine what *factually* happens with those > currencies. A legal fiction, on the other hand, is where there is > some independent reality but the Rules state some facts that legally > override the reality. Entities defined entirely by the rules seem pretty fictional and unreal to me, but I'm happy with your narrower definition. >> Come off it. Upon the adoption of this proposal, rule 101 is amended >> to say something completely different, but *after* the adoption of >> this proposal it goes back to the way it was? > That's quite different. A proposal with that wording *factually* > changes Rule 101, and the Rule won't change back because Rules don't > change without a cause. And I claim that a "deeming" event *factually* changes the set of legal fictions that we have to respect. > A legal fiction applies within a particular context (which might be > a period of time, or a piece of text, for example). Outside that > context the legal fiction does not apply, and reality applies as > usual. Sure. But if the scope of the fiction is the registration status of a particular player, then that will have ramifications in our game-state, and not elsewhere. Just as, to use one of the Wikipedia's example, the doctrine of survival can insist that one person died before another, which will have big effects on the state of the dead people's estates. >> Proposals change the game-state, and the state of the game clearly >> includes the content of any legal fictions that may be in force. > I disagree with the concept that the game state includes an > arbitrary set of legal fictions that are not reflected in the > present Rules. It's tantamount to having unwritten Rules. I > maintain that legal fictions can only continue to apply so long as > the Rules, or other competent instrument designated by the Rules, > specifically require them. Proposals are a competent instrument. It is clear that the rules support the notion of legal fictions, and that they exist. Therefore they are part of our game-state. Proposals can alter the game-state. Therefore proposals can alter the legal fictions that govern us. >> Refer again to 1728: there it deems something be true. > Ah yes, that is indeed a legal fiction. I was incorrect in saying > that the Ruleset does not have any. I think the use of a legal > fiction here is sloppy: the desired semantics can be achieved just > as easily without it. But it's not a very troublesome fiction, > because it only affects the operation of another part of the same > Rule. There is no attempt to give the fiction a persistent effect. Sure it has persistent effect. If in ten years, I call a CFJ on the question of whether or not someone posted an objection in the sense of the relevant clause, after they had performed a retraction, then the court will say that they did not. Moreover some action that is supposed to occur without objection will have actually occurred. That too might have serious consequences. I agree that it's not a very serious fiction, and that one might reword things, but it's clear that the fiction exists. And that's all my argument requires. As Murphy says, one might also see ratification as the creation of a legal fiction. In that case, the language has it that we simply assert that the game-state changes, but it seems pretty similar. The Registrar's report is ratifiable, and if it does not record a particular registration, and we ratify it what happens to the game-state then? We can agree as a matter of fact that Goethe did or did not send particular messages to the public forum, but the legal effect of such messages can be changed by ratification or proposal. Michael.
