On 2/1/07, Benjamin Schultz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
R1006 does not designate the Speaker as an office. Therefore the position
of Speaker is not regulated as offices are. So the restriction of R1450
does not apply to prevent the CotC or Promotor from becoming Speaker, as
empowered by R402. Accordingly, I rule TRUE.
Around the time CFJ 1599 was called, there was a short flurry of
discussion about the proper interpretation of the first sentence of
rule 1450, which reads:
The Speaker, Clerk of the Courts, and Promotor are mutually
exclusive offices.
According to the first interpretation, to which I adhere, the sentence
*designates* the three mentioned positions to be offices, then
requires them to be mutually exclusive.
According to the second interpretation, the sentence *presumes* that
the three mentioned positions are offices, then requires them to be
mutually exclusive.
The correctness of the Judge's blank assertion that the rules do not
designate the position of Speaker to be an office depends directly on
which if either of the above two interpretations of the first sentence
of Rule 1450 is correct. We therefore ought to set an explicit
judicial precedent for the interpretation of the construction used in
the quoted sentence, so that similar cases don't have to be resolved
with new CFJs. I therefore propose that we appeal the judgement of
CFJ 1599.
--
Michael Slone
