Zefram wrote:
Kerim Aydin wrote:
But a CFJ on the statement "a proposal (in general) can get around
R101" would have to be judged on the "current" ruleset, and it's
unclear to me whether the judge should judge it using (1) or (2).
There's nothing magical about rule changes that prevents a judge from
considering them as a mechanism. The unclear bit is whether "get around
R101" means "do things that the present R101 forbids" or "do things that
the R101 at the time forbids". But actually either way I'd judge that
statement TRUE: a proposal clearly *can* get around R101, of any version,
specifically by enacting an enabling rule.
Of course circumvention, as a concept, is not usual fare for a CFJ.
Perhaps that's why you find it odd for judicial reasoning to involve
hypothetical rule changes?
There have been a few CFJs along the lines of "Rule X prevents any
other rule from doing Y, unless the other rule takes precedence over
Rule X". The analogue for proposals is less clear: perhaps "Rule X
prevents any proposal from doing Y, unless the proposal alters the
operation of Rule X".
