On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 4:36 AM, Alex Smith <ais...@bham.ac.uk> wrote: > (The recent TIME OUT scam, which made players > inactive, likewise doesn't actually work on vote resolution, for this > reason; however, it would have worked on proposal /distribution/, back > before the loophole was patched.)
The recent TIME OUT scam was for a General Election, where the definition of eligible voter is different. > [...with notice...] > it's > possible for Fool to destroy the "part 1" promise even if its author > destruction condition is true *false? > There's clearly > something wrong with the kind of logical argument that lets you conclude > that one of a set of actions is possible, but without any knowledge as > to which. I disagree with this line of reasoning: *if* we assume that this type of statement allows one to assert arbitrary statements or mechanisms, and is thus generally equivalent to an arbitrary rule, it stands to reason that a pathological or inevaluable statement could be introduced just as easily as in a rule, so I don't think this possibility discredits the interpretation. > (Agora > always has had a custom that shorthand that would expand to an infinite > statement is not allowed.) I wouldn't call this shorthand. Shorthand is where the Rules require that some information be specified - directly, if they are to be interpreted literally, but they are interpreted as implicitly allowing indirect specification via arbitrary statements as long as those statements are simple, easy to evaluate, determinate, etc. In this case, an arbitrary (and arbitrarily complex) statement is being explicitly evaluated, and precedent is to allow even statements like "this statement is false" which more unambiguously expand into infinitely long logical expressions. > - Rule 2337 permits X when sentence A is true (and thus not > undecidable) This is not an unreasonable interpretation, but it does conflict with repeatedly established custom that a paradoxical statement makes the possibility of X undecidable, e.g. in my previous win by paradox due to the same clause of Rule 2337; the introduction of Determinacy (and previously Messy Statements) into the rules support this interpretation, and the conflict is not inherent to a mechanical interpretation of the rules. Of course the issue here is that there is more than one form of paraconsistent logic. I would call for reconsideration if this affected the outcome of the CFJ, but since it does not, I'll kick the can...