"Ghost" Rulesets like the one we have now are disorientating. Proto: Merge Assesor and Rulekeepor, and have them publish the new ruleset once a proposal amending it is enacted.
On Sat, Jul 8, 2017 at 10:56 PM, Aris Merchant < thoughtsoflifeandligh...@gmail.com> wrote: > Judge's arguments for CFJ 3532: > > This call for judgment inquires whether the "existing solely" clause > (hereinafter The Clause) of Rule 2166, which defines assets, prevents > assets > referenced by multiple rules from existing. I turn first to the relevant > text > of the rule, which is as follows: > > An asset is an entity defined as such by a rule (hereafter its backing > document), and existing solely because its backing document defines its > existence. > > Clearly The Clause prevents, say, the sun from being defined as an asset. > This > is good, because if the sun could be an asset the rules might make it > destructible, and then we'd be forced to accept, for game purposes, that > there > was no sun. It would be even more problematic if we accepted persons, and > therefore players, as assets. Obviously the rules are free to make such > definitions anyway (although we might argue over whether they would have > any > effect, considering the interests of the game). However, in the past > we've allowed contracts to define assets, explaining the necessity of such > restrictions. > > The Clause prevents another class of situations as well. It prevents > two different rules from defining the same asset. In older forms, it has > done > the same for a rule and a contract (CFJs 1922-1923). The question raised > here is > whether even referencing an asset would create such a situation. This > raises > interesting questions about the way we interpret the rules. It has long > been > understood that even if a term used in the rules is undefined, we are > obliged to > try our best to figure out what it means. Thus, even without the rule > defining > shinies, we would "interpret them into existence". Without shinies, pending > would be impossible, and we would be unable to pay out salaries, among > other > problems. So, it is apparent that we might consider shinies existent even > without the intervention of their defining rule, arguably triggering The > Clause. > > The historical interpretation of The Clause, however, does not support this > argument. There are no precedents that clearly apply to this situation, > although > in CFJ 3381 the Honorable Judge ais523 appears to assume in passing that > such > things are possible. But our current situation is not unprecedented, there > are > merely no applicable _judicial_ precedents. Rule 2166 is not a new rule. > It was, > in fact, a rather aged rule at time it was repealed, and it only seems new > to > us because of its recent reenactment. One example of a similar situation > is the > point, which was the general unit of currency under this [1] ruleset. I > can find > no record of anyone complaining that they didn't exist. > > If we were to ignore history, would we find? Well, the idea that we > interpret > terms in the rules in a way that gives them effect is largely a matter of > tradition. No rule says that, in the absence of a definition from either > conventional English or the rules, we have to try to interpret the rules > the way > they are intended to be read. Another consideration is the interests of the > game; certainly it would seem to be in the game's best interest to have a > definition for shinies, and all of the clarifications of their behavior > that > come with it. > > I know all the Platonists (if that is the right term, perhaps Logicians > would > be better) in the crowd out jeering at me for refusing to consider the > matter > logically, a priori, from the wording on up. I will therefore close with > two > arguments that I hope will placate them. First, the doctrine that the > rules and > the terms in them must be given meaning in accordance with common sense > exists > to make the game playable. If every typo or invented but undefined term > stopped > the game, then the game would long since have ended. We have to keep > playing, > and in order to keep playing, we often need to interpret the rules the way > they > are intended to be read. The core thesis of the doctrine is that the rules > need > to have their common sense meaning; using it to rob the rules of what they > are > plainly intended to mean violates that principle. It would essentially be > using > the doctrine to violate its own basis for existence. > > Second, and perhaps most convincingly, the argument that the rules conflict > with each other is only valid under circumstances that are themselves > internally > inconsistent. If we view the rules Platonically/logically, then only one > rule > attempts to define assets. If we consider the rules Pragmatically/legally, > then > their common sense intent shines through. It is only when we look at one > rule > one way and another rule another way that a contradiction between rules > arises. > As it is a longstanding principle of rule interpretation that, if > reasonably > possible, we will attempt to construe the rules so that no contradiction > occurs, > it is sensible to here use the only consistent interpretation, which also > happens to be the only one that doesn't violate the plain meaning of any of > the rules in question. > > I conclude my judgment by noting that there may in fact be one judicial > precedent that has some real bearing on this situation. Once there was a > contract that defined an asset called a "prop". I don't really know the > details > of the situation, but even after the contract stopped existing, people > still > acted like props existed. They were informally handed around and reported > on, > as if they still existed. Later that contract was brought back, and a CFJ > was > called to inquire into whether The Clause prevented them from being assets. > I realize that this is completely different from our current situation, and > that principles of rule interpretation are stronger and more established > than most informal traditions. Still, both are matters of tradition and > the collective imagination, and the fact remains that the one line verdict > of CFJ 2344, which to the best of my knowledge has not been overturned, > judged > that props were a valid asset. > > I judge CFJ 3532 TRUE. > > [1] https://mailman.agoranomic.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/ > agora-official/2008-July/004749.html > > -Aris >
