On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 3:52 PM Rebecca <edwardostra...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 3:51 PM Rebecca <edwardostra...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 3:41 PM Aris Merchant via agora-discussion <
>> agora-discussion@agoranomic.org> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 10:26 PM Rebecca via agora-discussion <
>>> agora-discussion@agoranomic.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> > On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 3:11 PM Aris Merchant via agora-discussion <
>>> > agora-discussion@agoranomic.org> wrote:
>>> >
>>> > > On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 9:16 PM Rebecca via agora-business <
>>> > > agora-busin...@agoranomic.org> wrote:
>>> > >
>>> > > > On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 2:07 PM Rebecca <edwardostra...@gmail.com>
>>> > wrote:
>>> > > >
>>> > > > > I CFJ:
>>> > > > > { CFJ 3828, which had the following statement, “A recent rule
>>> named
>>> > "A
>>> > > > > coin award" was enacted, increased
>>> > > > > the number of coins R. Lee owns by 1, and then repealed itself.”
>>> was
>>> > a
>>> > > > > "CFJ about the legality or possibility of a game
>>> > > > > action” under rule 2553, such that if a judgement of PARADOXICAL
>>> was
>>> > > > > assigned to it for seven days, the caller of the CFJ would win
>>> the
>>> > > game}
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > I don't think anything is INSUFFICIENT here, so I'm not going to
>>> > > provide
>>> > > > > much argument/evidence. A good argument was made by G., below.
>>> And
>>> > the
>>> > > > CFJ
>>> > > > > statement and rule quote is given here so you don't need to go
>>> > looking
>>> > > > (I'm
>>> > > > > not CFJing whether a judgement of PARADOXICAL was in fact
>>> assigned,
>>> > so
>>> > > no
>>> > > > > need to look for that either)
>>> > > > >
>>> > > >
>>> > > >
>>> > > > Sorry, I retract this CFJ and replace it with the following.
>>> > > > { CFJ 3828, which had the following statement, “A recent rule
>>> named "A
>>> > > > coin award" was enacted, increased
>>> > > > the number of coins R. Lee owns by 1, and then repealed itself.”
>>> was a
>>> > > "CFJ
>>> > > > about the legality or possibility of a game
>>> > > > action” under rule 2553, such that if a judgement of PARADOXICAL
>>> was
>>> > > > assigned to it for seven days, the caller of the CFJ would be
>>> eligible
>>> > to
>>> > > > win the game by announcement under rule 2553}
>>> > > >
>>> > > > I adopt G's argument as to this CFJ which I include below (the
>>> rest of
>>> > > > these words are eirs not mine)
>>> > > >
>>> > > > The CFJ statement began 'A recent rule named "A coin award" was
>>> > > > enacted...' which is a passively voiced action (active voice would
>>> have
>>> > > > been "Proposal XXX enacted a Rule...") . I think it's come up a
>>> couple
>>> > > > times recently in CFJs, that mere use of the passive voice doesn't
>>> > change
>>> > > > the fact that there's an action with an actor?
>>> > > >
>>> > > > Further, parsing the statement a bit gives 'A recent rule ...
>>> increased
>>> > > > the number of coins' which is definitely asking whether a rule
>>> > succeeded
>>> > > > in the action of coin-creation (a Rule creating a coin is
>>> definitely an
>>> > > > action, right?) So is a past tense "did X do Y?" close enough to
>>> "it
>>> > was
>>> > > > POSSIBLE for X to do Y at the time it is purported to have
>>> happened?"
>>> > > I'd
>>> > > > personally say yes because forcing the statement writing around
>>> > > > possibility is a mess compared to the straightforward "did X
>>> happen".
>>> > >
>>> > >
>>> > > Arguments:
>>> > >
>>> > > There is no way this is a CFJ about the possibility of a game
>>> action. To
>>> > > see why let's take a look at G.'s example. If the CFJ was "Rule XXX
>>> COULD
>>> > > do so and so", the answer would be yes, unless so and so involved
>>> messing
>>> > > with something secured. The question is whether Rule XXX actually
>>> *did*
>>> > so
>>> > > and so is a completely separate matter. Possibility implies a
>>> question
>>> > > about the power of an agent, and the only agent involved
>>> unquestionably
>>> > had
>>> > > that power. So a CFJ about whether the rule COULD do the action has a
>>> > > materially different outcome (trivially TRUE) and is thus a different
>>> > > question. Indeed, the reason the CFJ is PARADOXICAL is that the rule
>>> > COULD
>>> > > have done what the CFJ statement said it did, but it's impossible to
>>> > figure
>>> > > out whether it did that (or did something else instead).
>>> > >
>>> > > Onto the legality. Here, there's actually some question. It very much
>>> > > depends on how you define the term "legality". Whether a rule
>>> decided to
>>> > do
>>> > > something is certainly a legal question, and could be called a
>>> legality.
>>> > > However, I think the term "legality of a game action" probably
>>> refers to
>>> > > the matter of whether an action is legal or illegal. If this weren't
>>> > clear
>>> > > enough on its own, it is from the canon of noscitur a sociis, given
>>> the
>>> > use
>>> > > of the word "possibility" and the fact that possibility and
>>> > permissibility
>>> > > tend to go together.
>>> > >
>>> > > Bottom line here, whether something could happen and whether it did
>>> > happen
>>> > > are completely different questions. This is particularly relevant in
>>> this
>>> > > case, where one of the questions results in paradox and the other
>>> > doesn't.
>>> > > The rule could do everything that it might have done; the question
>>> of it
>>> > > actually did so is irresolvable without paradox. I respectfully opine
>>> > that
>>> > > the court should rule FALSE.
>>> > >
>>> > > -Aris
>>> > >
>>> >
>>> > This is a CFJ about the possibility of a game action. The statement
>>> for CFJ
>>> > 3828 was really three statements. If any were FALSE, the CFJ would be
>>> > FALSE.
>>> > 1: A recent rule called "A coin award" was enacted. For it to be
>>> enacted,
>>> > it needs to have been possible to enact this rule. Although the paradox
>>> > does not arise from this proposition, the proposition being present in
>>> the
>>> > CFJ still makes the CFJ "about" a possibility.
>>> > 2: [The rule] increased the number of coins R. Lee owned by one. For
>>> this
>>> > to happen, it needs to have been POSSIBLE for the rule, with the
>>> specific
>>> > text as enacted, to have awarded a player a coin. This is about the
>>> > possibility not of ANY rule giving a player a coin (trivially
>>> possible) but
>>> > the possibility of THIS rule giving a player a coin, which led
>>> directly to
>>> > the paradox.\\
>>> > 3: The rule repealed itself. It was only POSSIBLE for the specific
>>> rule, as
>>> > written, to repeal itself if it did in fact award a player one coin.
>>> This
>>> > is basically nested with proposition two.
>>> >
>>> > It's true as Aris says that "possibility" implies a question about the
>>> > power of the agent. The problem with his argument is that the agent
>>> > referred to is the rule "A coin award" which had the exact same power
>>> as
>>> > any other rule: the ability to do what its actual text commands and no
>>> > more.
>>>
>>>
>>> This strikes me as the same as saying that a person has the power to do
>>> something by announcement only if they actually decide to go through with
>>> the announcement. The question of whether an agent could do something is
>>> the question of whether it could *if it wanted to*, and for a rule
>>> wanting
>>> to do something is the same as having its text say it.
>>>
>>> It gets worse! The text of the rule COULD lead to the lead to the effect
>>> happening! There's just no way to tell if it actually did, which is why
>>> the
>>> CFJ was PARADOXICAL. But the coin being awarded was one of the POSSIBLE
>>> outcomes of the text, we just don't know if it was the one selected. So
>>> even supposing that rules CAN only act in a manner compatible with their
>>> text, it's *still* trivially possible for the rule to act in the
>>> specified
>>> way in this instance.
>>>
>>> -Aris
>>>
>> It is impossible for someone to perform a game action by announcement
>> unless they announce it. That is a proposition "about the possibility of a
>> game action" (and it is a true proposition).
>>
>> If I said "rule 101 has just given me one coin", that would not be
>> possible. Rule 101 does not have any text that purports to give me a coin
>> and therefore it is impossible that it has given me one. This is how
>> English works.
>>
>> --
>> From R. Lee
>>
> In fact, any CFJ about whether a game action happened or not is a CFJ
> about the possibility of a game action. If a game action didn't happen
> according to the rules, it is impossible that it happened. If it did happen
> or, like in this case, indeterminately could have happened, it is possible.
>
> --
> From R. Lee
>
For that matter I also know that it is impossible that the weather has been
rainy outside my house today. Why do I know that? It's not because of the
laws of physics, it's because I've looked outside many times and it
ACTUALLY hasn't rained, even though it could have. However, lacking that
knowledge of tomorrow, it is possible that it will rain tomorrow. "It has
rained today" is a statement about the possibility of the weather, that
statement posits that it is possible that it has rained and that, in fact,
it is certain. My answer to that statement is "Having observational
knowledge of the ACTUAL conditions of today up to this point, it is not
possible that it has rained outside my house today".
--
>From R. Lee
