The below is CFJ 3768. I assign it to Trigon.
On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 3:16 PM Jason Cobb <jason.e.c...@gmail.com> wrote: > > I CFJ: "A party to the contract in evidence CAN act on behalf of the > other party to transfer a coin.' > > > Evidence: > > { > > Contract: > https://mailman.agoranomic.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/agora-business/2019-August/041185.html > > Consent of a second party: > https://mailman.agoranomic.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/agora-business/2019-August/041186.html > > Excerpt from Rule 1742/21 ("Contracts"): > > A party to a contract CAN perform any of the following actions > as permitted by the contract's text: > > * Act on behalf of another party to the contract. > > * By announcement, revoke destructible assets from the contract. > > * By announcement, take liquid assets from the contract. > > } > > > Arguments: > > { > > The contract exists because two parties (G. and I) have consented to it, > and neither has ceased being party to the contract. > > The contract states that > > If "this statement is false" is a true statement, each party to this > contract is permitted to, and CAN, once, and only once, act on > behalf of the other party to transfer one (1) Coin to this contract. > > This contract, subject to a conditional, permits a party to act on > behalf of another party to it. Thus, whether or not Rule 1742 states > that I CAN act on behalf of another party is directly dependent on the > conditional specified by the contract. However, this conditional is a > paradoxical statement (the liar paradox). Thus, whether the Rule states > that I CAN act on behalf depends on a paradoxical statement. The other > part of the requirements is fulfilled, as I have not acted-on-behalf of > G. pursuant to this contract before. > > Considering the possible outcomes: > > FALSE: To reach this outcome one would need to find that "this statement > is false" is false, which is not a valid assessment of that statement's > truthfulness (it is a paradox); FALSE is not appropriate. > > TRUE: As above, but would need to find the statement true; TRUE is not > appropriate. > > IRRELEVANT: Whether or not I can act on behalf of G. is absolutely > relevant because it is on the permissibility of an action that affects a > quantity that the Treasuror must keep track of; I make this further > relevant by actually attempting to perform this action later in the > message in which I submit this case. This is therefore relevant to the > game; IRRELEVANT is not appropriate. > > INSUFFICIENT: I have (hopefully) given the judge everything that e needs > to issue a judgement; INSUFFICIENT is not appropriate. > > DISMISS: I argue that PARADOXICAL is appropriate, so DISMISS is not > appropriate. > > PARADOXICAL: "appropriate if the statement is logically undecidable as a > result of a paradox", I argue that this is in fact true, as the > statement depends on the truthfulness of the liar paradox; I argue that > PARADOXICAL is appropriate. > > } > > > And to make this RELEVANT: If I CAN do so, I cause G. to transfer 1 coin > to the below contract. > > Jason Cobb > > On 8/3/19 5:25 PM, Kerim Aydin wrote: > > > > Sure I'll bite (but I'll leave the judging to someone else). > > > > I consent to the below contract. > > > > On 8/3/2019 1:47 PM, Jason Cobb wrote: > >> On 8/3/19 4:13 PM, Kerim Aydin wrote: > >>> > >>> Yeah, when I set this up with you I thought it would be a long > >>> discussion > >>> about whether contract precedence should be forwards or backwards or > >>> whether > >>> there were other general interpretation principles that could apply > >>> (with a > >>> good chance of a "nope - this is paradoxical" result). The > >>> importance of > >>> the exact Rule link language ('specify') only occurred to me this > >>> morning. > >>> > >>> -G. > >> > >> > >> Alright. Looks like act-on-behalf only uses "permitted" (not > >> "specified"), and I would guess (read: hope) that a contract that > >> permits something based on a paradox is paradoxical. > >> > >> Would you like to try again, with this contract (which I consent to)? > >> > >> { > >> > >> 0. Only G. and Jason Cobb CAN be parties to this contract. If any > >> other person becomes party to this contract, e immediately ceases to > >> be a party, and, the rest of the contract notwithstanding, CANNOT > >> perform any actions permitted by this contract. > >> > >> 1. A party to this contract CAN cease being a contract by announcement. > >> > >> 2. If "this statement is false" is a true statement, each party to > >> this contract is permitted to, and CAN, once, and only once, act on > >> behalf of the other party to transfer one (1) Coin to this contract. > >> > >> 3. A party to this contract is permitted to, and CAN, take any liquid > >> assets from this contract by announcement. > >> > >> } > >> > >> Jason Cobb > >>