Huge input values in amdgpu_userq_wait_ioctl can lead to a OOM and could be exploited.
So check these input value against AMDGPU_USERQ_MAX_HANDLES which is big enough value for genuine use cases and could potentially avoid OOM. Signed-off-by: Sunil Khatri <[email protected]> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_userq_fence.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_userq_fence.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_userq_fence.c index 4f9386677c47..e31b2c6cc73b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_userq_fence.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_userq_fence.c @@ -636,6 +636,12 @@ int amdgpu_userq_wait_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, if (!amdgpu_userq_enabled(dev)) return -ENOTSUPP; + if (wait_info->num_syncobj_handles > AMDGPU_USERQ_MAX_HANDLES || + wait_info->num_syncobj_timeline_handles > AMDGPU_USERQ_MAX_HANDLES || + wait_info->num_bo_write_handles > AMDGPU_USERQ_MAX_HANDLES || + wait_info->num_bo_read_handles > AMDGPU_USERQ_MAX_HANDLES) + return -EINVAL; + num_syncobj = wait_info->num_syncobj_handles; syncobj_handles = memdup_array_user(u64_to_user_ptr(wait_info->syncobj_handles), num_syncobj, sizeof(u32)); -- 2.34.1
