For what it's worth, in Android, we do more than suggested by "man 4 random". Most Linux systems just save and restore entropy across boots, and don't feed in device specific information into the pool. In Android, we add device specific data to the entropy pool, to (help) prevent device class attacks. Two Android systems with different device device IDs should never have their entropy pool in the same state.
https://code.google.com/p/android-source-browsing/source/detail?r=b8cba95f&repo=platform--frameworks--base https://code.google.com/p/android-source-browsing/source/detail?r=b91ec410&repo=platform--frameworks--base -- Nick On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Jeffrey Walton <[email protected]> wrote: > More results on weak keys (it looks more comprehensive than results > from the EFF’s SSL Observatory): https://factorable.net/paper.html. > > The authors also do a nice job on the Linux Random Number Generator in > Section 5.1. The Linux PRNG has signficance here because Android uses > it. Devices such as SSDs and NAND Flash provide even less entropy to > the system. I imagine it only gets worse if the radios are switched > off for airplane mode. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Android Security Discussions" group. > To post to this group, send email to > [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/android-security-discuss?hl=en. > > -- Nick Kralevich | Android Security | [email protected] | 650.214.4037 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Android Security Discussions" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/android-security-discuss?hl=en.
