On Tue, Jun 18, 2013 at 1:53 PM, Robert Dailey <[email protected]> wrote: > Well, I know that the CA changes in Chrome when I access Gmail and I do get > a warning notification of that, although it wasn't installed on the system > at that time (if I choose to continue anyway). Hmmm... That could be an indication that someone is intercepting your communications. The fellow in Iran who alerted us to the Diginotar failure started that way too. http://productforums.google.com/forum/#!category-topic/gmail/share-and-discuss-with-others/3J3r2JqFNTw.
As far as I know, Google/Chrome has not changed its keys yet (its supposed to occur in August). So you should not be receiving a warning. http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Google-to-replace-SSL-certificates-1869281.html Are you using CertPatrol? CertPatrol pins the certificate (and not the public key), so you will get a warning even if the same key is re-certificated. Its common to use a certificate with a short lifetime to keep CRLs manageable (I suspect there are some possible security benefits too). Google practices it by rotating its certificates every 30 days or so. > On Android, however, I do not see the certificate installed. So, does that > mean that Gmail traffic is not being intercepted? Can you issue the following from the command line and post the results: $ echo "GET HTTP/1.0" | openssl s_client -connect gmail.com:443 CONNECTED(00000003) depth=1 C = US, O = Google Inc, CN = Google Internet Authority verify error:num=20:unable to get local issuer certificate verify return:0 --- Certificate chain 0 s:/C=US/ST=California/L=Mountain View/O=Google Inc/CN=mail.google.com i:/C=US/O=Google Inc/CN=Google Internet Authority 1 s:/C=US/O=Google Inc/CN=Google Internet Authority i:/C=US/O=Equifax/OU=Equifax Secure Certificate Authority --- Server certificate -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDgjCCAuugAwIBAgIKN8yQgAABAACMwjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBGMQswCQYD VQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UEChMKR29vZ2xlIEluYzEiMCAGA1UEAxMZR29vZ2xlIElu dGVybmV0IEF1dGhvcml0eTAeFw0xMzA2MDUxOTA2MzNaFw0xMzEwMzEyMzU5NTla MGkxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRYwFAYDVQQHEw1N b3VudGFpbiBWaWV3MRMwEQYDVQQKEwpHb29nbGUgSW5jMRgwFgYDVQQDEw9tYWls Lmdvb2dsZS5jb20wgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBANLmzUU+okQM MXLvLDvi5cTGoLgyDpx+e2gvFUNIlyQCPCvAuM90K3Y3M+UxL3JT+KxeAbt8tzJA 5Sh4X92pO9q2rwUwVyvCy1kpLjTs5YmeYXBqkatJPBskjhI1gkJr/Cjy7q4bXGDF 6KU9oRo6GbNehPm1kx0F6Z0quoZrzn2DAgMBAAGjggFSMIIBTjAdBgNVHSUEFjAU BggrBgEFBQcDAQYIKwYBBQUHAwIwHQYDVR0OBBYEFJ0KYTWDuaArJBl7Hdocp/Ut rR1yMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFL/AMOv1QxE+Z7qekfv8atrjaxIkMFsGA1UdHwRUMFIw UKBOoEyGSmh0dHA6Ly93d3cuZ3N0YXRpYy5jb20vR29vZ2xlSW50ZXJuZXRBdXRo b3JpdHkvR29vZ2xlSW50ZXJuZXRBdXRob3JpdHkuY3JsMGYGCCsGAQUFBwEBBFow WDBWBggrBgEFBQcwAoZKaHR0cDovL3d3dy5nc3RhdGljLmNvbS9Hb29nbGVJbnRl cm5ldEF1dGhvcml0eS9Hb29nbGVJbnRlcm5ldEF1dGhvcml0eS5jcnQwDAYDVR0T AQH/BAIwADAaBgNVHREEEzARgg9tYWlsLmdvb2dsZS5jb20wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEF BQADgYEAmnlaU65izftsi/WblWCUos1nln9afwEJkfoVfQyqBUPYmwz2RLVjr42d hrJIMhQqYlsW2W1AqnHF2oIM3Lc4wO//ltnX1/GqEx97RsFFM4KFN+ycXeD/trkZ HGlGJhAnw2zOw4hDDHA2BEPRIj2isbnSsfQgrHGDZsrrMGgAmoA= -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject=/C=US/ST=California/L=Mountain View/O=Google Inc/CN=mail.google.com issuer=/C=US/O=Google Inc/CN=Google Internet Authority --- No client certificate CA names sent --- SSL handshake has read 2116 bytes and written 448 bytes --- New, TLSv1/SSLv3, Cipher is ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 Server public key is 1024 bit Secure Renegotiation IS supported Compression: NONE ... Start Time: 1371578823 Timeout : 300 (sec) Verify return code: 20 (unable to get local issuer certificate) --- DONE Jeff > On Tue, Jun 18, 2013 at 12:50 PM, Brian Carlstrom <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Presumably they perform MITM by installing a CA controlled by proxy on >> your system. >> >> -bri >> >> On Tue, Jun 18, 2013 at 10:05 AM, Robert Dailey <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> > Could you explain a bit better? I asked my IT department, and they said >> > they >> > do monitor gmail traffic on Android. However, he could have been lying >> > or >> > just making a blanket statement. I figured out that they are using >> > "BlueCoat >> > ProxySG" to perform MITM on web-gmail, but I'm not familiar enough with >> > Android to understand why this also isn't being done on Gmail app for >> > Android. Is Android more secure because it has the trusted credentials? >> > I'm >> > assuming those are all known and accepted root certificates, so if they >> > did >> > indeed try to MITM gmail on Android, then the root would change and >> > thus, >> > I'd hope Gmail would fail to accept it or something of that sort. >> > >> > >> > --------- >> > Robert Dailey >> > >> > >> > On Tue, Jun 18, 2013 at 11:54 AM, Brian Carlstrom <[email protected]> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tue, Jun 18, 2013 at 8:52 AM, Jeffrey Walton <[email protected]> >> >> wrote: >> >> > On Mon, Jun 17, 2013 at 2:09 PM, Robert Dailey <[email protected]> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> Is it possible for MITM to occur for traffic on the Android Gmail >> >> >> client >> >> >> when connected to a Wifi network >> >> > Yes, its possible. >> >> >> >> Not unless a system CA has been compromised (which could then be >> >> disabled in Settings > Security > Trusted Credentials) or a user CA >> >> has been installed (which could be uninstalled from the same location) >> >> >> >> -bri >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> If so, how can I verify whether or not my >> >> >> SSL certificate has been compromised for Gmail? >> >> > Pin the server's certificate or public key. >> >> > https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Certificate_and_Public_Key_Pinning. >> >> > >> >> > If you are dealing with a browser-based app, then you are out of >> >> > luck. >> >> > Javascript, WebSockets, WebCrypto and other components in the stack >> >> > don't make the required connection information available. In this >> >> > case, you need to write a hybrid app or native app. Many people don't >> >> > want to hear their browser-based app can't handle a particular data >> >> > sensitivity level, and it usually goes over like a turd in a punch >> >> > bowl. >> >> > >> >> > Not all apps need to pin. If the app is dealing with throwaway, low >> >> > value data, then it does not matter - browser-based apps are fine. >> >> > For >> >> > medium value (for example, an organization's Single Sign On password) >> >> > and high value data (such as information covered under US Federal >> >> > law), then you probably can't use a browser-based app. >> >> > >> >> > In the future, sites (servers) will [likely] be able to ask the >> >> > browser (clients) to pin certificates via >> >> > https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-05.txt. >> >> > However, there is no guarantee a client will perform a pin in the >> >> > absence of a server's request. >> >> > >> >> > Jeff >> >> > >> >> > -- >> >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> >> > Groups "Android Security Discussions" group. >> >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >> >> > send >> >> > an email to [email protected]. >> >> > To post to this group, send email to >> >> > [email protected]. >> >> > Visit this group at >> >> > http://groups.google.com/group/android-security-discuss. >> >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> > >> >> > >> > >> > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Android Security Discussions" group. 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