Wednesday, 15 August 2001 16:50
(ET)
Walker's World: Macedonia's German problem
By MARTIN WALKER, Chief International Correspondent
The history of war is littered with useless but impeccable diplomatic
texts that might have brought peace had the belligerents been reasonable and
prepared to compromise. But were that the case, war would be far less
frequent than it is, and the Balkans would be a very different place.
The agreement so laboriously reached this week between the Macedonian
government and the groups claiming to represent their ethnic Albanian
citizens is now threatened with becoming another such empty document, an
ironic footnote on a better history that might have been.
Even as the negotiators were putting their initials on the deal, and then
while signing it in a location that the Macedonian government kept secret
until the last minute, Albanian rebels were fighting Macedonian troops in a
village just four miles from the capital of the tiny nation of 2 millions.
Militant elements of the Albanian National Liberation Army already have
sworn to fight on, intent on forging a Greater Albania whose coming would
require swathes of land and ethnic Albanians from Greece, Macedonia,
Montenegro and NATO-occupied Kosovo. It is fear of the widespread Balkan
destabilization that a Greater Albanian campaign implies that has led NATO
and the 15-nation European Union to devote such intense diplomatic efforts
in Macedonia.
Indeed, NATO secretary-general George Robertson and the EU's foreign
policy supreme Javier Solana have pinned their personal prestige on
achieving peace in Macedonia. Solana has extracted solemn and binding
personal assurances of support from the 15 EU heads of government, arguing
that if it fails this test (as it failed Bosnia) the EU's pretensions to be
a major player on the international stage will remain a diplomatic joke.
But the deal that NATO and the EU have half-brokered and half-imposed
looks shaky.
On the side of the Macedonian government, the chairman of the parliament
Stojan Andov, has declared that he will oppose the settlement. By giving
Albanian the status of an official language, and guaranteeing Albanians
something close to their own ethnic police force, he claims that it rewards
terrorism and opens the way to Albanian separatism.
Most ominous of all, the essential enforcement mechanism and the
international component, the arrival of 3,500 NATO troops to carry out the
disarming of the Albanian guerillas, will not take place until the ceasefire
becomes "durable." Moreover, as Andov points out, Macedonians are entitled
to some skepticism about NATO's commitment.
"NATO troops have been installed in Kosovo for the past two years and this
has been the period when the Albanians of Kosovo have armed, supported and
acted as secure base for the rebels to launch their war against Macedonia --
and NATO has done pitifully little to stop them," says Andov.
Taking their cue from the United States, the first of the modern
democracies to find its military and diplomatic options constrained by fear
of casualties, the NATO countries have been hesitant during their time in
Kosovo to protect the Serb minority or to constrain and disarm the Albanian
militants from expanding their operations into Kosovo.
"Macedonia is the last victim of the collateral damage from NATO's Kosovo
campaign," says Macedonia's Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski.
Worse still, there is some doubt about the political commitment of at
least one key NATO government, Germany, facing new elections next year amid
mounting economic difficulties. A group of 35 Social Democratic and Green
members of the Bundestag have said they will join the opposition to vote
against a German contingent being deployed as part of the NATO force in
Macedonia.
Germany's decision to send troops to the Kosovo force two years ago was a
breakthrough. It was the first time since 1945 that German troops had been
deployed beyond their own borders, and the action symbolized the
determination of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder that Germany start growing
beyond the shadow of its Nazi past to operate internationally and be seen as
"a normal country," free of the guilt and hesitations of the previous 55
years.
The German hesitation is understandable. NATO troops have now been
stationed in Bosnia for six years. They have just started their third year
of deployment in Kosovo. Now comes a new commitment in Macedonia, and there
is little sign that peace and stability would endure anywhere in the Balkans
if they were to withdraw soon.
The long-term strategy of the EU and NATO is to hold out the eventual
prospect of all the Balkan nations eventually joining the peace and
prosperity zone of the rest of Europe. But that is a strategy for 20 years
and more. And if the Germans back out (and German forces in Kosovo already
are being steadily reduced), it is hard to see the French, with their own
presidential election due next year, or the U.S. Congress, authorizing the
continuing deployment of their own troops.
The one factor that just might keep the NATO troops in place and give this
flimsy Macedonian accord a chance of working is the knowledge that absent
NATO troops, the Balkans erupts. This means not simply war at a distance,
but filling Western TV screens with images of refugees and slaughter,
concentration camps and ethnic cleansing.
And that is the real irony of this latest Balkan 'peace' agreement. For
security reasons, the global TV audience may not have been allowed to watch
the signing of the peace agreement. But if it fails, you can be sure we will
all be able to watch the war.
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Copyright 2001 by United Press International.
All rights reserved.
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