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Washington Post
December 7, 2001

Russia: A Partner, But Not in NATO 

By Henry A. Kissinger

Sept. 11, 2001, is etched in American minds as a vast tragedy, but it is

likely that history may record it as well as the turning point in
shaping the 
international order for the 21st century. Sept. 11 ended some of the
smug 
illusions of the 1990s, among them that international politics has been 
supplanted by global economics or by the Internet.

The idea that a uniting Europe should seek its identity in distinction
from 
the United States has been overtaken by European offers to join the
American 
diplomatic and military campaign against terrorism. Russia has become a 
partner in the antiterrorism campaign. China has provided intelligence. 
Relations with India have grown closer despite America's reliance on 
Pakistani bases in the war against Afghanistan. The United States has
made 
quiet overtures toward Iran. And the two defeated nations of World War
II, 
Germany and Japan, have abandoned previous domestic constraints, Germany
by 
sending troops beyond NATO's boundaries and Japan by deploying ships in
the 
Indian Ocean far from home waters. None of these steps was conceivable
six 
months earlier.

Sept. 11 brought home to our allies that Europe is without means of 
retaliation against similar attacks, hence that the need for a common 
transatlantic security relationship remains. And the steadily improving 
Russo-American relationship obviates the need for the incipent mediating
role 
between Russia and America that some European leaders sought to achieve.
For 
these reasons, within 48 hours of the terrorist attack, the NATO
Council, for 
the first time in NATO existence, invoked Article 5 of the NATO treaty 
authorizing collective self-defense. The coalition diplomacy that
emerged 
reflected a greater emphasis on bilateral cooperation with Washington on
a 
national basis and within the North Atlantic framework than on the 
institutions of the European Union. The subtle coalition diplomacy of
the 
Bush administration greatly aided this process.

A fresh perception of relations with Russia is the most important single

issue. For the greater part of its history, Russia has treated its
Western 
neighbors as a threat to its security and has responded by relentless 
expansion to create buffers, either by military means or by ideological 
intervention, as in the Holy Alliance or the Brezhnev doctrine.

Vladimir Putin, graduate of the analytical branch of the KGB, appears to
have 
concluded that imperialism caused more tragedies than triumphs for
Russia and 
is unsustainable by the reduced contemporary Russia, threatening it with

isolation. This is why the thrust of Putin's strategy has been to strive
for 
a kind of partnership with the United States, which is another way of
saying 
that he is pursuing Russia's objectives by enlisting American power in
their 
support.

President Bush has decisively seized this opening. But it is important
to 
keep in mind that the new Russian policy results not from a personal 
preference but from a cool assessment of Russia's interest. Putin has
left 
himself other options with China and with Europe, especially Germany,
should 
his emphasis on America founder. Therefore, personal relations between 
leaders -- necessary to create an initial psychological framework --
must be 
translated into agreed permanent common interests. Otherwise, there is
the 
risk of repeating the experience of previous Western leaders who relied
on 
their ties to Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin (and before that to
Joseph 
Stalin and his successors). One does Putin no favor by ascribing his
policies 
to his personality -- impressive as it is; it is an argument that
domestic 
opponents may well turn against him.

There is hope for improved American and Atlantic relations with Russia 
precisely because there is an objective new basis for them. It is not
only 
that the current political structure of Europe bars the kind of
Napoleonic or 
Hitlerite invasions that gave rise to Russian security concerns and that
wars 
between nuclear powers inevitably exact costs out of proportion to any 
rational objective. Above all, the political calculus has changed in
regions 
of historical contention such as the Middle East. The previous
conception of 
a zero sum game between two dominant powers is no longer applicable.
During 
the Cold War -- and for some period afterward -- both Russian and
American 
leaders thought that a political gain for one side was a strategic loss
for 
the other and systematically attempted to reduce each other's influence
in 
the Middle East. Under post-Sept. 11 conditions, such policies would
weaken 
both countries against Islamic fundamentalism and undermine the
stability of 
the region in which they both have a vital interest.

The challenge is how to create consulting mechanisms capable of dealing 
jointly with the new common realities without giving Europe the sense
that it 
is facing a Russo-American condominium. An attempt in that direction
occurred 
when NATO Secretary General George Robertson (following the lead of
British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair) advanced a scheme to fit Russia into NATO. A
new 
NATO council including Russia is supposed to deal with specifically
defined 
policy areas while the existing NATO council without Russia deals with
all 
other matters. Decisions by the new body would be unanimous, thus giving

Russia a veto within NATO. The topics have not yet been selected, but
nuclear 
proliferation, terrorism and refugee displacements have been mentioned
by 
Lord Robertson.

These subjects deserve common exploration with Russia. But Russian
membership 
in NATO -- however partial -- is not the solution. NATO is, and remains,

basically a military alliance, part of whose purpose is the protection
of 
Europe against Russian invasion. Since the end of the Cold War and the
advent 
of the common front against terrorism, this danger has disappeared for
the 
foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the reason why former members of the
Warsaw 
Pact have joined NATO, and why others are in the process of seeking to
do so, 
is that Central Europeans consider history more relevant to their
concerns 
than personalities. NATO does not protect its members against each
other. To 
couple NATO expansion with even partial Russian membership in NATO is,
in a 
sense, merging two incompatible courses of action.

It will be argued that this problem can be avoided by a careful
definition of 
objectives assigned to the new NATO-Russian council. But that would not
solve 
Russia's problem nor that of NATO. For if measures designed to protect 
against a reimperializing Russia -- however unlikely that contingency --
are 
handled separately by the same group of ambassadors who, wearing another
hat, 
are practicing cooperation, Russia will be inclined to claim
discrimination; 
and if Russia becomes a de facto NATO member, NATO ceases being an
alliance 
or turns into a vague collective security instrument.

Nor is a permanent assembly of NATO ambassadors the best forum for
exploring 
issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation and migration or other
global 
issues. For NATO is not now the principal forum for such issues. A new 
pattern of consultation outside the NATO framework is needed.

The situation is analogous to that posed by the collapse of the
Napoleonic 
empire. The end of Napoleon did not end the fears of a resurgent France.
But 
it was also recognized that permanent peace required the full
participation 
of France in international diplomacy. The solution was the creation of
the 
Quadruple Alliance to guard Europe against a renewal of French
expansionism. 
France was not a member of the security undertaking. But it was invited
to 
join as an equal partner in the so-called Concert of Europe that dealt
with 
political issues affecting the political stability of Europe.

An analogous institutional framework is in order to address the
contemporary 
challenge. Russia should become a full and equal partner in political 
discussions affecting international order. On matters affecting Atlantic

relations, the consultative machinery of the Organization for Security
and 
Cooperation in Europe could be raised to the head-of-state level; for
global 
issues, the G-8 meetings of industrial democracies could be returned to
their 
original emphasis on substance by giving them a political and not simply
an 
economic subject matter. Or else a new consultative framework should be 
created. But what will not work is to try to squeeze the new wine of an 
upheaval of the international system into the old bottles of
institutions 
created half a century ago for quite different purposes.

The writer, a former secretary of state, is president of Kissinger 
Associates, an international consulting firm. 

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