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http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=12253

The Long and Hidden History of the U.S in Somalia

Stephen Zunes, AlterNet

January 17, 2002

The East African nation of Somalia is being mentioned with increasing
frequency as the next possible target in the U.S.-led war against
international terrorism. With what passes for the central government
controlling little more than a section of the national capital of
Mogadishu, a separatist government in the north, and rival warlords and
clan leaders controlling most of the rest of the country, U.S. officials
believe that cells of the Al-Qaida terrorist network may have taken
advantage of the absence of governmental authority to set up operation.

Before the United States attacks that impoverished country, however, it
is important to know how Somalia became a possible haven for the
followers of Osama Bin Laden and what might result if the United States
goes to war.

As one of the most homogeneous countries in Africa, many would have not
predicted the chronic instability and violent divisions which have
gripped Somalia in recent years. During the early 1970s, Somalia was a
client of the Soviet Union, even allowing the Soviets to establish a
naval base at Berbera on the strategic north coast near the entrance to
the Red Sea. Somali dictator Siad Barre established this relationship in
response to the large-scale American military support of Somalia's
historic rival Ethiopia, then under the rule of the feudal emperor Haile
Selassie. When a military coup by leftist Ethiopian officers toppled the
monarchy in 1974 and declared the country a Marxist-Leninist state the
following year, the superpowers switched their allegiances, with the
Soviet Union backing the Ethiopia Dirgue and the United States siding
with the Barre regime in Somalia.

In 1977, Somalia attacked the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia in an
effort to incorporate the area's ethnic Somali population. The
Ethiopians were eventually able to repel the attack with large-scale
Soviet military support and 20,000 Cuban troops. Zbigniew Brzezinski,
then-National Security Advisor under President Jimmy Carter, has since
claimed that this conflict sparked the end of détente with the Soviet
Union and the renewal of the Cold War.

>From the late 1970s until just before Siad Barre's overthrow in early 
>1991,
the U.S. sent hundreds of millions of dollars of arms to Somalia in
return for the use of military facilities which had been originally
constructed for the Soviets. These bases were to be used to support
American military intervention in the Middle East. The consequences of
U.S. military support for the Barre regime on the Somali people was
deemed of little importance by American policymakers. The U.S.
government ignored warnings throughout the 1980s by Africa specialists,
human rights groups and humanitarian organizations that continued
American aid to the dictatorial government of Siad Barre would
eventually plunge Somalia into chaos.

These predictions proved tragically accurate. During the nearly fifteen
years of support by the United States and Italy, thousands of civilians
were massacred at the hands of Barre's increasingly authoritarian
regime. Full-scale civil war erupted in 1988 and the repression
increased still further, with clan leaders in the northern third of the
country declaring independence to escape government persecution. In
greatly centralizing his government's control, Barre severely weakened
traditional structures in Somali society which had kept civil order for
many years. To help maintain his grip on power, Barre played different
Somali clans against each other, sowing the seeds of the fratricidal
chaos to come, which in turn would contribute to mass starvation and
spur the ill-fated humanitarian intervention by the United States in
1992.

Meanwhile, by eliminating all potential rivals with a national
following, a power vacuum was created by Barre that could not be filled
when the U.S.-backed regime was finally overthrown in January 1991, an
event barely noticed outside the country as world attention was focused
on the start of the Gulf War. With the end of the Cold War and the
United States now granted bases in the Persian Gulf itself, Somalia fell
briefly off the radar screen of U.S. foreign policy.

There is widespread agreement among those familiar with Somalia that had
the U.S. government not supported the Barre regime with large amounts of
military aid, he would have been forced to step down long before his
misrule splintered the country. Prior to the dictator's downfall, former
U.S. Representative Howard Wolpe, then-chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Africa, called on the State Department to encourage
Barre to step down. His pleas were rejected. "What you are seeing,"
observed the Congressman and former professor of African Politics, "is a
general indifference to a disaster that we played a role in creating."

A U.S. diplomat who had been stationed in the Somali capital of
Mogadishu acknowledged, "It's easy to blame us for all this." But, he
argued, "This is a sovereign country we're taking about. They have
chosen to spend [U.S. military aid] that way, to hurt people and destroy
their own economy."

As the United States poured in more than $50 million of arms annually to
prop up the Barre regime, there was virtually no assistance offered that
would have helped build a selfsustaining economy which could feed
Somalia's people. In addition, the United States pushed a structural
adjustment program through the International Monetary Fund which
severely weakened the local agricultural economy. Combined with the
breakdown of the central government, drought conditions and rival
militias disrupting food supplies, there was famine on a massive scale,
resulting in the deaths of more than 300,000 Somalis, mostly children.

In November 1992, the outgoing Bush administration sent 30,000 U.S.
troops, primarily Marines and Army Rangers, to Somalia in what was
described as a humanitarian mission to assist in the distribution of
relief supplies which were being intercepted by armed militias without
reaching the civilian population in need. The United Nations Security
Council endorsed the initiative the following month. Many Somalis and
some relief organizations were grateful for the American role. Many
others expressed skepticism, noting that the famine had actually peaked
that summer and the security situation was also improving gradually. At
this point, the chaos limiting food shipments was limited to a small
area; most areas functioned as relatively peaceful fiefdoms. Most food
was getting through and the loss from theft was only slightly higher
than elsewhere in Africa. In some cases, U.S. forces essentially dumped
food on local markets, hurting indigenous farmers and creating greater
food shortages over the longer term. In any case, few Somalis were
involved in the decisions during this crucial period.

Most importantly for the United States, large numbers of Somalis saw the
American forces as representatives of the government which served as the
major Western supporter of the hated former dictatorship. Such an
overbearing foreign military presence in a country which had been free
from colonial rule for only a little more than three decades led to
growing resentment, particularly since these elite combat forces were
not trained for such humanitarian missions. (Author and journalist David
Halberstam quotes the U.S. Secretary of Defense telling an associate,
"We're sending the Rangers to Somalia. We are not going to be able to
control them. They are like overtrained pit bulls. No one controls
them.") Shootings at U.S. military roadblocks became increasingly
commonplace and Somalis witnessed scenes of mostly white American forces
harassing and shooting their black countrymen.

In addition, the U.S. role escalated to include attempts at disarming
some of the war lords, resulting in armed engagements, often in crowded
urban neighborhoods. This "mission creep" resulted in American
casualties, creating growing dissent at home in what had originally been
a widely-supported foreign policy initiative. The thousands of M16
rifles sent, courtesy of the American taxpayer, to Barre's armed forces
were now in the hands of rival militiamen who had not only used them to
kill their fellow countrymen and to disrupt the distribution of relief
supplies, but were now using them against American troops It wasn't long
before the slogan of American forces was "The only good Somali is a dead
Somali." It had become apparent that the U.S. had badly underestimated
the resistance.

The United States passed the mission on to the United Nations in May the
following year, marking the first time the world body had combined
peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian assistance. It was also
the first time the UN has intervened without a formal invitation by a
host government (because there wasn't any.) But Somalis had little trust
of the United Nations, either, particularly since the UN Secretary
General at that time was Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a major supporter of
Barre when he led Egypt's foreign ministry. U.S. forces, now leading the
UN mission, went on increasingly aggressive forays, including a major
battle in Mogadishu which resulted in the deaths of 18 Marines and
hundreds of Somali civilians, dramatized in the highly-fictionalized
thriller Black Hawk Down. The U.S.-led UN forces had become yet another
faction in the multi-sided conflict. Largely retreating to a fixed
position, the primary American objective soon became protecting its own
forces. With mounting criticism on Capitol Hill from both the left and
the right, President Bill Clinton withdrew American troops in March
1994. The United Nations pulled its last peacekeeping forces out one
year later.

The U.S. intervention in Somalia is now widely considered to have been a
fiasco. It is largely responsible for the subsequent U.S. hesitation
about so-called humanitarian intervention outside of high-altitude
bombing. It was the major factor in the tragic U.S. refusal to intervene
either unilaterally or through the United Nations to prevent the
genocide in Rwanda during the spring of 1994. The Somalia intervention
was most likely an ill-advised assertion of well-meaning liberal
internationalism, though there may have been other factors prompting the
American decision to intervene as well: perhaps as a rationalization for
increased military spending despite the end of the Cold War; an effort
to mollify the Islamic world for American overkill in the war against
Iraq and the inaction against the massacres of Muslims in Bosnia; and
possibly as a preemptive operation against possible Islamic extremists
rising out of the chaos. If the latter was the goal, it may have
backfired. Islamic radicals were able to find some willing recruits
among the Somalis, already upset by the U.S. support for Barre, now
additionally angry at the destruction wrought by direct U.S. military
intervention in their country.

In subsequent years, there has been only marginal progress towards
establishing any kind of widely-recognized national government. Somalia
is still divided into fiefdoms run by clan leaders and warlords, though
there is rarely any serious fighting. Some officials in the current Bush
Administration believe that Al-Qaida has established an important
network or active cells within this factious country.

If this is indeed the case, it begs the question as to how the United
States should respond. It is possible that U.S. forces have access to
remarkably accurate intelligence and would be able to pinpoint and take
out the cells without once again becoming embroiled in the messy urban
counter-insurgency warfare of 1993-94 or relying on air strikes in
heavily-populated areas, which would result in large-scale civilian
casualties. Based on the current methods employed by the Bush
administration to combat terrorism, however, this is rather doubtful.
The result of renewed U.S. military intervention in Somalia, then, could
be yet another debacle which would only encourage the extremist forces
we are trying to destroy.

Stephen Zunes is the Midde East analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus
(www.fpif.org) and associate professor in the department of politics at
the University of San Francisco.

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