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> Implications of Changing U.S. Force Structure in Korea > > Summary > > The United States will deploy an Interim Brigade Combat Team to > South Korea by 2007, according to South Korean media. The new > force -- more powerful than light infantry and more mobile than > heavy armor -- is ideal both for Korea's mountainous and urban > terrain and for regional deployments. The shift in U.S. force > structure on the Korean peninsula allows greater flexibility for > the troops based there, and it may reveal some shifts in > Washington's perception of the North Korean threat. > > Analysis > > The United States Forces in Korea (USFK) will deploy an Interim > Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) to South Korea by 2007, according to > South Korean media sources. Citing domestic defense sources, the > Korea Times and Chosun Ilbo indicated that the IBCT, a highly > mobile force, would replace one of the 2nd Infantry Division's > two brigades already deployed in Korea. > > The Korean IBCT reportedly would comprise 3,700 troops, 40 > armored carriers mounting 105-mm guns, 130 armored fighting > vehicles and 20 self-propelled guns. All equipment is readily > transportable in C-130 transport aircraft. The purpose of an IBCT > in general is to fill the gap between the time light infantry > arrives on a battlefield and the time heavy-armor forces reach > the area. The IBCT is more powerful than the former and > significantly more mobile than the latter. In the Korean context, > this shift in U.S. force configuration reveals changes in > Washington's attitude toward security threats in the Asia-Pacific > region. > > The idea of replacing a USFK brigade in Korea with a newer, more > mobile IBCT has been around for well over a year. Not only would > the new brigade allow greater mountain and urban fighting > capabilities to Washington's Korean-deployed forces but it also > would also be able to respond to other regional and even global > contingencies. Since the end of the Cold War, concerns have grown > that the 37,000 U.S. military personnel in Korea are locked down > on the peninsula and cannot contribute to operations elsewhere. > > The transformation of one of the 2nd Infantry Division's brigades > suggests a shift in Washington's perception of the challenges > faced by its Korea-based forces. In a possible war with North > Korea, the deployment of the IBCT would allow the military to > more readily push a counteroffensive into North Korea's > mountainous terrain. But more interestingly, the IBCT is not > designed just for the defense of South Korea. Instead, it is > intended to be available for other operations throughout the > Asia-Pacific region. > > By changing the configuration of one brigade and then allowing it > to leave the peninsula for other operations, Washington may be > revealing an altered perception of the threat posed by the North. > If the IBCT is to be made available for regional deployment, the > USFK is apparently confident that the remaining forces are > significant enough to deter or repel a potential North Korean > assault. This means either that the U.S. military assumes North > Korea's war-fighting abilities will be reduced by 2007 or -- > given Washington's changing stance on the use of the U.S. nuclear > arsenal -- that ground forces would not be the most effective > response to an assault. It also might mean that current U.S. > force structure on the peninsula is larger than necessary, given > other regional and global concerns. > > In South Korea, the deployment of an IBCT also may presage > changes in the balance and deployment of domestic forces. Unlike > heavier armor forces, the IBCT does not need to be deployed too > near the demilitarized zone. Its strength is in its mobility, not > in its ability to serve as static defense. As Washington and > Seoul look to find ways to reduce conventional forces on both > sides of the DMZ, the IBCT could be a bargaining tool to persuade > Pyongyang to pull some of its troops back as well. > > At the same time, however, the admission that U.S. forces in > Korea are not solely there for Korean contingencies but are also > designated to deploy regionally, may stir elements in South Korea > and even Japan that oppose the massive U.S. basing in these > nations. South Korean activists can argue that if the IBCT is not > vital for the defense of Korea, it is not necessary for the > United States to keep additional troops in Korea at all. The same > argument can be expanded in Japan, where the U.S. military > presence has become a political and nationalistic issue since the > Soviet Union's collapse, which removed the most obvious reason > for U.S. forces to be based in Japan. > > Despite the clear benefits to the United States in modifying its > force structure, Washington may inadvertently heighten the > political debate in Seoul and Tokyo over the need for a permanent > U.S. military presence in their respective countries at all. > ___________________________________________________________________ > > > <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< SEND THIS TO A FRIEND! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > Did you like this analysis? Then forward it to a friend! > > Got this from a friend? 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