The outside world's policy towards North Korea is in danger of turning
into a shambles that threatens to destabilise north-east Asia with little
obvious gain. The trouble is that the US, South Korea, the European Union
and Japan now run the risk of talking to Pyongyang at cross-purposes. It
is vital for them all to hammer out a consistent and forceful approach.
The immediate problem is that the Agreed Framework, which was
negotiated between the US and North Korea in 1994, is on the verge of
collapse. Under this deal, the US agreed to build a safe nuclear power
plant in North Korea to help meet the country's energy shortage in return
for Pyongyang abandoning its own nuclear ambitions.
But Pyongyang is now threatening to withdraw from the agreement because
of the seemingly incessant delays in building the reactor. Washington
could also withdraw because of Pyongyang's refusal to grant international
nuclear inspectors proper access.
Washington also harbours deep suspicions about North Korea's
missile-building programme and threat to proliferate weapons of mass
destruction. Pyongyang appears to be in the final stages of developing a
long-range missile that could at the very least hit Hawaii.
The heightened tensions between North Korea and the US have alarmed
South Korea, which has been pursuing a softer line towards Pyongyang.
Seoul's "sunshine" policy has considerably eased tensions on the peninsula
and lessened the likelihood of an accidental clash escalating into
full-scale confrontation.
But it would be foolish to exaggerate what the sunshine policy can
achieve. Many South Koreans, including the main opposition party, have
been deeply critical of the conciliatory approach to Pyongyang, believing
it has brought nothing in response. At the end of the day fine promises
must be backed by stern threats.
To that end, there may be some sense in the US playing "bad cop" while
South Korea, Japan, and the EU continue to play "good cop". But the danger
is that Pyongyang, which does not have the most sophisticated
understanding of the outside world, will not not follow the screenplay. It
might also encourage North Korea to start trying to play one country off
against another.
It would be better by far if the interested outside parties, including
China and Russia, could agree one consistent line towards Pyongyang,
offering inducements for good behaviour and threatening the use of force
if North Korea imperils international security.
