HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK
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Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2002 16:06:52 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Michael laird" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]:
counter dossier on Iraq
To: "mart-remote" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
this is long, but very informative. and, as you’ll
see, it fits in with what scott ritter has been
saying. take a look:
This addendum is published at
http://middleeast.reference.users.btopenworld.com/iraqncbfurther.html
and at the Traprock Peace Center website at
http://traprockpeace.org
September 29, 2002 ?
Dr. Glen Rangwala, Lecturer in politics at Cambridge
University, has written an Addendum to the
"Counter-Dossier." The Counter-Dossier, released by
Labour Against War on September 17 in the UK and
published by Traprock Peace Center in the US on
September 18, anticipated the release by Prime
Minister Blair’s dossier. Blair released his dossier
on September 24, a few hours before debate started in
the Commons that morning on war with Iraq.
Following is the text of the Addendum:
On 17 September, a week in advance of the release of
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s "dossier" on Iraq’s
non-conventional weapons, a pamphlet (a
"counter-dossier") that I co-authored with Alan
Simpson (MP for Nottingham
South) was released. The intention of this pamphlet
was to pre-empt some of the claims in the Prime
Minister’s dossier, and to raise the issues that the
dossier would need to address in detail for it to be
credible. An official version of the counter-dossier
is at:
http://www.labouragainstthewar.org.uk/link5.html
What follows are some further remarks on the themes of
counter-dossier.
These are in part a response to points in the Prime
Minister’s dossier. They may also serve as reference
notes, to be used in order to examine from a critical
perspective subsequent claims that are made about
Iraq’s non-conventional weapons.
I should flag up that I am not a biochemist, a
pharmacologist or a nuclear physicist. None of the
claims below about Iraq’s nuclear, chemical or
biological facilities are made as a result of my own
scientific investigations. Instead, they are collected
from two sources. Firstly, the majority of points
below are taken from published accounts of reputable
institutions, governmental bodies and international
organisations who have access to expertise that I do
not have. Secondly, a smaller number of claims are
taken from my own consultation with independent
experts in the fields of relevance.
Unlike the UK Government’s own dossier on Iraq’s
non-conventional weapons, these notes indicate the
sources for all the claims that it makes.
If any of the technical claims made below are
incorrect or incomplete, such mistakes have not been
made in a deliberate attempt to mislead the reader:
corrections and clarifications would be greatly
appreciated.
These comments are divided on issues of the threat of
Iraq’s weapons and those on the possibility of a
viable inspections regime.
1. The threat of Iraq’s weapons.
I. Stockpile
This Prime Minister’s dossier claims that information
already in the public domain "points clearly to Iraq’s
continued possession, after 1991, of chemical and
biological agents and weapons produced before the Gulf
War." (Executive Summary, para.2). There are also
references to surviving stocks of weapons in Chapter
2, para.13 and Chapter 3, paras.3 and 5-7 of the
dossier.
If Iraq had a stockpile of chemical and biological
weapons in 1998, it must consist of items produced
prior to 1991.
Not even the British government claims that Iraq was
engaged in the active production of chemical or
biological weapons in the period of weapons
inspections (1991 to 1998); the ongoing monitoring and
verification undertaken by UNSCOM would have detected
any such attempts.
The Iraqi government never provided UNSCOM with
information assessed to be sufficiently complete to
verify that Iraq had destroyed all the chemical and
biological agents it had produced prior to 1991. These
are items that are considered as "unaccounted for". It
may also be the case that Iraq had in fact produced
more of these agents than they had declared to UNSCOM
or that UNSCOM itself had uncovered.
Whilst it would undoubtedly be useful to have a clear
understanding of what happened to all of Iraq’s
chemical and biological weapons material that it had
produced, a more pressing question here is whether any
chemical or biological agents produced by Iraq prior
to 1991 would have remained useable after at least 11
years. As the analysis below attempts to demonstrate,
the overwhelming majority of the chemical and
biological warfare agents produced by Iraq prior to
1991 would be expected to have deteriorated to the
point where they are no longer lethal.
If the Prime Minister’s past allegations that Iraq
possessed a stockpile of illicit weapons were to be
true, then the dossier would need to present credible
evidence that Iraq had
managed to stabilise its chemical and biological
agents to a greater extent than it is previously
thought to have done.
The dossier does not make this claim: it only makes an
unsubstantiated assertion (in Chapter 3, para.6) that
Iraq had "the knowledge and capability to add
stabiliser to nerve agent and other chemical warfare
agents which would prevent such decomposition." The
fact that this assertion falls short of the claim that
Iraq actually achieved the stabilisation of its
chemical agents can be taken as an acknowledgement
that no evidence has been discovered - after over 7
years of intrusive inspections and 11 years of
intelligence gathering - to demonstrate Iraq’s
retention of stabilised chemical or biological agents.
(a) Biological warfare agents.
Before 1990, Iraq manufactured four major biological
agents. (i) Clostridium botulinum (botulinum toxin).
According to the "strategic dossier" of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
of 9 September 2002:
"Any botulinum toxin produced in 1989-90 would no
longer be useful" (p.40).
According to a CIA briefing of 1990 on the threat from
Iraq’s biological weapons facilities:
"Botulinum toxin is nonpersistent, degrading rapidly
in the environment. .. [It is] fairly stable for a
year when stored at temperatures below 27c.
"("Iraq’s Biological Warfare Program: Saddam’s Ace In
The Hole", August[?] 1990, at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/gulf/cia/960702/73924_01.htm)
(ii) Anthrax.
Much of the discussion of the threat of
Iraq’s biological weapons has focused on Iraq’s past
development of anthrax. By contrast, a report from
1998 by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) seems to discount the possibility that
the anthrax produced in bulk prior to 1991 can still
be effectively weaponised:
"Anthrax spores are extremely hardy and can achieve
65% to 80% lethality against untreated patients for
years. Fortunately, Iraq does not seem to have
produced dry, storable agents and only seems to have
deployed wet Anthrax agents, which have a relatively
limited life."
(Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iraq’s Past and Future
Biological Weapons Capabilities", CSIS Middle East
Dynamic Net Assessment, February 1998; at:
http://www.csis.org/stratassessment/reports/iraq_bios.pdf)
It should be noted that this assessment of the
degradability of wet anthrax is not accepted by the
entire expert community. The IISS report of 9
September 2002 states that "wet anthrax from [the
1989-90 period - if stored properly - would still be
infectious."
(p.40).
(iii) Aflatoxin. The Prime Minister stated in the
House of Commons on 24 September 2002 that Aflatoxin
is a lethal agent. It is not. Prolonged exposure may
be carcinogenic, but as a weapon its relevant
characteristic is in inducing headaches, vomiting and
liver disease.
Source: CSIS paper of February 1998, as above; p.13.
(iv) Clostridium Perfringens (causing gas gangrene).
Persistence unknown. However, as an anaerobic
bacillus, it has the same causes for a short-shelf
life as other anaerobic bacteria such as clostridium
botulinum.
(b) Chemical warfare agents.
Before 1990, Iraq had produced and weaponised four
lethal chemical agents:
(i) and (ii) Sarin and cyclosarin. These "G-series"
nerve
agents, used in the latter stages of the
Iran-Iraq war, deteriorate rapidly, especially if
impurities
are present in their manufacture. This seems
to have been the case with Iraq’s nerve agents. The
Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force of the US
Department of Defense gave the following assessment in
March 2001:
"Impure or improperly stored sarin is unstable and
degrades over time. US experts consider chemical
warfare agents less than 50 percent pure to be
militarily ineffective. Western sources estimate the
sarin Iraq produced never exceeded 60 percent purity,
and Iraq reported that poor operating practices at Al
Muthanna limited the purity of sarin to between 20 and
50 percent. Since it contained at least 40 percent
impurities when manufactured, sarin produced at Al
Muthanna had a short shelf life. The CIA estimates the
chemical warfare agent in the rockets stored at Al
Muthanna had deteriorated to approximately 18 percent
purity by the time that Bunker 2 was destroyed,
leaving about 1600 kilograms (1.6 metric tons) of
viable sarin."
("The Gulf War Air Campaign - Possible Chemical
Warfare Agent Release at Al Muthanna, February
8, 1991", 19 March 2001; at:
http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/al_muth/al_muth_s02.htm)
The taskforce of the Department of Defense attributed
the high level of Iraqi cooperation in revealing the
scale of its earlier chemical programme to the fact
that the Iraqi government realised that the nerve
agents it had produced were no longer viable:
"We believe Iraq was largely cooperative on its latest
declarations because many of its residual munitions
were of little use - other than bolstering the
credibility of Iraq’s declaration - because of
chemical agent degradation and leakage problems."
("Chemical Warfare Agent Issues During the Persian
Gulf War",
Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, April 2002; at:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/gulfwar/cwagents/cwpaper1.htm)
A similar assessment was made by the CIA in a
memorandum from January 1991:
"Iraq is not able to make good-quality chemical
agents.
Technical failures have reduced their purity and
caused problems in storage and handling. This is a
particular problem for the sarin- type nerve agents
(GB and GF). These both contain hydrofluoricacid (HF),
an impurity that attacks metal surfaces and catalyzes
nerve agent decomposition. This leads to metal failure
and leaks in the ammunition, increasing handling
hazards. ... Lower purity significantly limits shelf
life and reduces toxic effects when the munition is
employed. ... The nerve agent should have already
begun to deteriorate, and decomposition should make
most of the nerve agent weapons unserviceable by the
end of March 1991."
("Iraq: Potential for Chemical Weapon Use", 25 January
1991; at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/gulf/cia/970825/970613_dim37_91d_txt_0001.html)
This assessment is repeated in the IISS strategic
dossier of 9 September 2002:
"As a practical matter, any nerve agent from this
period [pre-1991] would have deteriorated by now.."
(p.51
)
(iii) Mustard. A "blister agent", mustard has a longer
shelf-life than G-series nerve agents. As the final
assessment report from UNSCOM recorded:
"a dozen mustard-filled shells were recovered at a
former CW storage facility in the period 1997 - 1998
.. After seven years, the purity of mustard ranged
between 94 and 97%."
(Enclosure 1 to the Annex of the Letter to the
President of the Security Council, 29 January 1999,
S/1999/94, para.33; at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/s99-94.htm)
However, mustard has a low volume-to-effectiveness
ratio. As the IISS record in the strategic dossier:
"large amounts of mustard are necessary for effective
military operations.
Roughly, one tonne of agent is needed to effectively
contaminate 2.6 square kilometres of territory, if
properly disseminated."
Iraq declared that it filled approximately 13,000
artillery shells with mustard prior to 1991. UNSCOM
accounted for 12,792 of these shells, and destroyed
them in the period of 1992-94. However, Iraq also
declared that 550 mustard-filled artillery shells had
been lost in the aftermath of the Gulf War. The extent
to which these - if they still existed – could
constitute an ongoing danger should be assessed in
light of the need to deploy large amounts of mustard
for effective use.
(iv) VX. In 1998, UNSCOM found VX degradation products
on missile warheads, indicating that Iraq had
stabilised VX sufficiently and had managed to
weaponise it (in contrast to the Government of Iraq’s
own claims).
The IISS strategic dossier records the
status of VX produced before the Gulf War:
"Any VX produced by Iraq before 1991 is likely to have
decomposed over the past decade ... Any G-agent or
V-agent stocks that Iraq concealed from UNSCOM
inspections are likely to have deteriorated by now."
(pp. 52 and 53).
In summary, the overwhelming majority of the chemical
and biological weapons agents that Iraq has retained
from prior to 1991 would no longer be useable in the
present day – if the assessments presented above are
correct. The major exception is mustard. However,
there is no evidence to suggest that Iraq has retained
sufficient stocks of mustard to deploy in a militarily
effective way.
II. Ongoing development
The majority of the claims in the Prime Minister’s
dossier, from pp.17-32, relate not to the retention of
prior stocks - the focus of UNSCOM’s work - but to the
development of new nuclear, chemical and biological
facilities.
Any new facilities could either manufacture new
weaponisable material, or - more simply - they could
constitute chemical agents out of precursor stocks
that were undeclared by Iraq to UNSCOM and would not
have deteriorated as the agents themselves would have
done.
For example, if stable precursors for VX, sarin
or cyclosarin were retained by Iraq after 1991, they
could be used to produce fresh
supplies of these agents.
However, the Prime Minister’s dossier - like the
strategic dossier of the IISS - provides no evidence
that this is actually taking place. The assertions
that facilities are being reconstituted or built is
phrased in noticeably ambiguous language: this
indicates that there is considerable uncertainty
within the UK intelligence institutions about whether
Iraq is actually engaged in the development of
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
(a) Nuclear development
The main evidence presented in the dossier for the
continuation of Iraq’s nuclear programme is that Iraq
has been "making concerted covert efforts to acquire
dual-use technology and materials with nuclear
applications" since 1998.
However, it should be noted that the claim in the
dossier is not that the materials that Iraq has sought
to import can only be used as part of a nuclear
weapons programme, but that these materials could be
used in such a programme.
Conversely, it is quite conceivable that these
materials are not being used in a nuclear programme at
all.
For example, the dossier notes that Iraq has attempted
to purchase Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride (AHF) since
1998, and that AHF could be used in gas centrifuges
for the enrichment of uranium (Chapter 3, para.21).
However, AHF is also used as an alkylating agent in
the petrochemical industry.
For a country that has been made solely dependent upon
its petrochemical exports for its foreign exchange,
the import of AHF can hardly be a surprise or a cause
for suspicion.
More significantly, the attempts by Iraq to import
aluminium tubes has been highlighted both in President
George W. Bush’s paper "A Decade of Deception and
Defiance" (12 September 2002), p.9, and in the Prime
Minister’s dossier on p.26, para.22, and presented as
evidence that Iraq was seeking to construct gas
centrifuges. David Albright, former IAEA inspector and
director of the Institute for Science and
International Security (ISIS), has argued that the
aluminium tubes are more likely to be used in the
making of conventional artillery rockets.
Although this was mentioned in the original
counter-dossier, an ISIS paper has subsequently made
the following clarifications: Iraq has imported the
same form of aluminium tubes from the 1980s onwards,
for non-nuclear purposes.
That steel or carbon fibre tubes would have been more
suitable if Iraq had been planning to use them in the
construction of gas centrifuges. Iraq had previously
invested in developing steel and carbon fibre parts
for its nuclear programme before 1990.
These tubes are not critical centrifuge components;
the most advanced components (rotors, end caps,
bearings) would still need to be imported if Iraq was
intent on building gas centrifuges.
(ISIS report, "Aluminum Tubing..", 23 September 2002,
updated on 27 September; at:
www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/aluminumtubes.html
).
It is noteworthy that none of the imports listed in
the Prime Minister’s dossier are identified as being
for the exclusive purpose of nuclear development, and
it is
not claimed that these items are in fact being put to
use in a nuclear programme.
The sole claim that could indicate an active nuclear
programme is one of the most ambiguous in the entire
dossier: it is claimed that "Iraq has sought the
supply of significant quantities of uranium from
Africa" (Chapter 3, para.20). The absence of any
detail - such as the year (or even the decade) in
which this purported attempt to obtain uranium; the
country in which Iraq’s alleged activities are thought
to have taken place; and the quality of the uranium
sought - coupled with the lack of emphasis given to
this claim in the dossier may indicate that a serious
risk is not attributed to this possibility. Iraq has
indeed sought to import significant quantities of
uranium (yellowcake) from Niger; this was in1981-82.
Could it be this episode to which the dossier refers,
and the reason why the claim is left in such an
ambiguous form?
(b) Chemical and biological weapons development
One of the most detailed set of claims in the Prime
Minister’s dossier concerns the rebuilding of
facilities that were formerly associated with chemical
and biological weapons. It is noticeable that the
dossier does not claim that any specific facility is
currently being used for the production of chemical or
biological warfare agents. Instead, the facilities are
identified as being capable of producing such agents
as well as civilian products, or that the material
that is being produced could be used in the
development of illicit weapons.
Unless there is a reliable assessment that the
production undertaken at these facilities is part of a
chemical and biological warfare programme, the
information presented in Chapter 3, paras.8-13, cannot
be taken as indicating that Iraq has recently produced
illicit chemical and biological agents. This is an
overview of the sites mentioned in the Prime
Minister’s dossier.
Fallujah 2, near Habbaniyah: this site, which used to
produce chemical weapons precursors, was bombed in the
Gulf War, and its remaining stocks were removed and
destroyed by UNSCOM. It was inactive in 1998.
The Prime Minister’s dossier claims that it now
produces chlorine and phenol (ie carbolic acid), which
could serve as precursor chemicals. They could also be
used as disinfectants. There are no assertions in the
dossier that they are currently being used otherwise.
Ibn Sina Company at Tarmiyah: the dossier identifies
this as a chemical research centre (and provides a
satellite photograph). The Research Centre for
Industrial Chemistry which was established in March
1992.
According to IAEA reports from 1993 and 1994, the
Centre was engaged in small scale chemical recovery
work, such as the purification of phosphoric acid and
the recovery of vanadium from coal ash. al-Qa’qa’
chemical complex: according to the dossier, this plant
produces phosgene. Iraqi officials claimed to
journalists visiting the site after the release of the
dossier that phosgene is produced as a by-product of
the manufacture of gun-powder. al-Sharqat: this
facility is identified in the dossier as producing
nitric acid. Indeed, according to the IAEA report of
January 1994, it is the principle supplier of
sulphuric and nitric acid to Iraqi industries. The
dossier does not claim that the nitric acid produced
at al-Sharqat is used in the production of illicit
weapons, merely that nitric acid "can be used" in
missile fuel and in purifying uranium.
Fallujah: this is identified in the dossier as
producing castor oil.
The official purpose of the production of castor oil
is for brake fluids. al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease
Vaccine Institute (also known as al-Manal). Prior to
1991, it was engaged in research on viral warfare
agents. In March 2001, the Government of Iraq wrote to
the UN
Secretary-General to notify him of the reactivation of
this facility for the production of foot and mouth
vaccine. A number of journalists have visited
al-Dawrah since then. On 12 August 2002, a reporter
from Russian news agency RIA-Novosti recounted that:
"Journalists were shown empty shops at the plant, and
dark, dusty premises with no light. Electric cables
and various pipes along the walls had been cut
through. Remnants of structures and equipment were
piled on the floor."
Amariyah Sera and Vaccine Plant at Abu Ghraib:
according to the dossier, this site has expanded
storage capacity. Journalists were allowed into the
new buildings at this plant within two hours of the
dossier’s release, and reported that they found only
empty fridges.
III.Delivery means
Unless the chemical and biological agents could be
delivered by Iraqi forces, they cannot be considered
to be a danger. Four possibilities are mentioned in
the Prime Minister’s dossier (Chapter 3, para.14):
free-fall bombs, artillery shells and rockets,
helicopter and aircraft borne sprayers (such as the
L-29), and ballistic missile.
With regard to Iraq’s biological weapons, the IISS
strategic dossier claims:
"On balance, Iraq’s ability to deliver BW efficiently
with conventional munitions (missiles, planes,
rockets, etc.) against opposing forces on the
battlefield or against civilian targets beyond Iraq’s
borders appears to be limited, unless Iraq has made
substantial advances in delivery technology."
(p.29)
There are no claims in the Prime Minister’s dossier
about such substantial advances. Out of the four
delivery means listed above, helicopter and aircraft
borne sprayers have been discussed in the
counter-dossier, and shown not to be a viable delivery
means beyond Iraq’s borders.
Artillery shells and Iraq’s rockets have a very
limited range, and could only be considered a threat
to Iraq’s own citizenry and those within a few
kilometres of Iraq’s borders.
Ballistic missiles are also not a credible delivery
means. The IISS strategic dossier reviews the evidence
on the design of Iraq’s missile warhead for al-Hussein
missile: "dissemination would be extremely inefficient
if Iraq has not advanced beyond its 1990-era design.
Most agent would be destroyed on impact, and the
immediate area of dispersal would be fairly small (a
few hundred metres in diameter)." (p.40; for
biological agents).
"Unless Iraq has advanced beyond the impact fusing and
warhead design of its 1990-era special warheads,
however, its ability to effectively disseminate CW
agent with such missile warheads is questionable. Most
of the CW agent is likely to be destroyed on impact,
and the remainder would be dispersed over a limited
area." (pp.53-54).
Delivery of free-fall bombs would require strong air
force capabilities. According to the IISS, however,
these are "very weak ... Poor maintenance, lack of
spare parts, and low flight training time has likely
degraded operational performance." (p.54)
IV. Threat
There is no presentation in the Prime Minister’s
dossier of Iraq having a strategic doctrine - or even
a military plan - to use chemical, biological or
nuclear weapons in an offensive capacity. There is no
indication of why Iraqi leaders would have an
intention to use such weapons, other than to deter
current US attempts to unseat the current regime by
force.
2. The need for ongoing inspections in Iraq
One of the most problematic parts of the Prime
Minister’s dossier is the discussion of the
"Presidential sites" (Part 2, para.5). The dossier
states that inspectors were "barred" from these sites
in December 1997, and by virtue of omission implies
that these sites remained unaccessed by inspectors.
Instead, an agreement was reached in February 1998
between the UN Secretary-General and the Government of
Iraq (the Memorandum of Understanding of 23 February
1998) which allowed weapons inspectors access to all
sites in Iraq, as long as they were accompanied by
senior diplomats appointed by the UN Secretary-General
at eight listed Presidential sites (the procedure for
inspections is here). The Memorandum of Understanding
was endorsed by the UN Security Council in Resolution
1154 (2 March 1998); it was agreed to by the British
government of the time, also headed by Prime Minister
Blair. The Iraqi government fulfilled the terms of the
Memorandum of Understanding, and no further delays and
obstacles were reported by weapons inspectors over
these sites in the remaining period of inspections.
Satisfactory compliance from the Government of Iraq
with regard to Presidential sites was noted in the
reports to the Security Council of 15 April 1998
(S/1998/326) and 6 May 1998 (S/1998/377), and was
welcomed in a statement of the President of the
Security Council of 14 May 1998 (S/PRST/1998/11).
In the dossier and in the Prime Minister’s
accompanying speech to the House of Commons, repeated
reference was made to the large area of the
Presidential sites.
The UN technical mission to Iraq
that surveyed these sites issued a report on 20
February, prior to the conclusion of the Memorandum of
Understanding. The total area of the eight
Presidential sites amounts to 31.5 square kilometres,
of which approximately 10.2 square kilometres is made
up of lakes. One site, the Radwaniyah in Baghdad,
totalled around 17.8 square kilometres, and is by far
the largest (para.14). The mission conducted detailed
surveys of each site, and found no military
installations (other than sentry towers, guard rooms,
and - in one case - headquarters for the Presidential
Battalion) on any of them (para.12).
The draft resolution placed by the US before the
Security Council on 28 September seeks to do away with
this category of Presidential sites, and thus nullify
the Memorandum of Understanding that the US and UK had
previously agreed to. As expected, the Government of
Iraq has rejected this new provision. It is likely
that if the resolution is passed, Iraq will not permit
inspectors into Presidential sites without the
diplomatic accompaniment agreed in 1998; it is
possible that the whole inspections regime will be
blocked by the US if there is no agreement on this
issue.
Alternatively, a confrontation will be
provoked in which the Government of Iraq withdraws its
offer to allow unrestricted access to weapons
inspectors. The US will thus have succeeded in
preventing the resumption of inspections, and in
preserving the pretext for war that the Iraqi offer
threatened to discredit.
GLEN RANGWALA, 27 September 2002.
Contact details on Index page.
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