On 13 Apr 1997, Paul Richards wrote: > Marc Slemko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > > On Sat, 12 Apr 1997, P. Alejandro Lopez-Valencia wrote: > > > > > The use of a modified environemt PATH is not reflected in the > > > actual $PATH passed to the CGI. It may constitute a security hole > > > as the $PATH used is that of the owner of the parent process (root). > > > > What do you mean "modified path"? Who is modifying it? The path should > > be that in effect when the server was started, or some default path if > > there was none. Generally root's path is reasonably restrictive; if you > > wish to modify it you should be able to use SetEnv or change the path > > before you start httpd. > > We recently ran into this at work. I don't see any reason to pass the > $PATH onto scripts at all. Any scripts that depend on the $PATH aren't > written robustly enough amd should be corrected to not rely on the > server's environement.
I don't buy that. What if you are trying to write a generic script and need to use ls? How are you supposed to magically know where to find it? It is a great idea in principle, but means that many scripts have to be changed for each server which isn't really a nice thing. > Most security breaches are due to admin error so as far as possible > programs should take this into account. I do, however, agree with the concept of what you are saying (just not sure it can be reasonably implemented...) and think that this should be: - more clearly documented - configurable