Date: Saturday, June 10, 2017 @ 18:22:33 Author: archange Revision: 236037
Add erlang19(-nox) to fix CouchDB building Added: erlang19-nox/ erlang19-nox/repos/ erlang19-nox/trunk/ erlang19-nox/trunk/PKGBUILD erlang19-nox/trunk/openssl-1.1.0-fixup.patch erlang19-nox/trunk/openssl-1.1.0.patch erlang19-nox/trunk/otp-0007-Fix-CVE-2016-10253.patch -----------------------------------+ PKGBUILD | 112 +++ openssl-1.1.0-fixup.patch | 32 + openssl-1.1.0.patch | 1062 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ otp-0007-Fix-CVE-2016-10253.patch | 318 ++++++++++ 4 files changed, 1524 insertions(+) Added: erlang19-nox/trunk/PKGBUILD =================================================================== --- erlang19-nox/trunk/PKGBUILD (rev 0) +++ erlang19-nox/trunk/PKGBUILD 2017-06-10 18:22:33 UTC (rev 236037) @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +# Maintainer: Bruno Pagani (a.k.a. ArchangeGabriel) <archa...@archlinux.org> +# Contributor: Alexander F Rødseth <xypr...@archlinux.org> +# Contributor: Lukas Fleischer <lfleisc...@archlinux.org> +# Contributor: Vesa Kaihlavirta <v...@archlinux.org> +# Contributor: Sarah Hay <sarah...@mb.sympatico.ca> +# Contributor: Tom Burdick <thomas.burd...@wrightwoodtech.com> +# Contributor: Ricardo Catalinas Jiménez <jimenezr...@gmail.com> + +pkgname=erlang19-nox +pkgver=19.3 +pkgrel=1 +pkgdesc="General-purpose concurrent functional programming language developed by Ericsson (headless version, only for building CouchDB)" +arch=('x86_64' 'i686') +url="http://www.erlang.org/" +license=('Apache') +depends=('zlib' 'openssl') +makedepends=('perl' 'git') +conflicts=('erlang') +options=('staticlibs') +source=("git+https://github.com/erlang/otp.git#tag=OTP-${pkgver}" + 'otp-0007-Fix-CVE-2016-10253.patch' + 'openssl-1.1.0.patch' + 'openssl-1.1.0-fixup.patch') +sha256sums=('SKIP' + 'a1361b0fd7b32d8de061f1a985df31f5b37f433b42d46a6a03e2f19c9372b46e' + 'dd315047f3ccdad8609a5eb881eb2f312222316e5fcc34ebec2a0b6328d5a7a5' + '3ca0a3b8426f1ad08b7bb2fb45a243cf17efa7d5db0ed20a934cd8cbf6178b53') + +prepare() { + cd otp + git cherry-pick -n 25aa0128340d819e85e641f0ef8b9e0fd5fdda0b + git cherry-pick -n e30294f44d02200c20a80f1a3a2bb075afc3747d + git cherry-pick -n 78a5de9611c25a4e7b5248aa9828f949f3a5c131 + git cherry-pick -n 1cdaf0a6fd8dbbf08fe88dd148424df4da683f48 + patch -Np1 -i ../openssl-1.1.0.patch + patch -Np1 -i ../openssl-1.1.0-fixup.patch + patch -Np1 -i ../otp-0007-Fix-CVE-2016-10253.patch + ./otp_build autoconf +} + +build() { + cd otp + + # List of apps at http://erlang.org/doc/applications.html, CouchDB only needs the following: + # compiler + # erts + # kernel + # sasl + # stdlib > parsetools + # + # os_mon > otp_mibs > snmp + # + # asn1 + # crypto + # inets + # public_key + # ssl + # xmerl + # + # runtime_tools + # syntax_tools + # + # Plus for makedepends: + # erl_interface + # eunit + # reltool + + # Actually this is not working at release step, but not clear which app is missing for that. + # So massively commenting out. + ./configure \ + --prefix=/usr \ + --enable-smp-support \ + --disable-sctp \ + --without-javac #\ + # --without-mnesia \ + # --without-odbc \ + # --without-diameter \ + # --without-eldap \ + # --without-gs \ + # --without-jinterface \ + # --without-megaco \ + # --without-ssh \ + # --without-wx \ + # --without-debugger \ + # --without-dialyzer \ + # --without-et \ + # --without-observer \ + # --without-percept \ + # --without-tools \ + # --without-typer \ + # --without-common_test \ + # --without-edoc \ + # --without-erl_docgen \ + # --without-cosEvent \ + # --without-cosEventDomain \ + # --without-cosFileTransfer \ + # --without-cosNotification \ + # --without-cosProperty \ + # --without-cosTime \ + # --without-cosTransactions \ + # --without-ic \ + # --without-orber \ + # --without-hipe + make +} + +package() { + make -C otp DESTDIR="${pkgdir}" install + + # License + install -Dm0644 "${srcdir}"/otp/LICENSE.txt -t "${pkgdir}"/usr/share/licenses/erlang +} Added: erlang19-nox/trunk/openssl-1.1.0-fixup.patch =================================================================== --- erlang19-nox/trunk/openssl-1.1.0-fixup.patch (rev 0) +++ erlang19-nox/trunk/openssl-1.1.0-fixup.patch 2017-06-10 18:22:33 UTC (rev 236037) @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +--- otp/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c 2017-04-28 09:39:16.685119582 +0000 ++++ otp/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c 2017-04-28 09:41:19.371604045 +0000 +@@ -1720,7 +1720,7 @@ + ErlNifBinary key, ivec, text; + #ifdef HAVE_EVP_AES_CTR + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; + unsigned char *out; + int outl = 0; + #else +@@ -1749,15 +1749,15 @@ + } + + out = enif_make_new_binary(env,text.size,&ret); +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); +- EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, cipher, NULL, ++ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); ++ EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, + key.data, ivec.data, (argv[3] == atom_true)); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&ctx, 0); +- EVP_CipherUpdate(&ctx, out, &outl, text.data, text.size); ++ EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, out, &outl, text.data, text.size); + ASSERT(outl == text.size); +- EVP_CipherFinal_ex(&ctx, out + outl, &outl); ++ EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, out + outl, &outl); + ASSERT(outl == 0); +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + #else + memcpy(ivec_clone, ivec.data, 16); + memset(ecount_buf, 0, sizeof(ecount_buf)); Added: erlang19-nox/trunk/openssl-1.1.0.patch =================================================================== --- erlang19-nox/trunk/openssl-1.1.0.patch (rev 0) +++ erlang19-nox/trunk/openssl-1.1.0.patch 2017-06-10 18:22:33 UTC (rev 236037) @@ -0,0 +1,1062 @@ +--- a/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto_callback.c ++++ b/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto_callback.c +@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static void nomem(size_t size, const char* op) + abort(); + } + +-static void* crypto_alloc(size_t size) ++static void* crypto_alloc(size_t size CCB_FILE_LINE_ARGS) + { + void *ret = enif_alloc(size); + +@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static void* crypto_alloc(size_t size) + nomem(size, "allocate"); + return ret; + } +-static void* crypto_realloc(void* ptr, size_t size) ++static void* crypto_realloc(void* ptr, size_t size CCB_FILE_LINE_ARGS) + { + void* ret = enif_realloc(ptr, size); + +@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static void* crypto_realloc(void* ptr, size_t size) + nomem(size, "reallocate"); + return ret; + } +-static void crypto_free(void* ptr) ++static void crypto_free(void* ptr CCB_FILE_LINE_ARGS) + { + enif_free(ptr); + } +--- a/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto_callback.h ++++ b/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto_callback.h +@@ -18,13 +18,20 @@ + * %CopyrightEnd% + */ + ++#include <openssl/crypto.h> ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L ++# define CCB_FILE_LINE_ARGS ++#else ++# define CCB_FILE_LINE_ARGS , const char *file, int line ++#endif ++ + struct crypto_callbacks + { + size_t sizeof_me; + +- void* (*crypto_alloc)(size_t size); +- void* (*crypto_realloc)(void* ptr, size_t size); +- void (*crypto_free)(void* ptr); ++ void* (*crypto_alloc)(size_t size CCB_FILE_LINE_ARGS); ++ void* (*crypto_realloc)(void* ptr, size_t size CCB_FILE_LINE_ARGS); ++ void (*crypto_free)(void* ptr CCB_FILE_LINE_ARGS); + + /* openssl callbacks */ + #ifdef OPENSSL_THREADS +--- a/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c ++++ b/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c +@@ -64,57 +64,57 @@ + /* Helper macro to construct a OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER. + * See openssl/opensslv.h + */ +-#define OpenSSL_version(MAJ, MIN, FIX, P) \ ++#define PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION(MAJ, MIN, FIX, P) \ + ((((((((MAJ << 8) | MIN) << 8 ) | FIX) << 8) | (P-'a'+1)) << 4) | 0xf) + +-#define OpenSSL_version_plain(MAJ, MIN, FIX) \ +- OpenSSL_version(MAJ,MIN,FIX,('a'-1)) ++#define PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION_PLAIN(MAJ, MIN, FIX) \ ++ PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION(MAJ,MIN,FIX,('a'-1)) + + +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OpenSSL_version_plain(1,0,0) ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION_PLAIN(1,0,0) + #include <openssl/modes.h> + #endif + + #include "crypto_callback.h" + +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OpenSSL_version_plain(0,9,8) \ ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION_PLAIN(0,9,8) \ + && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA224) && defined(NID_sha224) \ + && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256) /* disabled like this in my sha.h (?) */ + # define HAVE_SHA224 + #endif +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OpenSSL_version_plain(0,9,8) \ ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION_PLAIN(0,9,8) \ + && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256) && defined(NID_sha256) + # define HAVE_SHA256 + #endif +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OpenSSL_version_plain(0,9,8) \ ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION_PLAIN(0,9,8) \ + && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA384) && defined(NID_sha384)\ + && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA512) /* disabled like this in my sha.h (?) */ + # define HAVE_SHA384 + #endif +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OpenSSL_version_plain(0,9,8) \ ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION_PLAIN(0,9,8) \ + && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA512) && defined(NID_sha512) + # define HAVE_SHA512 + #endif +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OpenSSL_version(0,9,7,'e') ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION(0,9,7,'e') + # define HAVE_DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt + #endif + +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OpenSSL_version(0,9,8,'o') \ ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION(0,9,8,'o') \ + && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) \ + && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) \ + && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA) + # define HAVE_EC + #endif + +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OpenSSL_version(0,9,8,'c') ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION(0,9,8,'c') + # define HAVE_AES_IGE + #endif + +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OpenSSL_version_plain(1,0,1) ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION_PLAIN(1,0,1) + # define HAVE_EVP_AES_CTR + # define HAVE_GCM + # define HAVE_CMAC +-# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OpenSSL_version(1,0,1,'d') ++# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION(1,0,1,'d') + # define HAVE_GCM_EVP_DECRYPT_BUG + # endif + #endif +@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ + # define HAVE_CHACHA20_POLY1305 + #endif + +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= OpenSSL_version(0,9,8,'l') ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION(0,9,8,'l') + # define HAVE_ECB_IVEC_BUG + #endif + +@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ + + #endif + ++ + #ifdef VALGRIND + # include <valgrind/memcheck.h> + +@@ -225,6 +226,122 @@ + } \ + } while (0) + ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION_PLAIN(1,1,0) ++ ++/* ++ * In OpenSSL 1.1.0, most structs are opaque. That means that ++ * the structs cannot be allocated as automatic variables on the ++ * C stack (because the size is unknown) and that it is necessary ++ * to use access functions. ++ * ++ * For backward compatibility to previous versions of OpenSSL, define ++ * on our versions of the new functions defined in 1.1.0 here, so that ++ * we don't have to sprinkle ifdefs throughout the code. ++ */ ++ ++static HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void); ++static void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx); ++ ++static HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new() ++{ ++ HMAC_CTX *ctx = CRYPTO_malloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX), __FILE__, __LINE__); ++ HMAC_CTX_init(ctx); ++ return ctx; ++} ++ ++static void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx) ++{ ++ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx); ++ return CRYPTO_free(ctx); ++} ++ ++#define EVP_MD_CTX_new() EVP_MD_CTX_create() ++#define EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx) ++ ++static INLINE int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d); ++static INLINE int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q); ++static INLINE int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp); ++ ++static INLINE int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) ++{ ++ r->n = n; ++ r->e = e; ++ r->d = d; ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static INLINE int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) ++{ ++ r->p = p; ++ r->q = q; ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static INLINE int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) ++{ ++ r->dmp1 = dmp1; ++ r->dmq1 = dmq1; ++ r->iqmp = iqmp; ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static INLINE int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key); ++static INLINE int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g); ++ ++static INLINE int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) ++{ ++ d->pub_key = pub_key; ++ d->priv_key = priv_key; ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static INLINE int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) ++{ ++ d->p = p; ++ d->q = q; ++ d->g = g; ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static INLINE int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key); ++static INLINE int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g); ++static INLINE void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, ++ const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g); ++static INLINE void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, ++ const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key); ++ ++static INLINE int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) ++{ ++ dh->pub_key = pub_key; ++ dh->priv_key = priv_key; ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static INLINE int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) ++{ ++ dh->p = p; ++ dh->q = q; ++ dh->g = g; ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static INLINE void ++DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g) ++{ ++ *p = dh->p; ++ *q = dh->q; ++ *g = dh->g; ++} ++ ++static INLINE void ++DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key) ++{ ++ *pub_key = dh->pub_key; ++ *priv_key = dh->priv_key; ++} ++ ++#endif /* End of compatibility definitions. */ ++ + /* NIF interface declarations */ + static int load(ErlNifEnv* env, void** priv_data, ERL_NIF_TERM load_info); + static int upgrade(ErlNifEnv* env, void** priv_data, void** old_priv_data, ERL_NIF_TERM load_info); +@@ -399,7 +516,7 @@ + { + ErlNifMutex* mtx; + int alive; +- HMAC_CTX ctx; ++ HMAC_CTX* ctx; + }; + static void hmac_context_dtor(ErlNifEnv* env, struct hmac_context*); + +@@ -526,18 +643,24 @@ + #define PRINTF_ERR1(FMT,A1) + #define PRINTF_ERR2(FMT,A1,A2) + +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OpenSSL_version_plain(1,0,0) ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION_PLAIN(1,0,0) + /* Define resource types for OpenSSL context structures. */ + static ErlNifResourceType* evp_md_ctx_rtype; +-static void evp_md_ctx_dtor(ErlNifEnv* env, EVP_MD_CTX* ctx) { +- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx); ++struct evp_md_ctx { ++ EVP_MD_CTX* ctx; ++}; ++static void evp_md_ctx_dtor(ErlNifEnv* env, struct evp_md_ctx *ctx) { ++ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->ctx); + } + #endif + + #ifdef HAVE_EVP_AES_CTR + static ErlNifResourceType* evp_cipher_ctx_rtype; +-static void evp_cipher_ctx_dtor(ErlNifEnv* env, EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx) { +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); ++struct evp_cipher_ctx { ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx; ++}; ++static void evp_cipher_ctx_dtor(ErlNifEnv* env, struct evp_cipher_ctx* ctx) { ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->ctx); + } + #endif + +@@ -625,7 +748,7 @@ + PRINTF_ERR0("CRYPTO: Could not open resource type 'hmac_context'"); + return __LINE__; + } +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OpenSSL_version_plain(1,0,0) ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION_PLAIN(1,0,0) + evp_md_ctx_rtype = enif_open_resource_type(env, NULL, "EVP_MD_CTX", + (ErlNifResourceDtor*) evp_md_ctx_dtor, + ERL_NIF_RT_CREATE|ERL_NIF_RT_TAKEOVER, +@@ -937,12 +1060,12 @@ + return ret; + } + +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OpenSSL_version_plain(1,0,0) ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION_PLAIN(1,0,0) + + static ERL_NIF_TERM hash_init_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) + {/* (Type) */ + struct digest_type_t *digp = NULL; +- EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; ++ struct evp_md_ctx *ctx; + ERL_NIF_TERM ret; + + digp = get_digest_type(argv[0]); +@@ -953,8 +1076,9 @@ + return atom_notsup; + } + +- ctx = enif_alloc_resource(evp_md_ctx_rtype, sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX)); +- if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx, digp->md.p)) { ++ ctx = enif_alloc_resource(evp_md_ctx_rtype, sizeof(struct evp_md_ctx)); ++ ctx->ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); ++ if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx->ctx, digp->md.p)) { + enif_release_resource(ctx); + return atom_notsup; + } +@@ -964,7 +1088,7 @@ + } + static ERL_NIF_TERM hash_update_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) + {/* (Context, Data) */ +- EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, *new_ctx; ++ struct evp_md_ctx *ctx, *new_ctx; + ErlNifBinary data; + ERL_NIF_TERM ret; + +@@ -973,9 +1097,10 @@ + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } + +- new_ctx = enif_alloc_resource(evp_md_ctx_rtype, sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX)); +- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(new_ctx, ctx) || +- !EVP_DigestUpdate(new_ctx, data.data, data.size)) { ++ new_ctx = enif_alloc_resource(evp_md_ctx_rtype, sizeof(struct evp_md_ctx)); ++ new_ctx->ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); ++ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(new_ctx->ctx, ctx->ctx) || ++ !EVP_DigestUpdate(new_ctx->ctx, data.data, data.size)) { + enif_release_resource(new_ctx); + return atom_notsup; + } +@@ -987,7 +1112,8 @@ + } + static ERL_NIF_TERM hash_final_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) + {/* (Context) */ +- EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, new_ctx; ++ struct evp_md_ctx *ctx; ++ EVP_MD_CTX *new_ctx; + ERL_NIF_TERM ret; + unsigned ret_size; + +@@ -995,16 +1121,19 @@ + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } + +- ret_size = (unsigned)EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx); ++ ret_size = (unsigned)EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx->ctx); + ASSERT(0 < ret_size && ret_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + +- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&new_ctx, ctx) || +- !EVP_DigestFinal(&new_ctx, ++ new_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); ++ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(new_ctx, ctx->ctx) || ++ !EVP_DigestFinal(new_ctx, + enif_make_new_binary(env, ret_size, &ret), + &ret_size)) { ++ EVP_MD_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return atom_notsup; + } +- ASSERT(ret_size == (unsigned)EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx)); ++ EVP_MD_CTX_free(new_ctx); ++ ASSERT(ret_size == (unsigned)EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx->ctx)); + + return ret; + } +@@ -1288,7 +1417,7 @@ + static void hmac_context_dtor(ErlNifEnv* env, struct hmac_context *obj) + { + if (obj->alive) { +- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&obj->ctx); ++ HMAC_CTX_free(obj->ctx); + obj->alive = 0; + } + enif_mutex_destroy(obj->mtx); +@@ -1313,15 +1442,16 @@ + obj = enif_alloc_resource(hmac_context_rtype, sizeof(struct hmac_context)); + obj->mtx = enif_mutex_create("crypto.hmac"); + obj->alive = 1; +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OpenSSL_version_plain(1,0,0) ++ obj->ctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION_PLAIN(1,0,0) + // Check the return value of HMAC_Init: it may fail in FIPS mode + // for disabled algorithms +- if (!HMAC_Init(&obj->ctx, key.data, key.size, digp->md.p)) { ++ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(obj->ctx, key.data, key.size, digp->md.p, NULL)) { + enif_release_resource(obj); + return atom_notsup; + } + #else +- HMAC_Init(&obj->ctx, key.data, key.size, digp->md.p); ++ HMAC_Init_ex(obj->ctx, key.data, key.size, digp->md.p, NULL); + #endif + + ret = enif_make_resource(env, obj); +@@ -1343,7 +1473,7 @@ + enif_mutex_unlock(obj->mtx); + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } +- HMAC_Update(&obj->ctx, data.data, data.size); ++ HMAC_Update(obj->ctx, data.data, data.size); + enif_mutex_unlock(obj->mtx); + + CONSUME_REDS(env,data); +@@ -1370,8 +1500,8 @@ + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } + +- HMAC_Final(&obj->ctx, mac_buf, &mac_len); +- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&obj->ctx); ++ HMAC_Final(obj->ctx, mac_buf, &mac_len); ++ HMAC_CTX_free(obj->ctx); + obj->alive = 0; + enif_mutex_unlock(obj->mtx); + +@@ -1437,7 +1567,7 @@ + struct cipher_type_t *cipherp = NULL; + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; + ErlNifBinary key, ivec, text; +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx; + ERL_NIF_TERM ret; + unsigned char *out; + int ivec_size, out_size = 0; +@@ -1478,30 +1608,30 @@ + + out = enif_make_new_binary(env, text.size, &ret); + +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); +- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, ++ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); ++ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, + (argv[argc - 1] == atom_true)) || +- !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ctx, key.size) || ++ !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, key.size) || + !(EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) != NID_rc2_cbc || +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&ctx, EVP_CTRL_SET_RC2_KEY_BITS, key.size * 8, NULL)) || +- !EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_SET_RC2_KEY_BITS, key.size * 8, NULL)) || ++ !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, + key.data, ivec_size ? ivec.data : NULL, -1) || +- !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&ctx, 0)) { ++ !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0)) { + +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + return enif_raise_exception(env, atom_notsup); + } + + if (text.size > 0 && /* OpenSSL 0.9.8h asserts text.size > 0 */ +- (!EVP_CipherUpdate(&ctx, out, &out_size, text.data, text.size) ++ (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, out, &out_size, text.data, text.size) + || (ASSERT(out_size == text.size), 0) +- || !EVP_CipherFinal_ex(&ctx, out + out_size, &out_size))) { ++ || !EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, out + out_size, &out_size))) { + +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + return enif_raise_exception(env, atom_notsup); + } + ASSERT(out_size == 0); +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + CONSUME_REDS(env, text); + + return ret; +@@ -1578,7 +1708,7 @@ + static ERL_NIF_TERM aes_ctr_stream_init(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) + {/* (Key, IVec) */ + ErlNifBinary key_bin, ivec_bin; +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; ++ struct evp_cipher_ctx *ctx; + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; + ERL_NIF_TERM ret; + +@@ -1596,18 +1726,18 @@ + default: return enif_make_badarg(env); + } + +- ctx = enif_alloc_resource(evp_cipher_ctx_rtype, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX)); +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx); +- EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, ++ ctx = enif_alloc_resource(evp_cipher_ctx_rtype, sizeof(struct evp_cipher_ctx)); ++ ctx->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); ++ EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx->ctx, cipher, NULL, + key_bin.data, ivec_bin.data, 1); +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx->ctx, 0); + ret = enif_make_resource(env, ctx); + enif_release_resource(ctx); + return ret; + } + static ERL_NIF_TERM aes_ctr_stream_encrypt(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) + {/* (Context, Data) */ +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, *new_ctx; ++ struct evp_cipher_ctx *ctx, *new_ctx; + ErlNifBinary data_bin; + ERL_NIF_TERM ret, cipher_term; + unsigned char *out; +@@ -1617,11 +1747,11 @@ + || !enif_inspect_iolist_as_binary(env, argv[1], &data_bin)) { + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } +- new_ctx = enif_alloc_resource(evp_cipher_ctx_rtype, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX)); +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(new_ctx); +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(new_ctx, ctx); ++ new_ctx = enif_alloc_resource(evp_cipher_ctx_rtype, sizeof(struct evp_cipher_ctx)); ++ new_ctx->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(new_ctx->ctx, ctx->ctx); + out = enif_make_new_binary(env, data_bin.size, &cipher_term); +- EVP_CipherUpdate(new_ctx, out, &outl, data_bin.data, data_bin.size); ++ EVP_CipherUpdate(new_ctx->ctx, out, &outl, data_bin.data, data_bin.size); + ASSERT(outl == data_bin.size); + + ret = enif_make_tuple2(env, enif_make_resource(env, new_ctx), cipher_term); +@@ -1692,7 +1822,7 @@ + static ERL_NIF_TERM aes_gcm_encrypt(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) + {/* (Key,Iv,AAD,In) */ + #if defined(HAVE_GCM) +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; + ErlNifBinary key, iv, aad, in; + unsigned int tag_len; +@@ -1716,40 +1846,40 @@ + else if (key.size == 32) + cipher = EVP_aes_256_gcm(); + +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); ++ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + +- if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1) ++ if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1) + goto out_err; + +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&ctx, 0); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); + +- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, iv.size, NULL) != 1) ++ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, iv.size, NULL) != 1) + goto out_err; +- if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, key.data, iv.data) != 1) ++ if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key.data, iv.data) != 1) + goto out_err; +- if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, NULL, &len, aad.data, aad.size) != 1) ++ if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &len, aad.data, aad.size) != 1) + goto out_err; + + outp = enif_make_new_binary(env, in.size, &out); + +- if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, outp, &len, in.data, in.size) != 1) ++ if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outp, &len, in.data, in.size) != 1) + goto out_err; +- if (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, outp+len, &len) != 1) ++ if (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outp+len, &len) != 1) + goto out_err; + + tagp = enif_make_new_binary(env, tag_len, &out_tag); + +- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, tag_len, tagp) != 1) ++ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, tag_len, tagp) != 1) + goto out_err; + +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + + CONSUME_REDS(env, in); + + return enif_make_tuple2(env, out, out_tag); + + out_err: +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + return atom_error; + + #else +@@ -1762,7 +1892,7 @@ + #if defined(HAVE_GCM_EVP_DECRYPT_BUG) + return aes_gcm_decrypt_NO_EVP(env, argc, argv); + #elif defined(HAVE_GCM) +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; + ErlNifBinary key, iv, aad, in, tag; + unsigned char *outp; +@@ -1785,34 +1915,34 @@ + else if (key.size == 32) + cipher = EVP_aes_256_gcm(); + +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); ++ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + +- if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1) ++ if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1) + goto out_err; +- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, iv.size, NULL) != 1) ++ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, iv.size, NULL) != 1) + goto out_err; +- if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, key.data, iv.data) != 1) ++ if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key.data, iv.data) != 1) + goto out_err; +- if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, NULL, &len, aad.data, aad.size) != 1) ++ if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &len, aad.data, aad.size) != 1) + goto out_err; + + outp = enif_make_new_binary(env, in.size, &out); + +- if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, outp, &len, in.data, in.size) != 1) ++ if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, outp, &len, in.data, in.size) != 1) + goto out_err; +- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, tag.size, tag.data) != 1) ++ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, tag.size, tag.data) != 1) + goto out_err; +- if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, outp+len, &len) != 1) ++ if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, outp+len, &len) != 1) + goto out_err; + +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + + CONSUME_REDS(env, in); + + return out; + + out_err: +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + return atom_error; + #else + return enif_raise_exception(env, atom_notsup); +@@ -2134,13 +2264,10 @@ + } + + dsa = DSA_new(); +- dsa->p = dsa_p; +- dsa->q = dsa_q; +- dsa->g = dsa_g; +- dsa->priv_key = NULL; +- dsa->pub_key = dsa_y; +- i = DSA_verify(0, digest_bin.data, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, +- sign_bin.data, sign_bin.size, dsa); ++ DSA_set0_pqg(dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g); ++ DSA_set0_key(dsa, dsa_y, NULL); ++ i = DSA_verify(0, digest_bin.data, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, ++ sign_bin.data, sign_bin.size, dsa); + DSA_free(dsa); + return(i > 0) ? atom_true : atom_false; + } +@@ -2197,13 +2324,15 @@ + ERL_NIF_TERM head, tail, ret; + int i; + RSA *rsa; +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OpenSSL_version_plain(1,0,0) ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION_PLAIN(1,0,0) + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx; + #endif + const EVP_MD *md; + const ERL_NIF_TERM type = argv[0]; + struct digest_type_t *digp = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *rsa_e; ++ BIGNUM *rsa_n; + + digp = get_digest_type(type); + if (!digp) { +@@ -2220,16 +2349,18 @@ + || digest_bin.size != EVP_MD_size(md) + || !enif_inspect_binary(env, argv[2], &sign_bin) + || !enif_get_list_cell(env, argv[3], &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &rsa->e) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &rsa_e) + || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &rsa->n) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &rsa_n) + || !enif_is_empty_list(env, tail)) { + + ret = enif_make_badarg(env); + goto done; + } + +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OpenSSL_version_plain(1,0,0) ++ (void) RSA_set0_key(rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL); ++ ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION_PLAIN(1,0,0) + pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); + EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa); + +@@ -2319,34 +2450,44 @@ + { + /* key=[E,N,D]|[E,N,D,P1,P2,E1,E2,C] */ + ERL_NIF_TERM head, tail; ++ BIGNUM *e, *n, *d; ++ BIGNUM *p, *q; ++ BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *iqmp; + + if (!enif_get_list_cell(env, key, &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &rsa->e) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &e) + || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &rsa->n) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &n) + || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &rsa->d) +- || (!enif_is_empty_list(env, tail) && +- (!enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &rsa->p) +- || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &rsa->q) +- || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &rsa->dmp1) +- || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &rsa->dmq1) +- || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &rsa->iqmp) +- || !enif_is_empty_list(env, tail)))) { ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &d)) { + return 0; + } ++ (void) RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, d); ++ if (enif_is_empty_list(env, tail)) { ++ return 1; ++ } ++ if (!enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &p) ++ || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &q) ++ || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dmp1) ++ || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dmq1) ++ || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &iqmp) ++ || !enif_is_empty_list(env, tail)) { ++ return 0; ++ } ++ (void) RSA_set0_factors(rsa, p, q); ++ (void) RSA_set0_crt_params(rsa, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp); + return 1; + } + + static ERL_NIF_TERM rsa_sign_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) + {/* (Type, Digest, Key=[E,N,D]|[E,N,D,P1,P2,E1,E2,C]) */ + ErlNifBinary digest_bin, ret_bin; +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OpenSSL_version_plain(1,0,0) ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION_PLAIN(1,0,0) + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx; + size_t rsa_s_len; +@@ -2379,7 +2520,7 @@ + } + + +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OpenSSL_version_plain(1,0,0) ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION_PLAIN(1,0,0) + pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); + EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa); + rsa_s_len=(size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); +@@ -2426,6 +2567,8 @@ + ERL_NIF_TERM head, tail; + unsigned int dsa_s_len; + DSA* dsa; ++ BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *dummy_pub_key, *priv_key = NULL; + int i; + + if (argv[0] != atom_sha +@@ -2434,26 +2577,37 @@ + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } + +- dsa = DSA_new(); +- +- dsa->pub_key = NULL; + if (!enif_get_list_cell(env, argv[2], &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dsa->p) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dsa_p) + || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dsa->q) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dsa_q) + || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dsa->g) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dsa_g) + || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dsa->priv_key) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &priv_key) + || !enif_is_empty_list(env,tail)) { +- DSA_free(dsa); ++ if (dsa_p) BN_free(dsa_p); ++ if (dsa_q) BN_free(dsa_q); ++ if (dsa_g) BN_free(dsa_g); ++ if (priv_key) BN_free(priv_key); + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } + ++ /* Note: DSA_set0_key() does not allow setting only the ++ * private key, although DSA_sign() does not use the ++ * public key. Work around this limitation by setting ++ * the public key to a copy of the private key. ++ */ ++ dummy_pub_key = BN_dup(priv_key); ++ ++ dsa = DSA_new(); ++ DSA_set0_pqg(dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g); ++ DSA_set0_key(dsa, dummy_pub_key, priv_key); + enif_alloc_binary(DSA_size(dsa), &ret_bin); + i = DSA_sign(NID_sha1, digest_bin.data, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, + ret_bin.data, &dsa_s_len, dsa); + DSA_free(dsa); ++ + if (i) { + if (dsa_s_len != ret_bin.size) { + enif_realloc_binary(&ret_bin, dsa_s_len); +@@ -2490,20 +2644,22 @@ + ERL_NIF_TERM head, tail; + int padding, i; + RSA* rsa; ++ BIGNUM *e, *n; + + rsa = RSA_new(); + + if (!enif_inspect_binary(env, argv[0], &data_bin) + || !enif_get_list_cell(env, argv[1], &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &rsa->e) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &e) + || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &rsa->n) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &n) + || !enif_is_empty_list(env,tail) + || !rsa_pad(argv[2], &padding)) { + + RSA_free(rsa); + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } ++ (void) RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, NULL); + + enif_alloc_binary(RSA_size(rsa), &ret_bin); + +@@ -2584,6 +2740,7 @@ + int p_len, g_len; + unsigned char *p_ptr, *g_ptr; + ERL_NIF_TERM ret_p, ret_g; ++ const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_q, *dh_g; + + if (!enif_get_int(env, argv[0], &prime_len) + || !enif_get_int(env, argv[1], &generator)) { +@@ -2594,15 +2751,16 @@ + if (dh_params == NULL) { + return atom_error; + } +- p_len = BN_num_bytes(dh_params->p); +- g_len = BN_num_bytes(dh_params->g); ++ DH_get0_pqg(dh_params, &dh_p, &dh_q, &dh_g); ++ DH_free(dh_params); ++ p_len = BN_num_bytes(dh_p); ++ g_len = BN_num_bytes(dh_g); + p_ptr = enif_make_new_binary(env, p_len, &ret_p); + g_ptr = enif_make_new_binary(env, g_len, &ret_g); +- BN_bn2bin(dh_params->p, p_ptr); +- BN_bn2bin(dh_params->g, g_ptr); ++ BN_bn2bin(dh_p, p_ptr); ++ BN_bn2bin(dh_g, g_ptr); + ERL_VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(p_ptr, p_len); + ERL_VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(g_ptr, g_len); +- DH_free(dh_params); + return enif_make_list2(env, ret_p, ret_g); + } + +@@ -2611,18 +2769,19 @@ + DH* dh_params; + int i; + ERL_NIF_TERM ret, head, tail; +- +- dh_params = DH_new(); ++ BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g; + + if (!enif_get_list_cell(env, argv[0], &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dh_params->p) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dh_p) + || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dh_params->g) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dh_g) + || !enif_is_empty_list(env,tail)) { + +- DH_free(dh_params); + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } ++ ++ dh_params = DH_new(); ++ DH_set0_pqg(dh_params, dh_p, NULL, dh_g); + if (DH_check(dh_params, &i)) { + if (i == 0) ret = atom_ok; + else if (i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME) ret = atom_not_prime; +@@ -2645,26 +2804,32 @@ + unsigned char *pub_ptr, *prv_ptr; + ERL_NIF_TERM ret, ret_pub, ret_prv, head, tail; + int mpint; /* 0 or 4 */ ++ BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *dh_p = NULL, *dh_g = NULL; + unsigned long len = 0; + +- dh_params = DH_new(); +- +- if (!(get_bn_from_bin(env, argv[0], &dh_params->priv_key) ++ if (!(get_bn_from_bin(env, argv[0], &priv_key) + || argv[0] == atom_undefined) + || !enif_get_list_cell(env, argv[1], &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dh_params->p) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dh_p) + || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dh_params->g) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dh_g) + || !enif_is_empty_list(env, tail) + || !enif_get_int(env, argv[2], &mpint) || (mpint & ~4) + || !enif_get_ulong(env, argv[3], &len) ) { +- DH_free(dh_params); ++ if (priv_key) BN_free(priv_key); ++ if (dh_p) BN_free(dh_p); ++ if (dh_g) BN_free(dh_g); + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } + ++ dh_params = DH_new(); ++ DH_set0_key(dh_params, NULL, priv_key); ++ DH_set0_pqg(dh_params, dh_p, NULL, dh_g); ++ + if (len) { +- if (len < BN_num_bits(dh_params->p)) +- dh_params->length = len; ++ if (len < BN_num_bits(dh_p)) ++ DH_set_length(dh_params, len); + else { + DH_free(dh_params); + return enif_make_badarg(env); +@@ -2672,16 +2837,18 @@ + } + + if (DH_generate_key(dh_params)) { +- pub_len = BN_num_bytes(dh_params->pub_key); +- prv_len = BN_num_bytes(dh_params->priv_key); ++ const BIGNUM *pub_key, *priv_key; ++ DH_get0_key(dh_params, &pub_key, &priv_key); ++ pub_len = BN_num_bytes(pub_key); ++ prv_len = BN_num_bytes(priv_key); + pub_ptr = enif_make_new_binary(env, pub_len+mpint, &ret_pub); + prv_ptr = enif_make_new_binary(env, prv_len+mpint, &ret_prv); + if (mpint) { + put_int32(pub_ptr, pub_len); pub_ptr += 4; + put_int32(prv_ptr, prv_len); prv_ptr += 4; + } +- BN_bn2bin(dh_params->pub_key, pub_ptr); +- BN_bn2bin(dh_params->priv_key, prv_ptr); ++ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, pub_ptr); ++ BN_bn2bin(priv_key, prv_ptr); + ERL_VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(pub_ptr, pub_len); + ERL_VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(prv_ptr, prv_len); + ret = enif_make_tuple2(env, ret_pub, ret_prv); +@@ -2696,26 +2863,37 @@ + static ERL_NIF_TERM dh_compute_key_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) + {/* (OthersPublicKey, MyPrivateKey, DHParams=[P,G]) */ + DH* dh_params; +- BIGNUM* pubkey = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *dummy_pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *other_pub_key; ++ BIGNUM *dh_p = NULL, *dh_g = NULL; + int i; + ErlNifBinary ret_bin; + ERL_NIF_TERM ret, head, tail; + + dh_params = DH_new(); + +- if (!get_bn_from_bin(env, argv[0], &pubkey) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, argv[1], &dh_params->priv_key) ++ if (!get_bn_from_bin(env, argv[0], &other_pub_key) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, argv[1], &priv_key) + || !enif_get_list_cell(env, argv[2], &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dh_params->p) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dh_p) + || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) +- || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dh_params->g) ++ || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &dh_g) + || !enif_is_empty_list(env, tail)) { +- ++ if (dh_p) BN_free(dh_p); ++ if (dh_g) BN_free(dh_g); + ret = enif_make_badarg(env); + } + else { ++ /* Note: DH_set0_key() does not allow setting only the ++ * private key, although DH_compute_key() does not use the ++ * public key. Work around this limitation by setting ++ * the public key to a copy of the private key. ++ */ ++ dummy_pub_key = BN_dup(priv_key); ++ DH_set0_key(dh_params, dummy_pub_key, priv_key); ++ DH_set0_pqg(dh_params, dh_p, NULL, dh_g); + enif_alloc_binary(DH_size(dh_params), &ret_bin); +- i = DH_compute_key(ret_bin.data, pubkey, dh_params); ++ i = DH_compute_key(ret_bin.data, other_pub_key, dh_params); + if (i > 0) { + if (i != ret_bin.size) { + enif_realloc_binary(&ret_bin, i); +@@ -2727,7 +2905,7 @@ + ret = atom_error; + } + } +- if (pubkey) BN_free(pubkey); ++ if (other_pub_key) BN_free(other_pub_key); + DH_free(dh_params); + return ret; + } +@@ -3299,7 +3477,7 @@ + + enif_alloc_binary(ECDSA_size(key), &ret_bin); + +- i = ECDSA_sign(md->type, digest_bin.data, len, ++ i = ECDSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(md), digest_bin.data, len, + ret_bin.data, &dsa_s_len, key); + + EC_KEY_free(key); +@@ -3349,7 +3527,7 @@ + || !get_ec_key(env, argv[3], atom_undefined, argv[4], &key)) + goto badarg; + +- i = ECDSA_verify(md->type, digest_bin.data, len, ++ i = ECDSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(md), digest_bin.data, len, + sign_bin.data, sign_bin.size, key); + + EC_KEY_free(key); Added: erlang19-nox/trunk/otp-0007-Fix-CVE-2016-10253.patch =================================================================== --- erlang19-nox/trunk/otp-0007-Fix-CVE-2016-10253.patch (rev 0) +++ erlang19-nox/trunk/otp-0007-Fix-CVE-2016-10253.patch 2017-06-10 18:22:33 UTC (rev 236037) @@ -0,0 +1,318 @@ +From: Zephyr Pellerin <z...@nxvr.org> +Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2017 15:36:41 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2016-10253 + + +diff --git a/erts/emulator/pcre/pcre_compile.c b/erts/emulator/pcre/pcre_compile.c +index d48126a..15a81fa 100644 +--- a/erts/emulator/pcre/pcre_compile.c ++++ b/erts/emulator/pcre/pcre_compile.c +@@ -2335,34 +2335,36 @@ for (;;) + } + } + +- +- + /************************************************* +-* Scan compiled branch for non-emptiness * +-*************************************************/ ++ * Scan compiled branch for non-emptiness * ++ *************************************************/ + + /* This function scans through a branch of a compiled pattern to see whether it +-can match the empty string or not. It is called from could_be_empty() +-below and from compile_branch() when checking for an unlimited repeat of a +-group that can match nothing. Note that first_significant_code() skips over +-backward and negative forward assertions when its final argument is TRUE. If we +-hit an unclosed bracket, we return "empty" - this means we've struck an inner +-bracket whose current branch will already have been scanned. +- +-Arguments: +- code points to start of search +- endcode points to where to stop +- utf TRUE if in UTF-8 / UTF-16 / UTF-32 mode +- cd contains pointers to tables etc. +- +-Returns: TRUE if what is matched could be empty ++ can match the empty string or not. It is called from could_be_empty() ++ below and from compile_branch() when checking for an unlimited repeat of a ++ group that can match nothing. Note that first_significant_code() skips over ++ backward and negative forward assertions when its final argument is TRUE. If we ++ hit an unclosed bracket, we return "empty" - this means we've struck an inner ++ bracket whose current branch will already have been scanned. ++ ++ Arguments: ++ code points to start of search ++ endcode points to where to stop ++ utf TRUE if in UTF-8 / UTF-16 / UTF-32 mode ++ cd contains pointers to tables etc. ++ recurses chain of recurse_check to catch mutual recursion ++ ++ Returns: TRUE if what is matched could be empty + */ + ++ + static BOOL + could_be_empty_branch(const pcre_uchar *code, const pcre_uchar *endcode, +- BOOL utf, compile_data *cd) ++ BOOL utf, compile_data *cd, recurse_check *recurses) + { + register pcre_uchar c; ++recurse_check this_recurse; ++ + for (code = first_significant_code(code + PRIV(OP_lengths)[*code], TRUE); + code < endcode; + code = first_significant_code(code + PRIV(OP_lengths)[c], TRUE)) +@@ -2390,25 +2392,47 @@ for (code = first_significant_code(code + PRIV(OP_lengths)[*code], TRUE); + + if (c == OP_RECURSE) + { +- const pcre_uchar *scode; ++ const pcre_uchar *scode = cd->start_code + GET(code, 1); ++ const pcre_uchar *endgroup = scode; + BOOL empty_branch; + +- /* Test for forward reference */ ++ /* Test for forward reference or uncompleted reference. This is disabled ++ when called to scan a completed pattern by setting cd->start_workspace to ++ NULL. */ + +- for (scode = cd->start_workspace; scode < cd->hwm; scode += LINK_SIZE) +- if ((int)GET(scode, 0) == (int)(code + 1 - cd->start_code)) return TRUE; ++ if (cd->start_workspace != NULL) ++ { ++ const pcre_uchar *tcode; ++ for (tcode = cd->start_workspace; tcode < cd->hwm; tcode += LINK_SIZE) ++ if ((int)GET(tcode, 0) == (int)(code + 1 - cd->start_code)) return TRUE; ++ if (GET(scode, 1) == 0) return TRUE; /* Unclosed */ ++ } + +- /* Not a forward reference, test for completed backward reference */ ++ /* If the reference is to a completed group, we need to detect whether this ++ is a recursive call, as otherwise there will be an infinite loop. If it is ++ a recursion, just skip over it. Simple recursions are easily detected. For ++ mutual recursions we keep a chain on the stack. */ + +- empty_branch = FALSE; +- scode = cd->start_code + GET(code, 1); +- if (GET(scode, 1) == 0) return TRUE; /* Unclosed */ ++ do endgroup += GET(endgroup, 1); while (*endgroup == OP_ALT); ++ if (code >= scode && code <= endgroup) continue; /* Simple recursion */ ++ else ++ { ++ recurse_check *r = recurses; ++ for (r = recurses; r != NULL; r = r->prev) ++ if (r->group == scode) break; ++ if (r != NULL) continue; /* Mutual recursion */ ++ } ++ ++ /* Completed reference; scan the referenced group, remembering it on the ++ stack chain to detect mutual recursions. */ + +- /* Completed backwards reference */ ++ empty_branch = FALSE; ++ this_recurse.prev = recurses; ++ this_recurse.group = scode; + + do + { +- if (could_be_empty_branch(scode, endcode, utf, cd)) ++ if (could_be_empty_branch(scode, endcode, utf, cd, &this_recurse)) + { + empty_branch = TRUE; + break; +@@ -2448,7 +2472,7 @@ for (code = first_significant_code(code + PRIV(OP_lengths)[*code], TRUE); + if (c == OP_BRA || c == OP_BRAPOS || + c == OP_CBRA || c == OP_CBRAPOS || + c == OP_ONCE || c == OP_ONCE_NC || +- c == OP_COND) ++ c == OP_COND || c == OP_SCOND) + { + BOOL empty_branch; + if (GET(code, 1) == 0) return TRUE; /* Hit unclosed bracket */ +@@ -2464,8 +2488,8 @@ for (code = first_significant_code(code + PRIV(OP_lengths)[*code], TRUE); + empty_branch = FALSE; + do + { +- if (!empty_branch && could_be_empty_branch(code, endcode, utf, cd)) +- empty_branch = TRUE; ++ if (!empty_branch && could_be_empty_branch(code, endcode, utf, cd, ++ recurses)) empty_branch = TRUE; + code += GET(code, 1); + } + while (*code == OP_ALT); +@@ -2522,34 +2546,57 @@ for (code = first_significant_code(code + PRIV(OP_lengths)[*code], TRUE); + + /* Opcodes that must match a character */ + ++ case OP_ANY: ++ case OP_ALLANY: ++ case OP_ANYBYTE: ++ + case OP_PROP: + case OP_NOTPROP: ++ case OP_ANYNL: ++ ++ case OP_NOT_HSPACE: ++ case OP_HSPACE: ++ case OP_NOT_VSPACE: ++ case OP_VSPACE: + case OP_EXTUNI: ++ + case OP_NOT_DIGIT: + case OP_DIGIT: + case OP_NOT_WHITESPACE: + case OP_WHITESPACE: + case OP_NOT_WORDCHAR: + case OP_WORDCHAR: +- case OP_ANY: +- case OP_ALLANY: +- case OP_ANYBYTE: ++ + case OP_CHAR: + case OP_CHARI: + case OP_NOT: + case OP_NOTI: ++ + case OP_PLUS: ++ case OP_PLUSI: + case OP_MINPLUS: +- case OP_POSPLUS: +- case OP_EXACT: ++ case OP_MINPLUSI: ++ + case OP_NOTPLUS: ++ case OP_NOTPLUSI: + case OP_NOTMINPLUS: ++ case OP_NOTMINPLUSI: ++ ++ case OP_POSPLUS: ++ case OP_POSPLUSI: + case OP_NOTPOSPLUS: ++ case OP_NOTPOSPLUSI: ++ ++ case OP_EXACT: ++ case OP_EXACTI: + case OP_NOTEXACT: ++ case OP_NOTEXACTI: ++ + case OP_TYPEPLUS: + case OP_TYPEMINPLUS: + case OP_TYPEPOSPLUS: + case OP_TYPEEXACT: ++ + return FALSE; + + /* These are going to continue, as they may be empty, but we have to +@@ -2583,30 +2630,58 @@ for (code = first_significant_code(code + PRIV(OP_lengths)[*code], TRUE); + return TRUE; + + /* In UTF-8 mode, STAR, MINSTAR, POSSTAR, QUERY, MINQUERY, POSQUERY, UPTO, +- MINUPTO, and POSUPTO may be followed by a multibyte character */ ++ MINUPTO, and POSUPTO and their caseless and negative versions may be ++ followed by a multibyte character. */ + + #if defined SUPPORT_UTF && !defined COMPILE_PCRE32 + case OP_STAR: + case OP_STARI: ++ case OP_NOTSTAR: ++ case OP_NOTSTARI: ++ + case OP_MINSTAR: + case OP_MINSTARI: ++ case OP_NOTMINSTAR: ++ case OP_NOTMINSTARI: ++ + case OP_POSSTAR: + case OP_POSSTARI: ++ case OP_NOTPOSSTAR: ++ case OP_NOTPOSSTARI: ++ + case OP_QUERY: + case OP_QUERYI: ++ case OP_NOTQUERY: ++ case OP_NOTQUERYI: ++ + case OP_MINQUERY: + case OP_MINQUERYI: ++ case OP_NOTMINQUERY: ++ case OP_NOTMINQUERYI: ++ + case OP_POSQUERY: + case OP_POSQUERYI: ++ case OP_NOTPOSQUERY: ++ case OP_NOTPOSQUERYI: ++ + if (utf && HAS_EXTRALEN(code[1])) code += GET_EXTRALEN(code[1]); + break; + + case OP_UPTO: + case OP_UPTOI: ++ case OP_NOTUPTO: ++ case OP_NOTUPTOI: ++ + case OP_MINUPTO: + case OP_MINUPTOI: ++ case OP_NOTMINUPTO: ++ case OP_NOTMINUPTOI: ++ + case OP_POSUPTO: + case OP_POSUPTOI: ++ case OP_NOTPOSUPTO: ++ case OP_NOTPOSUPTOI: ++ + if (utf && HAS_EXTRALEN(code[1 + IMM2_SIZE])) code += GET_EXTRALEN(code[1 + IMM2_SIZE]); + break; + #endif +@@ -2632,7 +2707,6 @@ return TRUE; + } + + +- + /************************************************* + * Scan compiled regex for non-emptiness * + *************************************************/ +@@ -2660,7 +2734,7 @@ could_be_empty(const pcre_uchar *code, const pcre_uchar *endcode, + { + while (bcptr != NULL && bcptr->current_branch >= code) + { +- if (!could_be_empty_branch(bcptr->current_branch, endcode, utf, cd)) ++ if (!could_be_empty_branch(bcptr->current_branch, endcode, utf, cd, NULL)) + return FALSE; + bcptr = bcptr->outer; + } +@@ -2668,7 +2742,6 @@ return TRUE; + } + + +- + /************************************************* + * Check for POSIX class syntax * + *************************************************/ +@@ -5392,7 +5465,7 @@ for (;; ptr++) + pcre_uchar *scode = bracode; + do + { +- if (could_be_empty_branch(scode, ketcode, utf, cd)) ++ if (could_be_empty_branch(scode, ketcode, utf, cd, NULL)) + { + *bracode += OP_SBRA - OP_BRA; + break; +diff --git a/erts/emulator/pcre/pcre_internal.h b/erts/emulator/pcre/pcre_internal.h +index af436bd..eb0db89 100644 +--- a/erts/emulator/pcre/pcre_internal.h ++++ b/erts/emulator/pcre/pcre_internal.h +@@ -2455,6 +2455,13 @@ typedef struct branch_chain { + pcre_uchar *current_branch; + } branch_chain; + ++/* Structure for mutual recursion detection. */ ++ ++typedef struct recurse_check { ++ struct recurse_check *prev; ++ const pcre_uchar *group; ++} recurse_check; ++ + /* Structure for items in a linked list that represents an explicit recursive + call within the pattern; used by pcre_exec(). */ +