Date: Monday, June 19, 2017 @ 21:51:14
Author: anthraxx
Revision: 298992
archrelease: copy trunk to testing-i686, testing-x86_64
Added:
glibc/repos/testing-i686/
glibc/repos/testing-i686/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_AUDIT.patch
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_AUDIT.patch)
glibc/repos/testing-i686/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_LIBRARY_PATH.patch
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_LIBRARY_PATH.patch)
glibc/repos/testing-i686/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_PRELOAD.patch
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_PRELOAD.patch)
glibc/repos/testing-i686/PKGBUILD
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/PKGBUILD)
glibc/repos/testing-i686/cvs-hwcap-AT_SECURE.patch
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/cvs-hwcap-AT_SECURE.patch)
glibc/repos/testing-i686/cvs-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/cvs-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch)
glibc/repos/testing-i686/glibc.install
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/glibc.install)
glibc/repos/testing-i686/locale-gen
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/locale-gen)
glibc/repos/testing-i686/locale.gen.txt
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/locale.gen.txt)
glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/
glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_AUDIT.patch
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_AUDIT.patch)
glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_LIBRARY_PATH.patch
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_LIBRARY_PATH.patch)
glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_PRELOAD.patch
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_PRELOAD.patch)
glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/PKGBUILD
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/PKGBUILD)
glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/cvs-hwcap-AT_SECURE.patch
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/cvs-hwcap-AT_SECURE.patch)
glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/cvs-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/cvs-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch)
glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/glibc.install
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/glibc.install)
glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/locale-gen
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/locale-gen)
glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/locale.gen.txt
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/locale.gen.txt)
------------------------------------------------------------+
testing-i686/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_AUDIT.patch | 205 +++++++++++
testing-i686/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_LIBRARY_PATH.patch | 33 +
testing-i686/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_PRELOAD.patch | 111 +++++
testing-i686/PKGBUILD | 165 ++++++++
testing-i686/cvs-hwcap-AT_SECURE.patch | 28 +
testing-i686/cvs-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch | 21 +
testing-i686/glibc.install | 5
testing-i686/locale-gen | 42 ++
testing-i686/locale.gen.txt | 23 +
testing-x86_64/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_AUDIT.patch | 205 +++++++++++
testing-x86_64/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_LIBRARY_PATH.patch | 33 +
testing-x86_64/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_PRELOAD.patch | 111 +++++
testing-x86_64/PKGBUILD | 165 ++++++++
testing-x86_64/cvs-hwcap-AT_SECURE.patch | 28 +
testing-x86_64/cvs-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch | 21 +
testing-x86_64/glibc.install | 5
testing-x86_64/locale-gen | 42 ++
testing-x86_64/locale.gen.txt | 23 +
18 files changed, 1266 insertions(+)
Copied: glibc/repos/testing-i686/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_AUDIT.patch (from rev
298991, glibc/trunk/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_AUDIT.patch)
===================================================================
--- testing-i686/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_AUDIT.patch
(rev 0)
+++ testing-i686/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_AUDIT.patch 2017-06-19 21:51:14 UTC
(rev 298992)
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+From ba67ba3275d47e0080f0e5f09d9f5102c000c97e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+Message-Id:
<ba67ba3275d47e0080f0e5f09d9f5102c000c97e.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
+In-Reply-To: <cover.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
+References: <cover.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
+From: Florian Weimer <fwei...@redhat.com>
+Date: Sun, 28 May 2017 20:44:52 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] rtld: Reject overly long LD_AUDIT path elements
+To: libc-al...@sourceware.org
+
+Also only process the last LD_AUDIT entry.
+---
+ elf/rtld.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 95 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
+index 30f0cae..89d8573 100644
+--- a/elf/rtld.c
++++ b/elf/rtld.c
+@@ -116,13 +116,91 @@ dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
+ return *p != '\0';
+ }
+
+-/* List of auditing DSOs. */
++/* LD_AUDIT variable contents. Must be processed before the
++ audit_list below. */
++const char *audit_list_string;
++
++/* Cyclic list of auditing DSOs. audit_list->next is the first
++ element. */
+ static struct audit_list
+ {
+ const char *name;
+ struct audit_list *next;
+ } *audit_list;
+
++/* Iterator for audit_list_string followed by audit_list. */
++struct audit_list_iter
++{
++ /* Tail of audit_list_string still needing processing, or NULL. */
++ const char *audit_list_tail;
++
++ /* The list element returned in the previous iteration. NULL before
++ the first element. */
++ struct audit_list *previous;
++
++ /* Scratch buffer for returning a name which is part of
++ audit_list_string. */
++ char fname[PATH_MAX];
++};
++
++/* Initialize an audit list iterator. */
++static void
++audit_list_iter_init (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
++{
++ iter->audit_list_tail = audit_list_string;
++ iter->previous = NULL;
++}
++
++/* Iterate through both audit_list_string and audit_list. */
++static const char *
++audit_list_iter_next (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
++{
++ if (iter->audit_list_tail != NULL)
++ {
++ /* First iterate over audit_list_string. */
++ while (*iter->audit_list_tail != '\0')
++ {
++ /* Split audit list at colon. */
++ size_t len = strcspn (iter->audit_list_tail, ":");
++ if (len > 0 && len < PATH_MAX)
++ {
++ memcpy (iter->fname, iter->audit_list_tail, len);
++ iter->fname[len] = '\0';
++ }
++ else
++ /* Do not return this name to the caller. */
++ iter->fname[0] = '\0';
++
++ /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter. */
++ iter->audit_list_tail += len;
++ if (*iter->audit_list_tail == ':')
++ ++iter->audit_list_tail;
++
++ /* If the name is valid, return it. */
++ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (iter->fname))
++ return iter->fname;
++ /* Otherwise, wrap around and try the next name. */
++ }
++ /* Fall through to the procesing of audit_list. */
++ }
++
++ if (iter->previous == NULL)
++ {
++ if (audit_list == NULL)
++ /* No pre-parsed audit list. */
++ return NULL;
++ /* Start of audit list. The first list element is at
++ audit_list->next (cyclic list). */
++ iter->previous = audit_list->next;
++ return iter->previous->name;
++ }
++ if (iter->previous == audit_list)
++ /* Cyclic list wrap-around. */
++ return NULL;
++ iter->previous = iter->previous->next;
++ return iter->previous->name;
++}
++
+ #ifndef HAVE_INLINED_SYSCALLS
+ /* Set nonzero during loading and initialization of executable and
+ libraries, cleared before the executable's entry point runs. This
+@@ -1290,11 +1368,13 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend
to run this program.\n\
+ GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_modid = _dl_next_tls_modid ();
+
+ /* If we have auditing DSOs to load, do it now. */
+- if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL))
++ bool need_security_init = true;
++ if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL)
++ || __glibc_unlikely (audit_list_string != NULL))
+ {
+- /* Iterate over all entries in the list. The order is important. */
+ struct audit_ifaces *last_audit = NULL;
+- struct audit_list *al = audit_list->next;
++ struct audit_list_iter al_iter;
++ audit_list_iter_init (&al_iter);
+
+ /* Since we start using the auditing DSOs right away we need to
+ initialize the data structures now. */
+@@ -1305,9 +1385,14 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend
to run this program.\n\
+ use different values (especially the pointer guard) and will
+ fail later on. */
+ security_init ();
++ need_security_init = false;
+
+- do
++ while (true)
+ {
++ const char *name = audit_list_iter_next (&al_iter);
++ if (name == NULL)
++ break;
++
+ int tls_idx = GL(dl_tls_max_dtv_idx);
+
+ /* Now it is time to determine the layout of the static TLS
+@@ -1316,7 +1401,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend
to run this program.\n\
+ no DF_STATIC_TLS bit is set. The reason is that we know
+ glibc will use the static model. */
+ struct dlmopen_args dlmargs;
+- dlmargs.fname = al->name;
++ dlmargs.fname = name;
+ dlmargs.map = NULL;
+
+ const char *objname;
+@@ -1329,7 +1414,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend
to run this program.\n\
+ not_loaded:
+ _dl_error_printf ("\
+ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s;
ignored.\n",
+- al->name, err_str);
++ name, err_str);
+ if (malloced)
+ free ((char *) err_str);
+ }
+@@ -1433,10 +1518,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit
interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+ goto not_loaded;
+ }
+ }
+-
+- al = al->next;
+ }
+- while (al != audit_list->next);
+
+ /* If we have any auditing modules, announce that we already
+ have two objects loaded. */
+@@ -1700,7 +1782,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit
interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+ if (tcbp == NULL)
+ tcbp = init_tls ();
+
+- if (__glibc_likely (audit_list == NULL))
++ if (__glibc_likely (need_security_init))
+ /* Initialize security features. But only if we have not done it
+ earlier. */
+ security_init ();
+@@ -2331,9 +2413,7 @@ process_dl_audit (char *str)
+ char *p;
+
+ while ((p = (strsep) (&str, ":")) != NULL)
+- if (p[0] != '\0'
+- && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
+- || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
++ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (p))
+ {
+ /* This is using the local malloc, not the system malloc. The
+ memory can never be freed. */
+@@ -2397,7 +2477,7 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (memcmp (envline, "AUDIT", 5) == 0)
+- process_dl_audit (&envline[6]);
++ audit_list_string = &envline[6];
+ break;
+
+ case 7:
+--
+2.9.4
+
Copied: glibc/repos/testing-i686/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_LIBRARY_PATH.patch
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_LIBRARY_PATH.patch)
===================================================================
--- testing-i686/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_LIBRARY_PATH.patch
(rev 0)
+++ testing-i686/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_LIBRARY_PATH.patch 2017-06-19
21:51:14 UTC (rev 298992)
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 4d009d39ac9ede0369e268554a181b428f177a80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+Message-Id:
<4d009d39ac9ede0369e268554a181b428f177a80.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
+In-Reply-To: <cover.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
+References: <cover.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
+From: Florian Weimer <fwei...@redhat.com>
+Date: Sun, 28 May 2017 20:37:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] rtld: Completely ignore LD_LIBRARY_PATH for AT_SECURE=1
+ programs
+To: libc-al...@sourceware.org
+
+LD_LIBRARY_PATH can only be used to reorder system search paths, which
+is not useful functionality.
+---
+ elf/rtld.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
+index 319ef06..824b6cf 100644
+--- a/elf/rtld.c
++++ b/elf/rtld.c
+@@ -2419,7 +2419,8 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
+
+ case 12:
+ /* The library search path. */
+- if (memcmp (envline, "LIBRARY_PATH", 12) == 0)
++ if (!__libc_enable_secure
++ && memcmp (envline, "LIBRARY_PATH", 12) == 0)
+ {
+ library_path = &envline[13];
+ break;
+--
+2.9.4
+
Copied: glibc/repos/testing-i686/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_PRELOAD.patch (from
rev 298991, glibc/trunk/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_PRELOAD.patch)
===================================================================
--- testing-i686/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_PRELOAD.patch
(rev 0)
+++ testing-i686/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_PRELOAD.patch 2017-06-19 21:51:14 UTC
(rev 298992)
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+From 65ff0b7a085b85271ec8fde99f542281b495e3bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+Message-Id:
<65ff0b7a085b85271ec8fde99f542281b495e3bc.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
+In-Reply-To: <cover.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
+References: <cover.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
+From: Florian Weimer <fwei...@redhat.com>
+Date: Sun, 28 May 2017 20:57:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] rtld: Reject overly long LD_PRELOAD path elements
+To: libc-al...@sourceware.org
+
+---
+ elf/rtld.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
+index 824b6cf..30f0cae 100644
+--- a/elf/rtld.c
++++ b/elf/rtld.c
+@@ -99,6 +99,22 @@ uintptr_t __pointer_chk_guard_local
+ strong_alias (__pointer_chk_guard_local, __pointer_chk_guard)
+ #endif
+
++/* Check that AT_SECURE=0, or that the passed name does not contain
++ directories and is not overly long. Reject empty names
++ unconditionally. */
++static bool
++dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
++{
++ if (__glibc_unlikely (__libc_enable_secure))
++ {
++ /* Ignore pathnames with directories for AT_SECURE=1
++ programs, and also skip overlong names. */
++ size_t len = strlen (p);
++ if (len >= NAME_MAX || memchr (p, '/', len) != NULL)
++ return false;
++ }
++ return *p != '\0';
++}
+
+ /* List of auditing DSOs. */
+ static struct audit_list
+@@ -716,6 +732,42 @@ static const char *preloadlist attribute_relro;
+ /* Nonzero if information about versions has to be printed. */
+ static int version_info attribute_relro;
+
++/* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
++ separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
++ executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope list.
++ (If the binary is running setuid all elements containing a '/' are
++ ignored since it is insecure.) Return the number of preloads
++ performed. */
++unsigned int
++handle_ld_preload (const char *preloadlist, struct link_map *main_map)
++{
++ unsigned int npreloads = 0;
++ const char *p = preloadlist;
++ char fname[PATH_MAX];
++
++ while (*p != '\0')
++ {
++ /* Split preload list at space/colon. */
++ size_t len = strcspn (p, " :");
++ if (len > 0 && len < PATH_MAX)
++ {
++ memcpy (fname, p, len);
++ fname[len] = '\0';
++ }
++ else
++ fname[0] = '\0';
++
++ /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter. */
++ p += len;
++ if (*p == ' ' || *p == ':')
++ ++p;
++
++ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (fname))
++ npreloads += do_preload (fname, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
++ }
++ return npreloads;
++}
++
+ static void
+ dl_main (const ElfW(Phdr) *phdr,
+ ElfW(Word) phnum,
+@@ -1462,23 +1514,8 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit
interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+
+ if (__glibc_unlikely (preloadlist != NULL))
+ {
+- /* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
+- separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
+- executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope
+- list. If the binary is running setuid all elements
+- containing a '/' are ignored since it is insecure. */
+- char *list = strdupa (preloadlist);
+- char *p;
+-
+ HP_TIMING_NOW (start);
+-
+- /* Prevent optimizing strsep. Speed is not important here. */
+- while ((p = (strsep) (&list, " :")) != NULL)
+- if (p[0] != '\0'
+- && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
+- || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
+- npreloads += do_preload (p, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
+-
++ npreloads += handle_ld_preload (preloadlist, main_map);
+ HP_TIMING_NOW (stop);
+ HP_TIMING_DIFF (diff, start, stop);
+ HP_TIMING_ACCUM_NT (load_time, diff);
+--
+2.9.4
+
Copied: glibc/repos/testing-i686/PKGBUILD (from rev 298991,
glibc/trunk/PKGBUILD)
===================================================================
--- testing-i686/PKGBUILD (rev 0)
+++ testing-i686/PKGBUILD 2017-06-19 21:51:14 UTC (rev 298992)
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+# $Id$
+# Maintainer: Allan McRae <al...@archlinux.org>
+
+# toolchain build order:
linux-api-headers->glibc->binutils->gcc->binutils->glibc
+# NOTE: valgrind requires rebuilt with each major glibc version
+
+pkgname=glibc
+pkgver=2.25
+pkgrel=4
+_commit=ccb4fd7a657b0fbc4890c98f4586d58a135fc583
+pkgdesc='GNU C Library'
+arch=(i686 x86_64)
+url='http://www.gnu.org/software/libc'
+license=(GPL LGPL)
+groups=(base)
+depends=('linux-api-headers>=4.10' tzdata filesystem)
+makedepends=('gcc>=6' git gd)
+optdepends=('gd: for memusagestat')
+backup=(etc/gai.conf
+ etc/locale.gen
+ etc/nscd.conf)
+options=(!strip staticlibs)
+install=glibc.install
+source=(git+https://sourceware.org/git/glibc.git#commit=${_commit}
+ locale.gen.txt
+ locale-gen
+ CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_AUDIT.patch
+ CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_PRELOAD.patch
+ CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_LIBRARY_PATH.patch
+ cvs-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch
+ cvs-hwcap-AT_SECURE.patch)
+md5sums=('SKIP'
+ '07ac979b6ab5eeb778d55f041529d623'
+ '476e9113489f93b348b21e144b6a8fcf'
+ '519c6eda90310964d12c7c744ce09333'
+ 'ed0cf195055a66d0b6f6b409c08c3199'
+ 'ff9ff81f713bb1b062280e669a646114'
+ 'e78157b48300b2436b3d90059ef02976'
+ 'bd31ebc2514ad79cbabd25b611c0b2a1')
+
+prepare() {
+ mkdir glibc-build
+ cd ${pkgname}
+ patch -p1 < "${srcdir}/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_AUDIT.patch"
+ patch -p1 < "${srcdir}/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_PRELOAD.patch"
+ patch -p1 < "${srcdir}/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_LIBRARY_PATH.patch"
+ patch -p1 < "${srcdir}/cvs-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch"
+ patch -p1 < "${srcdir}/cvs-hwcap-AT_SECURE.patch"
+}
+
+build() {
+ cd glibc-build
+
+ if [[ ${CARCH} = "i686" ]]; then
+ # Hack to fix NPTL issues with Xen, only required on 32bit platforms
+ export CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} -mno-tls-direct-seg-refs"
+ fi
+
+ echo "slibdir=/usr/lib" >> configparms
+ echo "rtlddir=/usr/lib" >> configparms
+ echo "sbindir=/usr/bin" >> configparms
+ echo "rootsbindir=/usr/bin" >> configparms
+
+ # remove fortify for building libraries
+ CPPFLAGS=${CPPFLAGS/-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2/}
+
+ ../${pkgname}/configure \
+ --prefix=/usr \
+ --libdir=/usr/lib \
+ --libexecdir=/usr/lib \
+ --with-headers=/usr/include \
+ --with-bugurl=https://bugs.archlinux.org/ \
+ --enable-add-ons \
+ --enable-obsolete-rpc \
+ --enable-kernel=2.6.32 \
+ --enable-bind-now \
+ --disable-profile \
+ --enable-stackguard-randomization \
+ --enable-stack-protector=strong \
+ --enable-lock-elision \
+ --enable-multi-arch \
+ --disable-werror
+
+ # build libraries with fortify disabled
+ echo "build-programs=no" >> configparms
+ make
+
+ # re-enable fortify for programs
+ sed -i "/build-programs=/s#no#yes#" configparms
+
+ echo "CC += -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2" >> configparms
+ echo "CXX += -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2" >> configparms
+ make
+}
+
+check() {
+ cd glibc-build
+
+ # remove fortify in preparation to run test-suite
+ sed -i '/FORTIFY/d' configparms
+
+ # some failures are "expected"
+ make check || true
+}
+
+package() {
+ cd glibc-build
+
+ install -dm755 ${pkgdir}/etc
+ touch ${pkgdir}/etc/ld.so.conf
+
+ make install_root=${pkgdir} install
+
+ rm -f ${pkgdir}/etc/ld.so.{cache,conf}
+
+ install -dm755 ${pkgdir}/usr/lib/{locale,systemd/system,tmpfiles.d}
+
+ install -m644 ${srcdir}/${pkgname}/nscd/nscd.conf ${pkgdir}/etc/nscd.conf
+ install -m644 ${srcdir}/${pkgname}/nscd/nscd.service
${pkgdir}/usr/lib/systemd/system
+ install -m644 ${srcdir}/${pkgname}/nscd/nscd.tmpfiles
${pkgdir}/usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/nscd.conf
+
+ install -m644 ${srcdir}/${pkgname}/posix/gai.conf ${pkgdir}/etc/gai.conf
+
+ install -m755 ${srcdir}/locale-gen ${pkgdir}/usr/bin
+
+ # create /etc/locale.gen
+ install -m644 ${srcdir}/locale.gen.txt ${pkgdir}/etc/locale.gen
+ sed -e '1,3d' -e 's|/| |g' -e 's|\\| |g' -e 's|^|#|g' \
+ ${srcdir}/glibc/localedata/SUPPORTED >> ${pkgdir}/etc/locale.gen
+
+ # Do not strip the following files for improved debugging support
+ # ("improved" as in not breaking gdb and valgrind...):
+ # ld-${pkgver}.so
+ # libc-${pkgver}.so
+ # libpthread-${pkgver}.so
+ # libthread_db-1.0.so
+
+ cd $pkgdir
+ strip $STRIP_BINARIES usr/bin/{gencat,getconf,getent,iconv,iconvconfig} \
+ usr/bin/{ldconfig,locale,localedef,nscd,makedb} \
+ usr/bin/{pcprofiledump,pldd,rpcgen,sln,sprof} \
+ usr/lib/getconf/*
+ if [[ $CARCH = "i686" ]]; then
+ strip $STRIP_BINARIES usr/bin/lddlibc4
+ fi
+
+ strip $STRIP_STATIC usr/lib/lib{anl,BrokenLocale,c{,_nonshared},crypt}.a \
+ usr/lib/lib{dl,g,ieee,mcheck,nsl,pthread{,_nonshared}}.a
\
+ usr/lib/lib{resolv,rpcsvc,rt,util}.a
+
+ strip $STRIP_SHARED usr/lib/lib{anl,BrokenLocale,cidn,crypt}-${pkgver}.so \
+
usr/lib/libnss_{compat,db,dns,files,hesiod,nis,nisplus}-*.so \
+ usr/lib/lib{dl,m,nsl,resolv,rt,util}-${pkgver}.so \
+ usr/lib/lib{memusage,pcprofile,SegFault}.so \
+ usr/lib/{audit,gconv}/*.so || true
+
+ if [[ $CARCH = "x86_64" ]]; then
+ strip $STRIP_STATIC usr/lib/lib{m-${pkgver},mvec{,_nonshared}}.a
+ strip $STRIP_SHARED usr/lib/libmvec-*.so
+ fi
+
+ if [[ $CARCH = "i686" ]]; then
+ strip $STRIP_STATIC usr/lib/libm.a
+ fi
+}
Copied: glibc/repos/testing-i686/cvs-hwcap-AT_SECURE.patch (from rev 298991,
glibc/trunk/cvs-hwcap-AT_SECURE.patch)
===================================================================
--- testing-i686/cvs-hwcap-AT_SECURE.patch (rev 0)
+++ testing-i686/cvs-hwcap-AT_SECURE.patch 2017-06-19 21:51:14 UTC (rev
298992)
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+2017-03-07 Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddh...@sourceware.org>
+
+ [BZ #21209]
+ * elf/rtld.c (process_envvars): Ignore LD_HWCAP_MASK for
+ AT_SECURE processes.
+
+--- a/elf/rtld.c
++++ b/elf/rtld.c
+@@ -2404,7 +2404,8 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
+
+ case 10:
+ /* Mask for the important hardware capabilities. */
+- if (memcmp (envline, "HWCAP_MASK", 10) == 0)
++ if (!__libc_enable_secure
++ && memcmp (envline, "HWCAP_MASK", 10) == 0)
+ GLRO(dl_hwcap_mask) = __strtoul_internal (&envline[11], NULL,
+ 0, 0);
+ break;
+--- a/sysdeps/generic/unsecvars.h
++++ b/sysdeps/generic/unsecvars.h
+@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
+ "LD_DEBUG\0"
\
+ "LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT\0" \
+ "LD_DYNAMIC_WEAK\0" \
++ "LD_HWCAP_MASK\0" \
+ "LD_LIBRARY_PATH\0" \
+ "LD_ORIGIN_PATH\0" \
+ "LD_PRELOAD\0" \
Copied: glibc/repos/testing-i686/cvs-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch (from rev
298991, glibc/trunk/cvs-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch)
===================================================================
--- testing-i686/cvs-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch
(rev 0)
+++ testing-i686/cvs-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch 2017-06-19 21:51:14 UTC
(rev 298992)
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+2017-06-14 Florian Weimer <fwei...@redhat.com>
+
+ * sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c: Add IS_IN (libc) guard.
+ * sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c: Likewise.
+
+--- a/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c
++++ b/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c
+@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
+-#define __strcspn_sse2 __strcspn_ia32
+-#include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/strcspn-c.c>
++#if IS_IN (libc)
++# define __strcspn_sse2 __strcspn_ia32
++# include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/strcspn-c.c>
++#endif
+--- a/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c
++++ b/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c
+@@ -1 +1,3 @@
+-#include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/varshift.c>
++#if IS_IN (libc)
++# include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/varshift.c>
++#endif
Copied: glibc/repos/testing-i686/glibc.install (from rev 298991,
glibc/trunk/glibc.install)
===================================================================
--- testing-i686/glibc.install (rev 0)
+++ testing-i686/glibc.install 2017-06-19 21:51:14 UTC (rev 298992)
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+post_upgrade() {
+ locale-gen
+
+ ldconfig -r .
+}
Copied: glibc/repos/testing-i686/locale-gen (from rev 298991,
glibc/trunk/locale-gen)
===================================================================
--- testing-i686/locale-gen (rev 0)
+++ testing-i686/locale-gen 2017-06-19 21:51:14 UTC (rev 298992)
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+set -e
+
+LOCALEGEN=/etc/locale.gen
+LOCALES=/usr/share/i18n/locales
+if [ -n "$POSIXLY_CORRECT" ]; then
+ unset POSIXLY_CORRECT
+fi
+
+
+[ -f $LOCALEGEN -a -s $LOCALEGEN ] || exit 0;
+
+# Remove all old locale dir and locale-archive before generating new
+# locale data.
+rm -rf /usr/lib/locale/* || true
+
+umask 022
+
+is_entry_ok() {
+ if [ -n "$locale" -a -n "$charset" ] ; then
+ true
+ else
+ echo "error: Bad entry '$locale $charset'"
+ false
+ fi
+}
+
+echo "Generating locales..."
+while read locale charset; do \
+ case $locale in \#*) continue;; "") continue;; esac; \
+ is_entry_ok || continue
+ echo -n " `echo $locale | sed 's/\([^.\@]*\).*/\1/'`"; \
+ echo -n ".$charset"; \
+ echo -n `echo $locale | sed 's/\([^\@]*\)\(\@.*\)*/\2/'`; \
+ echo -n '...'; \
+ if [ -f $LOCALES/$locale ]; then input=$locale; else \
+ input=`echo $locale | sed 's/\([^.]*\)[^@]*\(.*\)/\1\2/'`; fi; \
+ localedef -i $input -c -f $charset -A /usr/share/locale/locale.alias
$locale; \
+ echo ' done'; \
+done < $LOCALEGEN
+echo "Generation complete."
Copied: glibc/repos/testing-i686/locale.gen.txt (from rev 298991,
glibc/trunk/locale.gen.txt)
===================================================================
--- testing-i686/locale.gen.txt (rev 0)
+++ testing-i686/locale.gen.txt 2017-06-19 21:51:14 UTC (rev 298992)
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# Configuration file for locale-gen
+#
+# lists of locales that are to be generated by the locale-gen command.
+#
+# Each line is of the form:
+#
+# <locale> <charset>
+#
+# where <locale> is one of the locales given in /usr/share/i18n/locales
+# and <charset> is one of the character sets listed in
/usr/share/i18n/charmaps
+#
+# Examples:
+# en_US ISO-8859-1
+# en_US.UTF-8 UTF-8
+# de_DE ISO-8859-1
+# de_DE@euro ISO-8859-15
+#
+# The locale-gen command will generate all the locales,
+# placing them in /usr/lib/locale.
+#
+# A list of supported locales is included in this file.
+# Uncomment the ones you need.
+#
Copied: glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_AUDIT.patch (from
rev 298991, glibc/trunk/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_AUDIT.patch)
===================================================================
--- testing-x86_64/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_AUDIT.patch
(rev 0)
+++ testing-x86_64/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_AUDIT.patch 2017-06-19 21:51:14 UTC
(rev 298992)
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+From ba67ba3275d47e0080f0e5f09d9f5102c000c97e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+Message-Id:
<ba67ba3275d47e0080f0e5f09d9f5102c000c97e.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
+In-Reply-To: <cover.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
+References: <cover.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
+From: Florian Weimer <fwei...@redhat.com>
+Date: Sun, 28 May 2017 20:44:52 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] rtld: Reject overly long LD_AUDIT path elements
+To: libc-al...@sourceware.org
+
+Also only process the last LD_AUDIT entry.
+---
+ elf/rtld.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 95 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
+index 30f0cae..89d8573 100644
+--- a/elf/rtld.c
++++ b/elf/rtld.c
+@@ -116,13 +116,91 @@ dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
+ return *p != '\0';
+ }
+
+-/* List of auditing DSOs. */
++/* LD_AUDIT variable contents. Must be processed before the
++ audit_list below. */
++const char *audit_list_string;
++
++/* Cyclic list of auditing DSOs. audit_list->next is the first
++ element. */
+ static struct audit_list
+ {
+ const char *name;
+ struct audit_list *next;
+ } *audit_list;
+
++/* Iterator for audit_list_string followed by audit_list. */
++struct audit_list_iter
++{
++ /* Tail of audit_list_string still needing processing, or NULL. */
++ const char *audit_list_tail;
++
++ /* The list element returned in the previous iteration. NULL before
++ the first element. */
++ struct audit_list *previous;
++
++ /* Scratch buffer for returning a name which is part of
++ audit_list_string. */
++ char fname[PATH_MAX];
++};
++
++/* Initialize an audit list iterator. */
++static void
++audit_list_iter_init (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
++{
++ iter->audit_list_tail = audit_list_string;
++ iter->previous = NULL;
++}
++
++/* Iterate through both audit_list_string and audit_list. */
++static const char *
++audit_list_iter_next (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
++{
++ if (iter->audit_list_tail != NULL)
++ {
++ /* First iterate over audit_list_string. */
++ while (*iter->audit_list_tail != '\0')
++ {
++ /* Split audit list at colon. */
++ size_t len = strcspn (iter->audit_list_tail, ":");
++ if (len > 0 && len < PATH_MAX)
++ {
++ memcpy (iter->fname, iter->audit_list_tail, len);
++ iter->fname[len] = '\0';
++ }
++ else
++ /* Do not return this name to the caller. */
++ iter->fname[0] = '\0';
++
++ /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter. */
++ iter->audit_list_tail += len;
++ if (*iter->audit_list_tail == ':')
++ ++iter->audit_list_tail;
++
++ /* If the name is valid, return it. */
++ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (iter->fname))
++ return iter->fname;
++ /* Otherwise, wrap around and try the next name. */
++ }
++ /* Fall through to the procesing of audit_list. */
++ }
++
++ if (iter->previous == NULL)
++ {
++ if (audit_list == NULL)
++ /* No pre-parsed audit list. */
++ return NULL;
++ /* Start of audit list. The first list element is at
++ audit_list->next (cyclic list). */
++ iter->previous = audit_list->next;
++ return iter->previous->name;
++ }
++ if (iter->previous == audit_list)
++ /* Cyclic list wrap-around. */
++ return NULL;
++ iter->previous = iter->previous->next;
++ return iter->previous->name;
++}
++
+ #ifndef HAVE_INLINED_SYSCALLS
+ /* Set nonzero during loading and initialization of executable and
+ libraries, cleared before the executable's entry point runs. This
+@@ -1290,11 +1368,13 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend
to run this program.\n\
+ GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_modid = _dl_next_tls_modid ();
+
+ /* If we have auditing DSOs to load, do it now. */
+- if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL))
++ bool need_security_init = true;
++ if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL)
++ || __glibc_unlikely (audit_list_string != NULL))
+ {
+- /* Iterate over all entries in the list. The order is important. */
+ struct audit_ifaces *last_audit = NULL;
+- struct audit_list *al = audit_list->next;
++ struct audit_list_iter al_iter;
++ audit_list_iter_init (&al_iter);
+
+ /* Since we start using the auditing DSOs right away we need to
+ initialize the data structures now. */
+@@ -1305,9 +1385,14 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend
to run this program.\n\
+ use different values (especially the pointer guard) and will
+ fail later on. */
+ security_init ();
++ need_security_init = false;
+
+- do
++ while (true)
+ {
++ const char *name = audit_list_iter_next (&al_iter);
++ if (name == NULL)
++ break;
++
+ int tls_idx = GL(dl_tls_max_dtv_idx);
+
+ /* Now it is time to determine the layout of the static TLS
+@@ -1316,7 +1401,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend
to run this program.\n\
+ no DF_STATIC_TLS bit is set. The reason is that we know
+ glibc will use the static model. */
+ struct dlmopen_args dlmargs;
+- dlmargs.fname = al->name;
++ dlmargs.fname = name;
+ dlmargs.map = NULL;
+
+ const char *objname;
+@@ -1329,7 +1414,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend
to run this program.\n\
+ not_loaded:
+ _dl_error_printf ("\
+ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s;
ignored.\n",
+- al->name, err_str);
++ name, err_str);
+ if (malloced)
+ free ((char *) err_str);
+ }
+@@ -1433,10 +1518,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit
interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+ goto not_loaded;
+ }
+ }
+-
+- al = al->next;
+ }
+- while (al != audit_list->next);
+
+ /* If we have any auditing modules, announce that we already
+ have two objects loaded. */
+@@ -1700,7 +1782,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit
interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+ if (tcbp == NULL)
+ tcbp = init_tls ();
+
+- if (__glibc_likely (audit_list == NULL))
++ if (__glibc_likely (need_security_init))
+ /* Initialize security features. But only if we have not done it
+ earlier. */
+ security_init ();
+@@ -2331,9 +2413,7 @@ process_dl_audit (char *str)
+ char *p;
+
+ while ((p = (strsep) (&str, ":")) != NULL)
+- if (p[0] != '\0'
+- && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
+- || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
++ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (p))
+ {
+ /* This is using the local malloc, not the system malloc. The
+ memory can never be freed. */
+@@ -2397,7 +2477,7 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (memcmp (envline, "AUDIT", 5) == 0)
+- process_dl_audit (&envline[6]);
++ audit_list_string = &envline[6];
+ break;
+
+ case 7:
+--
+2.9.4
+
Copied: glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_LIBRARY_PATH.patch
(from rev 298991, glibc/trunk/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_LIBRARY_PATH.patch)
===================================================================
--- testing-x86_64/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_LIBRARY_PATH.patch
(rev 0)
+++ testing-x86_64/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_LIBRARY_PATH.patch 2017-06-19
21:51:14 UTC (rev 298992)
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 4d009d39ac9ede0369e268554a181b428f177a80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+Message-Id:
<4d009d39ac9ede0369e268554a181b428f177a80.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
+In-Reply-To: <cover.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
+References: <cover.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
+From: Florian Weimer <fwei...@redhat.com>
+Date: Sun, 28 May 2017 20:37:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] rtld: Completely ignore LD_LIBRARY_PATH for AT_SECURE=1
+ programs
+To: libc-al...@sourceware.org
+
+LD_LIBRARY_PATH can only be used to reorder system search paths, which
+is not useful functionality.
+---
+ elf/rtld.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
+index 319ef06..824b6cf 100644
+--- a/elf/rtld.c
++++ b/elf/rtld.c
+@@ -2419,7 +2419,8 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
+
+ case 12:
+ /* The library search path. */
+- if (memcmp (envline, "LIBRARY_PATH", 12) == 0)
++ if (!__libc_enable_secure
++ && memcmp (envline, "LIBRARY_PATH", 12) == 0)
+ {
+ library_path = &envline[13];
+ break;
+--
+2.9.4
+
Copied: glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_PRELOAD.patch (from
rev 298991, glibc/trunk/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_PRELOAD.patch)
===================================================================
--- testing-x86_64/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_PRELOAD.patch
(rev 0)
+++ testing-x86_64/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_PRELOAD.patch 2017-06-19
21:51:14 UTC (rev 298992)
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+From 65ff0b7a085b85271ec8fde99f542281b495e3bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+Message-Id:
<65ff0b7a085b85271ec8fde99f542281b495e3bc.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
+In-Reply-To: <cover.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
+References: <cover.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
+From: Florian Weimer <fwei...@redhat.com>
+Date: Sun, 28 May 2017 20:57:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] rtld: Reject overly long LD_PRELOAD path elements
+To: libc-al...@sourceware.org
+
+---
+ elf/rtld.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
+index 824b6cf..30f0cae 100644
+--- a/elf/rtld.c
++++ b/elf/rtld.c
+@@ -99,6 +99,22 @@ uintptr_t __pointer_chk_guard_local
+ strong_alias (__pointer_chk_guard_local, __pointer_chk_guard)
+ #endif
+
++/* Check that AT_SECURE=0, or that the passed name does not contain
++ directories and is not overly long. Reject empty names
++ unconditionally. */
++static bool
++dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
++{
++ if (__glibc_unlikely (__libc_enable_secure))
++ {
++ /* Ignore pathnames with directories for AT_SECURE=1
++ programs, and also skip overlong names. */
++ size_t len = strlen (p);
++ if (len >= NAME_MAX || memchr (p, '/', len) != NULL)
++ return false;
++ }
++ return *p != '\0';
++}
+
+ /* List of auditing DSOs. */
+ static struct audit_list
+@@ -716,6 +732,42 @@ static const char *preloadlist attribute_relro;
+ /* Nonzero if information about versions has to be printed. */
+ static int version_info attribute_relro;
+
++/* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
++ separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
++ executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope list.
++ (If the binary is running setuid all elements containing a '/' are
++ ignored since it is insecure.) Return the number of preloads
++ performed. */
++unsigned int
++handle_ld_preload (const char *preloadlist, struct link_map *main_map)
++{
++ unsigned int npreloads = 0;
++ const char *p = preloadlist;
++ char fname[PATH_MAX];
++
++ while (*p != '\0')
++ {
++ /* Split preload list at space/colon. */
++ size_t len = strcspn (p, " :");
++ if (len > 0 && len < PATH_MAX)
++ {
++ memcpy (fname, p, len);
++ fname[len] = '\0';
++ }
++ else
++ fname[0] = '\0';
++
++ /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter. */
++ p += len;
++ if (*p == ' ' || *p == ':')
++ ++p;
++
++ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (fname))
++ npreloads += do_preload (fname, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
++ }
++ return npreloads;
++}
++
+ static void
+ dl_main (const ElfW(Phdr) *phdr,
+ ElfW(Word) phnum,
+@@ -1462,23 +1514,8 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit
interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+
+ if (__glibc_unlikely (preloadlist != NULL))
+ {
+- /* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
+- separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
+- executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope
+- list. If the binary is running setuid all elements
+- containing a '/' are ignored since it is insecure. */
+- char *list = strdupa (preloadlist);
+- char *p;
+-
+ HP_TIMING_NOW (start);
+-
+- /* Prevent optimizing strsep. Speed is not important here. */
+- while ((p = (strsep) (&list, " :")) != NULL)
+- if (p[0] != '\0'
+- && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
+- || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
+- npreloads += do_preload (p, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
+-
++ npreloads += handle_ld_preload (preloadlist, main_map);
+ HP_TIMING_NOW (stop);
+ HP_TIMING_DIFF (diff, start, stop);
+ HP_TIMING_ACCUM_NT (load_time, diff);
+--
+2.9.4
+
Copied: glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/PKGBUILD (from rev 298991,
glibc/trunk/PKGBUILD)
===================================================================
--- testing-x86_64/PKGBUILD (rev 0)
+++ testing-x86_64/PKGBUILD 2017-06-19 21:51:14 UTC (rev 298992)
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+# $Id$
+# Maintainer: Allan McRae <al...@archlinux.org>
+
+# toolchain build order:
linux-api-headers->glibc->binutils->gcc->binutils->glibc
+# NOTE: valgrind requires rebuilt with each major glibc version
+
+pkgname=glibc
+pkgver=2.25
+pkgrel=4
+_commit=ccb4fd7a657b0fbc4890c98f4586d58a135fc583
+pkgdesc='GNU C Library'
+arch=(i686 x86_64)
+url='http://www.gnu.org/software/libc'
+license=(GPL LGPL)
+groups=(base)
+depends=('linux-api-headers>=4.10' tzdata filesystem)
+makedepends=('gcc>=6' git gd)
+optdepends=('gd: for memusagestat')
+backup=(etc/gai.conf
+ etc/locale.gen
+ etc/nscd.conf)
+options=(!strip staticlibs)
+install=glibc.install
+source=(git+https://sourceware.org/git/glibc.git#commit=${_commit}
+ locale.gen.txt
+ locale-gen
+ CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_AUDIT.patch
+ CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_PRELOAD.patch
+ CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_LIBRARY_PATH.patch
+ cvs-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch
+ cvs-hwcap-AT_SECURE.patch)
+md5sums=('SKIP'
+ '07ac979b6ab5eeb778d55f041529d623'
+ '476e9113489f93b348b21e144b6a8fcf'
+ '519c6eda90310964d12c7c744ce09333'
+ 'ed0cf195055a66d0b6f6b409c08c3199'
+ 'ff9ff81f713bb1b062280e669a646114'
+ 'e78157b48300b2436b3d90059ef02976'
+ 'bd31ebc2514ad79cbabd25b611c0b2a1')
+
+prepare() {
+ mkdir glibc-build
+ cd ${pkgname}
+ patch -p1 < "${srcdir}/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_AUDIT.patch"
+ patch -p1 < "${srcdir}/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_PRELOAD.patch"
+ patch -p1 < "${srcdir}/CVE-2017-1000366-rtld-LD_LIBRARY_PATH.patch"
+ patch -p1 < "${srcdir}/cvs-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch"
+ patch -p1 < "${srcdir}/cvs-hwcap-AT_SECURE.patch"
+}
+
+build() {
+ cd glibc-build
+
+ if [[ ${CARCH} = "i686" ]]; then
+ # Hack to fix NPTL issues with Xen, only required on 32bit platforms
+ export CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} -mno-tls-direct-seg-refs"
+ fi
+
+ echo "slibdir=/usr/lib" >> configparms
+ echo "rtlddir=/usr/lib" >> configparms
+ echo "sbindir=/usr/bin" >> configparms
+ echo "rootsbindir=/usr/bin" >> configparms
+
+ # remove fortify for building libraries
+ CPPFLAGS=${CPPFLAGS/-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2/}
+
+ ../${pkgname}/configure \
+ --prefix=/usr \
+ --libdir=/usr/lib \
+ --libexecdir=/usr/lib \
+ --with-headers=/usr/include \
+ --with-bugurl=https://bugs.archlinux.org/ \
+ --enable-add-ons \
+ --enable-obsolete-rpc \
+ --enable-kernel=2.6.32 \
+ --enable-bind-now \
+ --disable-profile \
+ --enable-stackguard-randomization \
+ --enable-stack-protector=strong \
+ --enable-lock-elision \
+ --enable-multi-arch \
+ --disable-werror
+
+ # build libraries with fortify disabled
+ echo "build-programs=no" >> configparms
+ make
+
+ # re-enable fortify for programs
+ sed -i "/build-programs=/s#no#yes#" configparms
+
+ echo "CC += -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2" >> configparms
+ echo "CXX += -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2" >> configparms
+ make
+}
+
+check() {
+ cd glibc-build
+
+ # remove fortify in preparation to run test-suite
+ sed -i '/FORTIFY/d' configparms
+
+ # some failures are "expected"
+ make check || true
+}
+
+package() {
+ cd glibc-build
+
+ install -dm755 ${pkgdir}/etc
+ touch ${pkgdir}/etc/ld.so.conf
+
+ make install_root=${pkgdir} install
+
+ rm -f ${pkgdir}/etc/ld.so.{cache,conf}
+
+ install -dm755 ${pkgdir}/usr/lib/{locale,systemd/system,tmpfiles.d}
+
+ install -m644 ${srcdir}/${pkgname}/nscd/nscd.conf ${pkgdir}/etc/nscd.conf
+ install -m644 ${srcdir}/${pkgname}/nscd/nscd.service
${pkgdir}/usr/lib/systemd/system
+ install -m644 ${srcdir}/${pkgname}/nscd/nscd.tmpfiles
${pkgdir}/usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/nscd.conf
+
+ install -m644 ${srcdir}/${pkgname}/posix/gai.conf ${pkgdir}/etc/gai.conf
+
+ install -m755 ${srcdir}/locale-gen ${pkgdir}/usr/bin
+
+ # create /etc/locale.gen
+ install -m644 ${srcdir}/locale.gen.txt ${pkgdir}/etc/locale.gen
+ sed -e '1,3d' -e 's|/| |g' -e 's|\\| |g' -e 's|^|#|g' \
+ ${srcdir}/glibc/localedata/SUPPORTED >> ${pkgdir}/etc/locale.gen
+
+ # Do not strip the following files for improved debugging support
+ # ("improved" as in not breaking gdb and valgrind...):
+ # ld-${pkgver}.so
+ # libc-${pkgver}.so
+ # libpthread-${pkgver}.so
+ # libthread_db-1.0.so
+
+ cd $pkgdir
+ strip $STRIP_BINARIES usr/bin/{gencat,getconf,getent,iconv,iconvconfig} \
+ usr/bin/{ldconfig,locale,localedef,nscd,makedb} \
+ usr/bin/{pcprofiledump,pldd,rpcgen,sln,sprof} \
+ usr/lib/getconf/*
+ if [[ $CARCH = "i686" ]]; then
+ strip $STRIP_BINARIES usr/bin/lddlibc4
+ fi
+
+ strip $STRIP_STATIC usr/lib/lib{anl,BrokenLocale,c{,_nonshared},crypt}.a \
+ usr/lib/lib{dl,g,ieee,mcheck,nsl,pthread{,_nonshared}}.a
\
+ usr/lib/lib{resolv,rpcsvc,rt,util}.a
+
+ strip $STRIP_SHARED usr/lib/lib{anl,BrokenLocale,cidn,crypt}-${pkgver}.so \
+
usr/lib/libnss_{compat,db,dns,files,hesiod,nis,nisplus}-*.so \
+ usr/lib/lib{dl,m,nsl,resolv,rt,util}-${pkgver}.so \
+ usr/lib/lib{memusage,pcprofile,SegFault}.so \
+ usr/lib/{audit,gconv}/*.so || true
+
+ if [[ $CARCH = "x86_64" ]]; then
+ strip $STRIP_STATIC usr/lib/lib{m-${pkgver},mvec{,_nonshared}}.a
+ strip $STRIP_SHARED usr/lib/libmvec-*.so
+ fi
+
+ if [[ $CARCH = "i686" ]]; then
+ strip $STRIP_STATIC usr/lib/libm.a
+ fi
+}
Copied: glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/cvs-hwcap-AT_SECURE.patch (from rev 298991,
glibc/trunk/cvs-hwcap-AT_SECURE.patch)
===================================================================
--- testing-x86_64/cvs-hwcap-AT_SECURE.patch (rev 0)
+++ testing-x86_64/cvs-hwcap-AT_SECURE.patch 2017-06-19 21:51:14 UTC (rev
298992)
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+2017-03-07 Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddh...@sourceware.org>
+
+ [BZ #21209]
+ * elf/rtld.c (process_envvars): Ignore LD_HWCAP_MASK for
+ AT_SECURE processes.
+
+--- a/elf/rtld.c
++++ b/elf/rtld.c
+@@ -2404,7 +2404,8 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
+
+ case 10:
+ /* Mask for the important hardware capabilities. */
+- if (memcmp (envline, "HWCAP_MASK", 10) == 0)
++ if (!__libc_enable_secure
++ && memcmp (envline, "HWCAP_MASK", 10) == 0)
+ GLRO(dl_hwcap_mask) = __strtoul_internal (&envline[11], NULL,
+ 0, 0);
+ break;
+--- a/sysdeps/generic/unsecvars.h
++++ b/sysdeps/generic/unsecvars.h
+@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
+ "LD_DEBUG\0"
\
+ "LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT\0" \
+ "LD_DYNAMIC_WEAK\0" \
++ "LD_HWCAP_MASK\0" \
+ "LD_LIBRARY_PATH\0" \
+ "LD_ORIGIN_PATH\0" \
+ "LD_PRELOAD\0" \
Copied: glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/cvs-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch (from
rev 298991, glibc/trunk/cvs-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch)
===================================================================
--- testing-x86_64/cvs-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch
(rev 0)
+++ testing-x86_64/cvs-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch 2017-06-19 21:51:14 UTC
(rev 298992)
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+2017-06-14 Florian Weimer <fwei...@redhat.com>
+
+ * sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c: Add IS_IN (libc) guard.
+ * sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c: Likewise.
+
+--- a/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c
++++ b/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c
+@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
+-#define __strcspn_sse2 __strcspn_ia32
+-#include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/strcspn-c.c>
++#if IS_IN (libc)
++# define __strcspn_sse2 __strcspn_ia32
++# include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/strcspn-c.c>
++#endif
+--- a/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c
++++ b/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c
+@@ -1 +1,3 @@
+-#include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/varshift.c>
++#if IS_IN (libc)
++# include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/varshift.c>
++#endif
Copied: glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/glibc.install (from rev 298991,
glibc/trunk/glibc.install)
===================================================================
--- testing-x86_64/glibc.install (rev 0)
+++ testing-x86_64/glibc.install 2017-06-19 21:51:14 UTC (rev 298992)
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+post_upgrade() {
+ locale-gen
+
+ ldconfig -r .
+}
Copied: glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/locale-gen (from rev 298991,
glibc/trunk/locale-gen)
===================================================================
--- testing-x86_64/locale-gen (rev 0)
+++ testing-x86_64/locale-gen 2017-06-19 21:51:14 UTC (rev 298992)
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+set -e
+
+LOCALEGEN=/etc/locale.gen
+LOCALES=/usr/share/i18n/locales
+if [ -n "$POSIXLY_CORRECT" ]; then
+ unset POSIXLY_CORRECT
+fi
+
+
+[ -f $LOCALEGEN -a -s $LOCALEGEN ] || exit 0;
+
+# Remove all old locale dir and locale-archive before generating new
+# locale data.
+rm -rf /usr/lib/locale/* || true
+
+umask 022
+
+is_entry_ok() {
+ if [ -n "$locale" -a -n "$charset" ] ; then
+ true
+ else
+ echo "error: Bad entry '$locale $charset'"
+ false
+ fi
+}
+
+echo "Generating locales..."
+while read locale charset; do \
+ case $locale in \#*) continue;; "") continue;; esac; \
+ is_entry_ok || continue
+ echo -n " `echo $locale | sed 's/\([^.\@]*\).*/\1/'`"; \
+ echo -n ".$charset"; \
+ echo -n `echo $locale | sed 's/\([^\@]*\)\(\@.*\)*/\2/'`; \
+ echo -n '...'; \
+ if [ -f $LOCALES/$locale ]; then input=$locale; else \
+ input=`echo $locale | sed 's/\([^.]*\)[^@]*\(.*\)/\1\2/'`; fi; \
+ localedef -i $input -c -f $charset -A /usr/share/locale/locale.alias
$locale; \
+ echo ' done'; \
+done < $LOCALEGEN
+echo "Generation complete."
Copied: glibc/repos/testing-x86_64/locale.gen.txt (from rev 298991,
glibc/trunk/locale.gen.txt)
===================================================================
--- testing-x86_64/locale.gen.txt (rev 0)
+++ testing-x86_64/locale.gen.txt 2017-06-19 21:51:14 UTC (rev 298992)
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# Configuration file for locale-gen
+#
+# lists of locales that are to be generated by the locale-gen command.
+#
+# Each line is of the form:
+#
+# <locale> <charset>
+#
+# where <locale> is one of the locales given in /usr/share/i18n/locales
+# and <charset> is one of the character sets listed in
/usr/share/i18n/charmaps
+#
+# Examples:
+# en_US ISO-8859-1
+# en_US.UTF-8 UTF-8
+# de_DE ISO-8859-1
+# de_DE@euro ISO-8859-15
+#
+# The locale-gen command will generate all the locales,
+# placing them in /usr/lib/locale.
+#
+# A list of supported locales is included in this file.
+# Uncomment the ones you need.
+#
