On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 1:53 PM, John Curran <[email protected]> wrote: > Parties are likely to use RPKI services such that (as someone put > it recently) - "routing decisions are affected and breakage happens” > > While such impacts could happen with whois, parties would have to > create the linkages themselves, whereas with RPKI it is recognized > that the system is designed to provide information for influencing of > routing decisions (a major difference, and one that a judge could be > made to recognize if some service provider has a prolonged outage > due to their own self-inflicted Whois data wrangling into routing filters.)
Hi John, So along the risk line with whois at one end and spam RBLs at the other, RPKI sounds almost identical to the risk of deploying DNSSEC. Or am I missing something that makes RPKI more risky? Regards, Bill Herrin -- William Herrin ................ [email protected] [email protected] Owner, Dirtside Systems ......... Web: <http://www.dirtside.com/> May I solve your unusual networking challenges?
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