--- Eric Crampton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > since I'm going to have to pay the $100 regardless of what I > bid, I might as well state $5 million to get the $5 in expressive > benefits. > Eric
First of all, the outcome is not necessarily known in advance. The outcome could be to not obtain the good. We don't know whether one will have to pay the $100. Even when the outcome has a high probability, one does not necessarily get expressive benefit from agreeing with it. Suppose the issue is to spend an extra $10 billion in enforcing the drug laws. Those who disagree with this goal will express a value of zero. If the net values are fairly close to zero, a high stated value such as $5 million could well change the outcome. It seems to me your are setting up a case with a predetermined outcome, whereas in fact, social choices generally do not have such outcomes. > What drives the inefficiency is > that all voters take whether they have to pay the cost as being > exogenously determined, and optimize from there. Yes, but in social choice generally, is it not the case that the outcome can be unknown? Fred Foldvary ===== [EMAIL PROTECTED]
