Hi Manoj: > >Assam, for that matter North East's insurgency is similar to that of >Peru's Shining Path insurgency. Peru's majority didnot take along half >the population in the developmental path, this led to a long 2 decades >of fighting between the govt. forces and the guerrillas. The human >rights violations there were worse than NE probably.
*** I do not know enough about Peru's civil war to determine if it is of a similar nature to that of Assam's sovereignty aspirations and associated armed struggles. But one thing I know that is different in Assam's case is that it is NOT all about development like you allude to and so many others attempt to portray it as, some by design and others by ignorance. Yes, development is an issue. But EVEN if Assam were to be developed to the same extent as some other Indian state that is touted to be 'developed', this aspiration is not going to go away. And my guess is that it would actually be more pronounced. What has kept it in check has been a paucity of resources to wage the struggle. c-da At 12:01 PM +0530 2/20/06, Manoj Das wrote: >Assam, for that matter North East's insurgency is similar to that of >Peru's Shining Path insurgency. Peru's majority didnot take along half >the population in the developmental path, this led to a long 2 decades >of fighting between the govt. forces and the guerrillas. The human >rights violations there were worse than NE probably. > >The setting up of the truth commission is one idea we can borrow from >that country. Let the govt. set up an international truth commission >that will go into the reasons, rights abuses and suggest solutions. >All the parties should abide by the commissions recommendations and >find a lastign solution. > >MKD > >On 2/20/06, Roy, Santanu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Dear Sanjib: >> >> Excellent piece - enjoyed reading it. Thanks for posting it, >> >> Hopefully your writings will inspire some innovative thinking in circles >> that think. >> >> Your characterization of the stalemate machine is quite apt. Your >> observation that >> >> "...in India, even when conflicts have been terribly hurtful, localized >> suffering has not easily translated into high costs for the government >> side. Doing something about conflicts in the Northeast may be important >> for our national-level politicians, but no government has fallen because >> of the way it has handled or mishandled them. And after decades of >> counter-insurgency and attention to security, we have further cushioned >> our decision-making elites from the hurting effects of a stalemate." >> >> is at the heart of the problem. >> >> Indeed, (at the risk of being repetitive) I have always felt that the very >> forces that "cushion our decision making elites from the hurtful effects of >> a stalemate", the structures that ensure that "localized suffering ...not >> easily translated into high costs for the government" are also at the very >> root of the various reasons why local discontentment and localized >> insurgency emerge in the first place. >> >> There is a vicious circle here that acts as feedback mechanism and this to >> my view points to a fundamental failure of the Indian state. >> >> So, is there any hope? Perhaps, hope lies in some change of circumstances - >> something in the regular process of social change - or perhaps some turn of >> history that will make the ground reality in north eastern India (or Assam) >> extremely important to the interests of the political and bureucratic elite >> of the mainland. I can think of many examples. I can wish for some. But that > > would be wishful thinking. >> >> Take care- >> >> Santanu. >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Sanjib Baruah >> Sent: Mon 2/20/2006 7:50 AM >> To: assam@assamnet.org >> Subject: [Assam] Sanjib Baruah on Kakopathar >> >> >> http://www.telegraphindia.com/1060220/asp/opinion/story_5850159.asp > > >> The Telegraph (Calcutta) Monday, February 20, 2006 >> >> HOW THE STALEMATE MACHINE WORKS >> >> Sanjib Baruah >> >> The obvious lesson of Kakopathar is that counter-insurgency operations and >> negotiations towards peace do not go together, writes Sanjib Baruah The >> author is at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, and Bard College, >> Annandale-on-Hudson, New York >> >> The developments in Assam over the past few days have made one thing >> clear: that reports in recent years of the United Liberation Front of >> Assam losing influence have been highly exaggerated. At least that is not >> the case in those parts of rural upper Assam the home ground of ULFAs >> exiled top leadership and the site of the recent unrest. >> >> For a number of days, pro-ULFA slogans and sentiments have been in open >> display as villagers of the Kakopathar region blocked a national highway, >> stormed army pickets, vandalized vehicles and even dug up the highway to >> protest against the custodial killing of a fellow villager by the Indian >> army. That the army describes the victim as an ULFA hit-man has had no >> effect on the publics sense of outrage. Nine persons were killed in a >> police firing of protesters. ULFA called an Assam bandh on February 13, >> protesting against the Kakopathar firing and its chairman, Arabinda >> Rajkhowa, compared the incident with the Jalianwalla Bagh massacre. >> >> The backdrop to these developments might initially seem awkward. The >> second meeting between the government of India and the ULFA-appointed >> peoples consultative group had just taken place in Delhi where the >> government even promised confidence-building measures to facilitate what >> could some day be called a peace process. However, important differences >> exist on the government side on whether to negotiate with ULFA. No less a >> person than Assams governor, Lieutenant General Ajai Singh architect of >> two counter-insurgency operations against ULFA publicly opposes >> negotiations. What is there to negotiate with them? he asks. Instead, he >> favours instilling fear in the rebels so that they cannot dictate terms. >> By contrast, Assams elected chief minister, Tarun Gogoi, has been strongly >> supportive of negotiations. Singh and some others in the security >> establishment would probably interpret Kakopathar as no more than a >> temporary setback. But if a single incident could become a trigger to such >> public anger and expression of pro-ULFA sentiments, one can hardly have >> confidence in the security establishments reading of the ground situation >> and its recipe for bringing about peace. >> >> Indias track record of ending internal armed conflicts is quite poor. >> Today the world has numerous intra-state armed conflicts, and everywhere >> they last long on average about seven years as opposed to six months for >> international wars according to one count. However, the duration of >> intra-state armed conflicts in India and in the rest of south Asia have >> been much longer than the world average. The Naga war despite the >> nine-year old ceasefire will soon enter the sixth decade, making it one >> of the worlds oldest armed conflicts. >> >> There are many reasons why most of our conflicts have been long-lasting. >> But one common factor seems to suggest itself. Those who study armed >> internal conflicts emphasize the role of a mutually hurting stalemate >> felt by conflicting parties as a necessary condition for pushing >> conflicts in the direction of a negotiated settlement. These theorists >> argue that when parties realize that further military escalation would not >> produce victory and that the costs of the status quo are unacceptably >> high, a conflict becomes ripe for resolution. >> >> But in India, even when conflicts have been terribly hurtful, localized > > suffering has not easily translated into high costs for the government >> side. Doing something about conflicts in the Northeast may be important >> for our national-level politicians, but no government has fallen because >> of the way it has handled or mishandled them. And after decades of >> counter-insurgency and attention to security, we have further cushioned > > our decision-making elites from the hurting effects of a stalemate. >> >> In a new two-tiered order, the top echelons of the bureaucracy, the army >> and the political establishment who live and travel with very high levels >> of security are now the security haves. Under these conditions, despite >> enormous suffering by civilians, those who favour a military solution or >> rather a victors peace tend to win policy arguments. They seem to believe >> that given the obvious military superiority of the governments side, all >> armed groups can be eventually bullied into submission. This of course has >> meant, in effect, stalemated long-duration armed conflicts and the costs >> being paid almost entirely by the security have-nots. >> >> One obvious lesson of Kakopathar is that counter-insurgency operations and >> efforts toward a negotiated peace do not go together. Kakopathar >> underscores the absence of a solid coalition on the government side in >> support of negotiations. What has made the two meetings with the PCG >> possible is simply an electoral calculation that in post-Illegal Migrants >> (Determination by Tribunals) Act Assam, the ethnic Assamese vote might >> matter to the Congress more than usual. Appearing to be on the side of a >> negotiated peace with ULFA might give the Congress an edge over the Asom >> Gana Parishad among this segment. But since this posture does not have to >> be maintained beyond the elections, there is no need to try to build a >> stable political coalition to support a negotiated peace. Thus the serious >> differences between the governor and the chief minister can just be put >> aside. Were we serious about a negotiated peace, there might have been >> pressure for the governor to resign. After all, there could be no better >> confidence-building measure than making a civilian, and someone untainted >> by counter-insurgency operations, the next governor. >> >> Decisions made under these political conditions can only reinforce the >> existing stalemate. Daniel Ellsberg had coined the term stalemate machine >> to describe the American political logic of successive presidents >> committing just enough resources to Vietnam so as not to violate two >> critical domestic political rules of thumb: to not lose South Vietnam to >> the communists before the next election and not commit US ground troops to >> a land war in Asia. Pretending to work towards a negotiated peace with >> ULFA while carrying on counter-insurgency operations is an Indian version >> of a stalemate machine. >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> assam mailing list >> assam@assamnet.org >> http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> assam mailing list >> assam@assamnet.org >> http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org >> > > >-- >Manoj Kumar Das >B 109 Gr Floor Rear >Sarvodaya Enclave >New Delhi 110017 India >Tel: 91 11 26533824 >Telefax: 91 11 26533829 >Hand Phone: 91 9312650558 > >_______________________________________________ >assam mailing list >assam@assamnet.org >http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org _______________________________________________ assam mailing list assam@assamnet.org http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org
