No matter WHAT it takes: be it negotiation or removal of: arrogance, false >ego, greed - on anybody's part, but: LET THE PUBLIC LEAD A NORMAL LIFE.

*** Right. But what are they asking ? They are demanding that ULFA disappear. Right? Wish them away?

Are these folks real? You tell me A. They have a far better chance of getting results by going to an important temple and offering appropriate bribes to gods of their choices for a favorable outcome, won't you think :-)?








At 11:05 AM -0500 6/12/07, Alpana B. Sarangapani wrote:

No. calling home from abroad to see if everyone is OK, is NOT the same as being affected, like >those TRADERS for example.

Right.
The traders can do business only if people are alive and could come to their business to shop around.

Then can we ignore this?
"The public protests in Assam against the killing of innocent civilians by
the United Liberation Front of Asom in indiscriminate bombings are good.."


>No. calling home from abroad to see if everyone is OK, is NOT the same as being affected, like >those TRADERS for example.

Duh! C'da. You mean those protestors are not affected?? Why or who would they call home from abroad? They are right there - fearing to do their everyday thing - like going to work, go to the market, take their child to school!

They don't know who is fighting for what - they are protesting against the killing of civilians - they are right there - suffering - why would they call home from abroad?

The bottom line is: Give them the FREEDOM to live - to be able to go out to work and come back home safely to their family.

No matter WHAT it takes: be it negotiation or removal of: arrogance, false ego, greed - on anybody's part, but: LET THE PUBLIC LEAD A NORMAL LIFE.

And I strongly believe that's what they are protesting about and the article rightly mentions that...
"The public protests in Assam against the killing of innocent civilians by
the United Liberation Front of Asom in indiscriminate bombings are good.."









"In order to make spiritual progress you must be patient like a tree and humble like a blade of grass"

- Lakshmana








Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2007 10:25:50 -0500
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; assam@assamnet.org
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: [Assam] Protests against Ulfa in Assam

.ExternalClass blockquote, .ExternalClass dl, .ExternalClass ul, .ExternalClass ol, .ExternalClass li {padding-top:0;padding-bottom:0;}
Hi A:

NO, I did not miss that at all.

What I was referring to is the opposition of a segment of the population to a negotiated settlement. It is from those who are NOT affected by the violence and who receive an unwarranted amount of protection from the police and the military, or do not live in Assam, or are otherwise untouched by the continued violence.

No. calling home from abroad to see if everyone is OK, is NOT the same as being affected, like those TRADERS for example.

c-da







At 10:05 AM -0500 6/12/07, Alpana B. Sarangapani wrote:

C'da:

 As I always maintained, it is THOSE who are not affected by the
 violence, those who get the disproportionate protection of the police


It seems you missed the very first line of the article:

"The public protests in Assam against the killing of innocent civilians by
the United Liberation Front of Asom in indiscriminate bombings are good.."

The public (Assamese living in Assam, that is) are the victims and they want to regain safety. Can the ULFA provide them with that at least - the FREEDOM to live a life without fear?





"In order to make spiritual progress you must be patient like a tree and humble like a blade of grass"

- Lakshmana







 Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2007 19:38:55 -0500
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; assam@assamnet.org
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: Re: [Assam] Protests against Ulfa in Assam
 >
 As always, you hit the nail right on the head, Baruah. If only our
 intelligentsia could see what stares them at their faces.

 As I always maintained, it is THOSE who are not affected by the
 violence, those who get the disproportionate protection of the police
 and the military, as VVVIPs and what have you, are the most vocal
 ones who oppose negotiations and a political solution. And they are
 the ones who froth in the mouth declaring their sympathies to the
 victims, bringing a new low to hypocrisy.

 Best.

 m








 At 6:56 PM -0400 6/11/07, Sanjib Baruah wrote:
 >http://www.telegraphindia.com/1070612/asp/opinion/story_7908619.asp
 >
 >NEVER A MOMENT TO BREATHE EASY
 >
 >Sanjib Baruah
 >
 >Telegraph (Calcutta) June 12, 2007
 >
 >After yet another bloodbath carried out by Ulfa, Sanjib Baruah ponders
 >whether negotiations can still hold the magic answer in Assam
 >
 >
 >The public protests in Assam against the killing of innocent civilians by
 >the United Liberation Front of Asom in indiscriminate bombings are good
 >news. However, it would be premature to read them as a sign that a big
 >change is round the corner, since another kind of reaction is also
 >visible. An umbrella body of 30 trade associations, representing groups
 >that bore the brunt of Ulfas attacks, has strongly come out in support of
 >unconditional talks with Ulfa.
 >
 >The implications of this response are ambiguous. It is a contrast from the
 >way similar groups had reacted when Ulfa targeted Hindi-speaking labourers
 >last winter. The call then was for more security, for increased presence
 >of the army, and for tougher counter-insurgency operations. The Ulfa may
 >have reasons to be quite pleased with this turn of events.
 >
 >Counter-insurgency experts might see the support for talks among new
 >groups as Ulfas devious game-plan. Indeed, this explains why some people
 >feel that, with growing evidence of Ulfas isolation, there is even less
 >reason for the government to talk to it now than before.
 >
 >This view, however, ignores the logic of asymmetric warfare. Insurgents
 >everywhere choose tactics that play to their strengths, not to their
 >weaknesses, vis--vis governments. It is nave to think that rebel groups
 >would simply give up the battle and surrender once they lose militarily to
 >government forces. After all, even the most elementary lesson of armed

 > >conflicts suggests that military power is only one factor among many in
 >determining outcomes.
 >
 >Thus, when tough security barriers go up to protect VIPs and strategically
 >or symbolically important public places, it is only to be expected that
 >insurgent groups would turn to soft targets. The people can be excused for
 >being shocked and surprised by such insurgent tactics, but those in charge
 >of devising official strategy cannot claim to be equally surprised. They
 >must be able to outsmart insurgent leaders, and anticipate how the logic
 >of asymmetrical warfare plays out.
 >
 >There is a difference between the way governments as institutions may want
 >to respond to insurgent demands, and those who bear the brunt of their
 >threats and actions might. Such a difference becomes apparent in a
 >situation like a kidnapping, when a government position of never
 >negotiating with terrorists does not resonate with the families of
 >victims. Insurgent groups can try to leverage this intrinsic asymmetry.
 >
 >There is plenty of evidence of insurgent groups making civilians pawns in
 >their conflicts. A study at Uppsala Universitys Peace and Conflict
 >Research Department found that in hundreds of low-intensity armed
 >conflicts worldwide, attacks on civilians are a tactic of choice by armed
 >rebel groups engaged in asymmetric warfare with government forces.
 >According to Lisa Hultman, the author of this study, by targeting
 >civilians, rebel groups signal both their resolve to continue the battle
 >and their willingness to pay high costs in order to pursue victory against
 >a militarily stronger adversary.
 > >
 >This finding is in keeping with a long intellectual tradition of military
 >thought that sees war as a violent form of bargaining. Insurgent groups,
 >of course, realize that in attacking civilians, they run the risk of
 >alienating their primary audience, from whom they draw their core support.
 >The protests against Ulfas actions underscore that risk. At the same time,
 >the return for such grave risks can be quite high. Targeting civilians in
 >a foreign country is not quite the same as targeting civilians at home.
 >Yet the terrorist attacks by al Qaida on the Madrid trains in 2004 must
 >count as one of the most spectacular examples of political gains derived
 >from an attack on civilians. The attacks caused a rift between the people
 >of Spain and their elected government, and precipitated the withdrawal of
 >Spanish troops from Iraq.
 >
 >What then are our policy choices in Assam today? The failure of two
 >decades of counter-insurgency speaks for itself. At the same time, it is
 >hard to argue that negotiations hold the magic answer at this stage.
 >Insurgent groups do not usually fight long and costly battles against
 >impossible military odds, for what someone once called the mere privilege
 >of quitting. Ulfa is unlikely to be an exception.
 >
 >There is, however, a sense of deja vu about the current situation which is
 >disturbing. Assam has been in similar situations before. Indeed
 >counter-insurgency in the North-east is replete with instances of history
 >repeating itself. Indian officials in charge of counter-insurgency never
 >tire of repeating the clich that there are no military solutions, and that
 >a solution ultimately would have to be political. Yet there is little sign
 >of any change in a strategy that seeks to establish the military
 >superiority of the government in the expectation that it would force
 >insurgent groups to accept peace on its terms. There is little evidence of
 >an ability to respond to the adaptive capabilities of its adversaries, and
 >to their ability to constantly take conflicts to new realms. Still, no one
 >except the civilians of the region has had to pay a price for this long
 >history of policy failure.
 >
 >The author is at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi and the Indian
 >Institute of Technology, Guwahati.
 >
 >
 >_______________________________________________
 >assam mailing list

 > >assam@assamnet.org
 >http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org


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