*China's India aggression*

http://www.thestatesman.net/page.arcview.php?date=2007-11-05&usrsess=1&clid=3&id=202706

There are four main aspects to the China-Tibet-India problem over the last
century, some of which are only now becoming apparent. The first is
historical prior to the 1949 Communist takeover, in which the British,
Tibetans and Kuomintang were participants in background discussion and
events. The second is historical too, namely, the appeasement by Nehru and
his diplomats of the Mao-Zhou Communists and betrayal of normal Tibetan and
Indian interests in the period 1949-1959. The third is political, to do with
reaction, confusion and conflict among Indian Communists leading to the
CPI/CPI-M split in response to Communist attacks upon Tibet and India. The
fourth is military, to do with the 1962 war itself, the nature of the
surprise Chinese attack and Indian defeat.

Chinese claims

A 1954 Beijing publication not only claimed Tibet but alleged vast areas of
Asia to be Chinese: Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, NEFA (Arunachal), Assam,
the Andaman Islands, Burma (Myanmar), Malaya, Singapore, Thailand,
Indo-China, the Sulu Islands, the Ryukyus, Korea, Formosa (Taiwan), the
whole of East Turkestan (Sinkiang), Kazakhstan, Siberia west of the Amur
River, maritime provinces east of the Amur down to Vladivostok, and Sakhalin
(viz., Coral Bell in FS Northedge (ed) Foreign Policies of the Powers,
1973).
America's CIA reported in a secret 1962 analysis, declassified in May 2007,
that the Left faction of India's Communists had been repeating what Mao
Zedhong said to Ajoy Ghosh: "that Tibet, Sikkim, Bhutan, and NEFA are
provinces peopled by the same race, that China had a historic right to these
territories, that the McMahon line was not valid, and that the Indian
government's raising of 'the bogey of Chinese aggression' had resulted from
its realisation that Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and India would be deeply
affected by the social and economic revolution in Tibet" (CIA The Indian
Communist Party and the Sino-Soviet Dispute, Feb 1962, page 76). Referring
to Chinese designs on Mongolia, Kruschev's USSR condemned its
fellow-Communists: "… The true schemes of the Chinese leaders (are) obvious.
They are permeated through and through with great-power chauvinism and
hegemonism", Pravda 2 Sep 1964, quoted by Bell, op.cit.
China's 1962 India war was rationally consistent with carrying out precisely
such an expansionist policy in Sinkiang and Tibet. As the German historians
Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund have stated most succinctly, the NEFA
conflict was merely a deliberate diversionary tactic which has worked
brilliantly for decades:
"The consolidation of the Chinese hold on Tibet, as well as on other areas
of Central Asia... (required military infrastructure) to maintain it and a
ring road was constructed which led from China to Tibet and from there via
the Karakorum Range to Sinkiang and Mongolia and then back to China. At a
crucial point some Indian territory (Aksai Chin) obstructed this connection.
Beyond Aksai Chin was the terrible desert, Takla Makan, which was a major
obstacle. Faced with the dilemma of violating Indian territory or getting
stuck in the desert, the Chinese opted for the first course and quietly
built a road through Aksai Chin. In the meantime, they provoked incidents on
the northeastern border so as to divert attention from their real aims. They
also published maps which showed the border in Assam at the foot of the
mountains rather than on the watershed. The watershed line had been settled
by the McMahon border commission, which had also included a Chinese delegate
who initialled the protocol, although it was not subsequently ratified by
the Chinese government. Actually, there was no disagreement about the
watershed line at that time when debate was focused on a different line,
supposed to divide Tibet into an Inner and Outer Tibet on the same pattern
as Inner and Outer Mongolia. Inner Tibet was to be under Chinese influence
and Outer Tibet under British influence. But Communist China made use of the
fact that the agreement had not been ratiied and accused India of clinging
to the imperialist heritage with regard to the Himalayan boundary. This
harping on the legal position in the northeast was a tactical move made in
order to build up a bargaining position with regard to Aksai Chin where the
Chinese could not raise similar claims… Finally, a border war broke out in
October 1962. It was a typical demonstration war conducted with great
finesse by the Chinese. They completely perplexed the Indian generals by
pushing a whole division through the mountains down to the valley of Assam
and withdrawing it again as quickly as it had come. The Indian strategic
concept of defending the Himalayan boundary by cutting off the supply lines
of the enemy if it ventured too far beyond the border could not be put into
operation: the Chinese were gone before the supply lines could be cut. But
why did they do this? They wanted to divert attention from their moves in
the northwest, where they did reach the Karakorum Pass in a swift offensive
and did not withdraw as they had done in the east." (History of India, 1998,
pp 321-322).
Chinese casualties were some 1,460 dead, 1,697 wounded, Indian casualties
some 3,128 dead, 3,968 captured, 548 wounded, each as reported by itself. JK
Galbraith, the friendliest and fairest observer India may have hoped for,
found our Army populated by "tragically old-fashioned" peacetime generals
full of bluster, while brave soldiers under them remained woefully
ill-equipped and came to be outgunned and out-manoeuvred.
Mao Zedhong's racist reference to the people populating NEFA being of
Chinese origin was misguided, even nonsensical. On such a basis, China might
claim Japan or Korea next, as might West Africa claim sovereignty over North
and South American blacks or Mongolia over Turks and Afghans. NEFA's five
administrative divisions ~ Kameng, Subansiri, Siang, Lohit and Tirap ~ are
populated by indigenous animistic tribes including the Momba, Mishmi, Abor,
Miri, Dafla and Aka, each with defined areas. The 1883 Survey of India
showed these areas administered de facto by British India from Assam. The
1908 Edinburgh Geographical Institute's map by JG Bartholomew showed most of
the same to be part of Bhutan, a British Indian protectorate, as did earlier
18th Century maps.

Less than legitimate

Communist China's claims of sovereignty over NEFA (Arunachal) in any case
derive from its claims of sovereignty over Tibet. Britain, India and other
nations guided by international law have allowed that Lhasa, though long
independent, may acknowledge Chinese suzerainty ~ but only subject to the
condition of traditional autonomy. The 1907 Anglo-Russian Treaty stipulated
Tibet would be dealt with officially through China, leading to the Henry
McMahon Commission of 1914 which followed the normal international
cartographic practise of the watershed defining the boundary in NEFA. That
came to be generally followed by British and Indian maps of NEFA since. The
CIA's official 1959 map of the region concurred and the United States
Government explicitly instructed Galbraith, its New Delhi Ambassador during
the 1962 war, that the American position was the same as the British and
Indian. There appears to be no record of any serious Chinese cartography of
the region ever ~ Chinese maps prior to 1935 agreeing with the British
Indian position but disputing it afterwards, placing Tibet's boundary along
the margin of the Assam plain. China was ravaged by war, civil war and
revolutionary excesses during much of the 20th Century and hardly had
well-preserved national archives at a time when its own capital and central
government was changing several times.
China's Communists, being themselves in political power for decades somewhat
less than legitimately as a one-party dictatorship, have been loath to admit
all such inconvenient facts, and instead continue in their hegemonic mode. A
new liberal democratic China guided by law on the Taiwan pattern may have to
be awaited before this conflict comes to be resolved.

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