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http://www.constitution.org/gro/djbp_222.htm
CHAPTER 22: On the Unjust Causes of War.

Differences between real and colourable motives â War atrocious
without either of these motives â Wars of plunder, under the most
plausible pretexts, not justifiable â Causes apparently, but not
really just â Unnecessary advantage â Desire of a better soil â
Discovery of things belonging to others â Incapacity of the original
owners â War not always justifiable under the pretext of asserting
liberty or of imposing a beneficial government upon a people against
their will â Emperor's pretensions to universal empire refuted â
Pretensions of the Church â Imperfect obligations â Difference between
wars originally unjust and those afterwards becoming so.

I. IN a former part of this work, where the justice of war was
discussed, it was observed that some wars were founded upon real
motives and others only upon colourable pretexts. This distinction was
first noticed by Polybius, who calls the pretexts, profaseiV and the
real causes, aitiaV. Thus Alexander made war upon Darius, under the
pretence of avenging the former wrongs done by the Persians to the
Greeks. But the real motive of that bold and enterprising hero, was
the easy acquisition of wealth and dominion, which the expeditions of
Xenophon and Agesilaus had opened to his view.

In the same manner, a dispute about Saguntum furnished the
Carthaginians with COLOURABLE MOTIVES for the second Punic war, but,
in REALITY, they could not brook the indignity of having consented to
a treaty, which the Romans had extorted from them at an unfavourable
moment; and more especially as their spirits were revived by their
recent successes in Spain. The real causes assigned by Thucydides for
the Peloponnesian war, were the jealousies entertained by the
Lacedaemonians of the then growing power of the Athenians, though the
quarrels of the Corcyreans, Potidaens, and other secondary states were
made the ostensible reasons.

II. There are some who have neither ostensible reasons, nor just
causes to plead for their hostilities, in which, as Tacitus says, they
engage from the pure love of enterprise and danger. A disposition to
which Aristotle gives the name of ferocity. And in the last book of
his Nicomachian Ethics, he calls it a bloody cruelty to convert
friends into enemies, whom you may slaughter.

III. Though most powers, when engaging in war, are desirous to colour
over their real motives with justifiable pretexts, yet some, totally
disregarding such methods of vindication, seem able to give no better
reason for their conduct, than what is told by the Roman Lawyers of a
robber, who being asked, what right he had to a thing, which he had
seized, replied, it was his own, because he had taken it into his
possession? Aristotle in the third book of his Rhetoric, speaking of
the promoters of war, asks, if it is not unjust for a neighbouring
people to be enslaved, and if those promoters have no regard to the
rights of unoffending nations? Cicero, in the first book of his
Offices, speaks in the same strain, and calls the courage, which is
conspicuous in danger and enterprise, if devoid of justice, absolutely
undeserving of the name of valour. It should rather be considered as a
brutal fierceness outraging every principle of humanity."

IV. Others make -use of pretexts, which though plausible at first
sight, will not bear the examination and test of moral rectitude, and,
when stripped of their disguise, such pretexts will be found fraught
with injustice. In such hostilities, says Livy, it is not a trial of
right, but some object of secret and unruly ambition, which acts as
the chief spring. Most powers, it is said by Plutarch, employ the
relative situations of peace and war, as a current specie, for the
purchase of whatever they deem expedient.

By having before examined and established the principles of just and
necessary war, we may form a better idea of what goes to constitute
the injustice of the same. As the nature of things is best seen by
contrast, and we judge of what is crooked by comparing it with what is
straight. But for the sake of perspicuity, it will be necessary to
treat upon the leading points.

It was shewn above that apprehensions from a neigh. bouring power are
not a sufficient ground for war. For to authorize hostilities as a
defensive measure, they must arise from the necessity, which just
apprehensions create; apprehensions not only of the power, but of the
intentions of a formidable state, and such apprehensions as amount to
a moral certainty. For which reason the opinion of those is by no
means to be approved of, who lay down as a just ground of war, the
construction of fortifications in a neighbouring country, with whom
there is no existing treaty to prohibit such constructions, or the
securing of a strong hold, which may at some future period prove a
means of annoyance. For as a guard or against such apprehensions,
every power may construct, in its own territory, strong works, and
other military securities of the same kind, without having recourse to
actual war. One cannot but admire the character, which Tacitus has
drawn of the Chauci, a noble and high-spirited people of Germany,
"who, he says, were desirous of maintaining their greatness by
justice, rather than by acts of ungovernable rapacity and ambition â
provoking no wars, invading no countries, spoiling no neighbours to
aggrandize themselves, â yet, when necessity prompted, able to raise
men with arms in their hands at a moment's warning â a great
population with a numerous breed of horses to form a well mounted
cavalry-and, with all these advantages, upholding their reputation in
the midst of peace."

VI. Nor can the advantage to be gained by a war be ever pleaded as a
motive of equal weight and justice with necessity.

[Translator's note: Section V of the original is omitted in the translation.]

VII. and VIII. Neither can the desire of emigrating to a more
favourable soil and climate justify an attack upon a neighbouring
power. This, as we are informed by Tacitus, was a frequent cause of
war among the ancient Germans.

IX. There is no less injustice in setting up claims, under the
pretence of newly discovered titles, to what belongs to another.

Neither can the wickedness, and impiety, nor any other incapacity of
the original owner justify such a claim. For the title and right by
discovery can apply only to countries and places, that have no owner.

X. Neither moral nor religious virtue, nor any intellectual excellence
is requisite to form a good title to property. Only where a race of
men is so destitute of reason as to be incapable of exercising any act
of ownership, they can hold no property, nor will the law of charity
require that they should have more than the necessaries of life. For
the rules of the law of nations can only be applied to those, who are
capable of political or commercial intercourse: but not to a people
entirely destitute of reason, though it is a matter of just doubt,
whether any such is to be found.

It was an absurdity therefore in the Greeks to suppose, that
difference of manners, or inferiority of intellect made those, whom
they were pleased to call barbarians, their natural enemies. But as to
atrocious crimes striking at the very root and existence of society,
the forfeiture of property ensuing from thence is a question of a
different nature, belonging to punishments, under the head of which it
was discussed.

XI. But neither the independence of individuals, nor that of states,
is a motive that can at all times justify recourse to arms, as if all
persons INDISCRIMINATELY had a natural right to do so. For where
liberty is said to be a natural right belonging to all men and states,
by that expression is understood a right of nature, antecedent to
every human obligation or contract. But in that case, liberty is
spoken of in a negative sense, and not by way of contrast to
independence, the meaning of which is, that no one is by the law of
nature doomed to servitude, though he is not forbidden by that law to
enter into such a condition. For in this sense no one can be called
free, if nature leaves him not the privilege of chusing his own
condition: as Albutius pertinently remarks, "the terms, freedom and
servitude are not founded in the principles of nature, but are names
subsequently applied to men according to the dispositions of fortune."
And Aristotle defines the relations of master and servant to be the
result of political and not of natural appointment. Whenever therefore
the condition of servitude, either personal or political, subsists,
from lawful causes, men should be contented with that state, according
to the injunction of the Apostle, "Art thou called, being a servant,
let not that be an anxious concern?"

XII. And there is equal injustice in the desire of reducing, by force
of arms, any people to a state of servitude, under the pretext of its
being the condition for which they are best qualified by nature. It
does not follow that, because any one is fitted for a particular
condition, another has a right to impose it upon him. For every
reasonable creature ought to be left free in the choice of what may be
deemed useful or prejudicial to him, provided another has no just
right to a controul over him.

The case of children has no connection with the question, as they are
necessarily under the discipline of others.

XIII. It would scarce have been necessary to refute the foolish
opinion of some, who have ascribed to the Roman Emperors dominion over
the most remote and unknown nations, if Bartolus, deemed a lawyer of
the first eminence, had not pronounced it heresy to deny those
pretensions. This opinion has been built upon the Roman Emperor's some
times having styled himself Sovereign of the whole world; a term which
it was not unusual for many people to apply to their own country. Thus
in the scriptures we find Judea frequently called the whole inhabited
earth; therefore when the Jews, in their proverbial expression, called
Jerusalem the centre of the world, nothing more is to be implied than
that it was situated in the middle of Judea.

As to the argument in favor of universal dominion from its being so
beneficial to mankind, it may be observed that all its advantages are
counterbalanced by still greater disadvantages. For as a ship may be
built too large to be conveniently managed, so an empire may be too
extensive in population and territory to be directed and governed by
one head. But granting the expediency of universal empire, that
expediency can not give such a right, as can be acquired only by
treaty or conquest. There were many places formerly belonging to the
Roman Empire, over which the Emperor has at present no controul. For
war, treaty, or cession have made many changes, by which the rights of
territory have passed to other states or sovereign princes, and the
standards of different communities, whether kingdoms or commonwealths,
now wave in places, which the Roman Eagle once overshadowed with his
wings. These are losses and changes, that have been experienced by
other powers no less than that, which was once mistress of the world.

XIV. But there have been some, who have asserted the rights of the
church over unknown parts of the world, though the Apostle Paul
himself has expressly said that Christians were not to judge those who
were without the pale of their own community. And though the right of
judging, which belonged to the Apostles, might in some cases apply to
worldly concerns, yet in its general nature it was of a celestial
rather than an earthly kind â a judgment not exercised by fire and
sword, but by the word of God, proposed to all men and adapted to
their peculiar circumstances â a judgment exercised by displaying or
withholding the seals of divine grace, as it might be most expedient â
lastly, it was a judgment exercised in supernatural punishments; in
punishments proceeding from God, like the punishments of Ananias,
Elymas, Hymenaeus, and others.

Christ himself, the spring', from whence all the power of the church
was derived, and, whose life is the model for the church to follow,
said, his kingdom was not of this world, that is, was not of the same
nature, with other kingdoms, otherwise, like the rest of sovereigns,
he would have maintained his authority by the power of the sword. For
if he had pleased to call up the aid of Legions; he would have called
up hosts of Angels and not of men. And every exercise of his right was
performed by the influence of divine, and not of human power; even
when he drove the sellers out of the temple. For the ROD was the
EMBLEM and not the INSTRUMENT of divine wrath, as UNCTION was once a
SIGN of healing, and not the HEALING POWER ITSELF. St. Augustin on the
xviii Chapter of St. John, and 36 ver. invites Sovereign Princes into
this kingdom, in these terms, "Hear, O Jews, and Gentiles, hear, O
earthly Sovereigns, I will not obstruct your authority, for my kingdom
is not of this world.. Be not alarmed, like Herod, who trembled, when
he heard that Christ was born, and slew so many innocent children,
hoping to include the Saviour in that calamity. His fear shewed itself
in cruel wrath. But my kingdom, says Christ, is not of this world.
Therefore enter this kingdom without fear. Come with faith, and
provoke not the king to anger by your delay."

XV. There is a caution too necessary to be given, against drawing too
close a parallel between ancient and modern times. For it is but
seldom that any one can adduce a case exactly conformable to his own
circumstances. To draw such pretexts from the interpretation of
prophecy is the highest presumption. For no prophecy that is yet to be
fulfilled can be unfolded without the aid of a prophetic spirit. The
times even of events, that are certain, may escape our notice. Nor is
it every pre. diction, unless it be accompanied with an express
command from God, that can justify recourse to arms: sometimes indeed
God brings his predicted designs to their issue by the means of wicked
instrument.

XVI. As the imperfect obligations of charity, and other virtues of the
same kind are not cognizable in a court of justice, so neither can the
performance of them be compelled by force of arms. For it is not the
moral nature of a duty that can enforce its fulfillment, but there
must be some legal right in one of the parties to exact the
obligation. For the moral obligation receives an additional weight
from such a right. This obligation therefore must be united to the
former to give a war the character of a just war. Thus a person who
has conferred a favour, has not, strictly speaking, a RIGHT to demand
a return, for that would be converting an act of kindness into a
contract.

XVII. It is necessary to observe that a war may be just in its origin,
and yet the intentions of its authors may become unjust in the course
of its prosecution. For some other motive, not unlawful IN ITSELF, may
actuate them more powerfully than the original right, for the
attainment of which the war was begun. It is laudable, for instance,
to maintain national honour; it is laudable to pursue a public or a
private interest, and yet those objects may not form the justifiable
grounds of the war in question.A war may gradually change its nature
and its object from the prosecution of a right to the desire of
seconding or supporting the aggrandizement of some other power. But
such motives, though blamable, when even connected with a just war, do
not render the war ITSELF unjust, nor invalidate its conquests.

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