The Statesman, North East Page, Saturday February 12 2005
http://thestatesman.org/page.news.php?clid=14&theme=&usrsess=1&id=68386
On ending the Naga war
By Sanjib Baruah
The following is an excerpt from Sanjib Baruah's latest book, Durable Disorder: Understanding the Politics of Northeast India, published by Oxford University Press, India. The issues discussed are essential to understand the context in which the Naga peace talks are being held.
Projects of nationhood frequently rely on censuses and other modern forms of enumeration and classification and a modern technology of representation - the map - in order to connect territoriality and collective selfhood. The notion of territorially rooted collectivities living in their supposedly traditional national homelands relies on a very different spatial discourse than the one of overlapping frontiers and hierarchical polities that precedes it.
In North-east India the historical relations between hill peoples and the lowland states had an especially complex spatial, cultural and political dynamic. As a result there is a serious collision between competing projects of identity assertion today.
The Naga desire for a homeland that would bring together all Nagas into one political unit can come into being only at the expense of Manipur, as well as Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. Key to a political settlement is the recognition on the part of all parties that there is an inherent crisis of territoriality in North-east India. Such recognition, of course, will have to occur within the framework of a process that the Nagas can see as reconciliation, among themselves, with their neighbours and with the Indian government.
The Naga hills, where a multiplicity of cultural forms had historically reigned supreme are best seen as, what James C Scott terms, a non-state space - an "illegible space" from the perspective of the states in the lowlands. The ethnic landscape of the hills has always confused outsiders - states as well as ethnographers. The taxonomies about the hill peoples have been almost always wrong, groups identified as distinct were later found to be not "uniform, coherent, or stable through time". Whether it was linguistic practice, dress, rituals, diet or body decoration, neat boundary lines had been impossible to draw.
Such an unfamiliar and confusing ethnic landscape fits well with slash and burn agriculture - the common mode of livelihood in these hills - which means dispersed and mobile populations that could not be captured for corvee labour and military service by the labour-starved states of the plains; nor could tax-collectors monitor either the number of potential subjects or their holdings and income.
At the same time the non-state spaces in the hills and the state spaces in the lowlands had been anything but separate. Indeed the categories "hill tribes" and "valley peoples" are leaky vessels. People had continually moved from the hills to the plains and from the plains to the hills.
Since manpower was always in short supply, wars in this region were not about territory, but about capturing slaves. If wars produced movements in either direction, the attractions of commerce and what the lowlanders call civilisation may have generated a flow of hill peoples downwards. On the other hand, the extortionist labour demands of the lowland states and, the vulnerability of wet-rice cultivation to crop failure, epidemics and famines produced flight to the hills where there were more subsistence alternatives.
The Manipuri protest of 2001 served to bring to light the history of the region's "strange multiplicity" and the tensions between the spatial discourse that had historically enabled the hill peoples and lowland states of the region to coexist and the spatial discourse of exclusive territorially rooted collectivities that frame today's politics of recognition.
It is doubtful if secret bilateral meetings between the Government of India and the rebel leaders will produce a solution. Manipur surely has as serious a stake as any in the Naga conflict. If it is not a part of the way the Naga conflict is conventionally mapped, it is a function of how most observers have got accustomed to India's centralised style of governing and deciding the fate of this frontier region. At the same time it cannot be argued that the Naga talks can be suddenly expanded to include Manipur as a stakeholder. Before anything like that can happen, all parties would have to come to terms with the limits of the territorial discourse in North-east India that the collision between the Naga and Manipuri projects of recognition underscores.
In North-east India we have come to the end of the road of territorial reorganisation of states. We need an alternative institutional imagination. A source of fresh ideas may be an entirely different political discourse than that of making and breaking states.
The principle of the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples under international law, for instance, has led to concepts like separate polities within shared territories, which have been tried in societies where relations between settlers and indigenous peoples are based on treaties between a government and particular indigenous nations.
Even if these parties had vastly asymmetric power relations when these treaties were signed, and for a long time such treaties did not protect these peoples against assimilative policies and practices, in recent years they have provided the basis for challenging the foundational myths of the national communities created by settler communities. But most significantly, slowly but steadily they are modifying the architecture of federalism in countries like Australia, Canada and the USA. The "native" peoples have been able to claim a place in the federal table alongside states.
Given the history of the past five decades, it would be too much to expect the Naga conflict to suddenly end on a whimper of some vague promise of cultural autonomy. A proposal that might have the power to capture the Naga imagination at the moment might take the Burmese government into confidence and bring the Nagas of Burma into the picture as well. This can be the first step towards a comprehensive dialogue that includes Nagas as well as the other stakeholders to consider an arrangement that crosses both transnational and inter-state borders which recognises Naga identity, alongside both the sovereignty of India and Burma and the territorially embodied identities of states like Manipur and Assam. Without such a significant shifting of gears, it is unlikely that the seven-year old Naga peace process can overcome the formidable obstacles it currently faces to end one of world's most protracted and tragic armed conflicts.
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