http://www.telegraphindia.com/1050714/asp/opinion/story_4956956.asp
The Telegraph, Calcutta, Thursday, July 14, 2005 |
WHY WE NEED TO WALK THE TALK
Not engaging with the Ulfa now will only strengthen the hands of those who
do not want to risk breaking with the past, argues Sanjib Baruah The
author is visiting professor, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi
There is a pattern in the evolving debate on whether the government should
nego-tiate with the United Libe- ration Front of Asom. The Assamese
writer, Indira Goswami, has worked for nearly a year to facilitate
negotiations. The chief minister, Tarun Gogoi, favours engagement. Much of
the Assamese media and many writers and cultural figures are behind
Goswami's initiative and Assamese popular sentiments appear to strongly
favour engagement.
A prominent opponent of engagement is Assams governor, Ajai Singh the
architect of two counter-insurgency operations against it. He believes
that he could have "finished" the Ulfa a long time ago, and is unwilling
to countenance talking to a group that is militarily weaker today than it
was when he commanded troops against it. Whatever one thinks of his
position, it is odd in a parliamentary democracy to have an unelected
governor a retired military general locking horns with an elected chief
minister on whether negotiations is a better option than force.
There is a significant new cleavage in todays Assam: between the "security
haves" and the "security have-nots". Those who live in a security bubble
surrounded everywhere by jeep-loads of armed men are not exactly in a
position to argue against engagement when their less-privileged
compatriots want to give engagement a chance.
There is widespread expectation in Assam that engagement could end the
insecurity of everyday life seen as being the pro-duct both of actions by
insurgents and of counter-insurgency operations. While the pro-engagement
position is strong in Assam, the anti-engagement position appears to be
gaining strength in New Delhi and among its representatives in Assam.
Of course, a good argument can be made against engagement. Why, for
instance, give credibility to the Ulfas demand for sovereignty? And isnt
there a danger that engagement will give further legitimacy to violence as
a political instrument?
But in order to bolster its position, the anti-engagement camp has also
come up with the choicest of epithets against the Ulfa terrorists,
criminals, extortionists, ISI agents and so on. But such tirades, that put
the pro-engagement camp on the defensive, are misplaced.
The argument for engaging with the Ulfa is one that Jimmy Carter, a former
US president, once made in another context. "Who would one engage with to
stop a conflict or human rights abuse," he asked, "if not the people
involved in the conflict or perpetrating the human rights violation?"
It is not the character of the Ulfa or the legitimacy of its demands that
is at issue. The question is: what is the best way to end the stalemate
between the Ulfa and the government? Is it engagement or non-engagement?
If the government does not engage with the Ulfa, will the latter simply
wither away? Do those who argue against engagement have up their sleeves
another viable strategy to end the stalemate?
Those who are against engagement ignore the logic that sustains
low-intensity armed conflicts in north-east India and relies on a
selective account of conditions on the ground. The civilian population
increasingly those in rural rather than in urban areas bears the brunt of
the continued stalemate. While Goswami is responding to the attendant
human misery she sees, Gogois is a response to the political consequences
of that misery. After all, even George W. Bushs men have been forced to
secretly talk to Iraqi insurgents after discovering that Americas
unparalleled military might is quite useless as a tool to combat
insurgency.
No one should expect that engaging with the Ulfa would be easy. If the
Ulfa is willing to come to the negotiation table, it should not be read as
a sign of a sudden conversion to the path of non-violence and of an
emerging new consensus that its old ways were wrong.
The internal dynamics of armed groups do not generally favour rushing to
moderate positions when faced with a choice between sticking to old ways
and change. Even if some people in the Ulfa may be convinced that the old
strategy is not working or that the costs imposed by counter-insurgency
are very high, the organization may not find it easy to switch gears.
There are risks involved in moving from the jungle to the negotiating
table. Continuing with old positions is a more comfortable position
because there is less danger of factional infighting. A swift compromise
on foundational issues without trying to get everyone on board can produce
rebellions, factionalism and splits.
Apart from the cadre, the Ulfa leadership also faces the question of
explaining a radical shift to its sympathizers, especially to those who
have lost loved ones. How will it explain a complete turn-around of goals
and strategy to them? Ironically, it is precisely when an armed militant
group is weak and considers moderation that the unity of the organization
and the authority of prevailing hierarchies become most threatened.
The Ulfas response, reiterating its maximalist position and the demand for
the release of ten of its central committee members from prisons in Assam
and Bangladesh, therefore, should not come as a surprise. To read it as a
sign that the Ulfa lacks the will to negotiate and is trying to regroup
may be shortsighted.
The organizations de facto leadership probably considers it particularly
important now to show to the world that it is not compromising on its
basic goals. It does not want to make some of the most important decisions
that it has ever made with the majority of the organizations formal
leadership behind bars. That wont exactly be the best recipe for getting
all the factions of the organization behind the negotiations. Short of
releasing jailed leaders, there is room for compromise such as allowing
meetings in prison.
The process of engaging with the Ulfa will be complex. At this stage, in
responding to its statements, the government will be well-advised to take
into account the compulsions of the Ulfas internal dynamics. Its so-called
core demand, that is sovereignty, cannot be seen as the immediate item on
the agenda when government negotiators and the Ulfa leadership meet. A
more realistic goal in approaching the question of engagement with the
Ulfa would be to enable it as an organization to make this shift in other
words, to strengthen the hands of those in the Ulfa camp who might favour
moderation. Not engaging with the Ulfa now will only strengthen the hands
of those who may not want to risk breaking with the past.
Responding creatively to the Ulfas moves might require diplomatic skills
that appear to be in short supply in the home ministry, where most
important decisions on the North-east are made.
Even in our imperfect democracy, it is possible to make decisions that
respect the wishes of the people most affected by this conflict those
bearing the brunt of the insecurity of everyday life that has
characterized Assam for the past quarter century. We must do all that it
takes to put a sustainable peace process in place
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