Hey Chuck, Our daily CDR's are usually within a certain file size. If you use Outlook, you could create a rule to alert you if your CDR size is above a certain file size. This will also alert you of excessively busy days, so you can see what caused it in your business.
Cheers, Doug -----Original Message----- From: Chuck Mariotti [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: November-11-08 6:43 PM To: Chuck Mariotti; Simon P. Ditner; [email protected] Subject: RE: [on-asterisk] SIP hack attempts I also made some recommendations to Unlimitel, but maybe this should be shared with providers as to what would have allowed me to catch this issue: I know this is likely a lot of work, but... it would be nice to have the daily totals in the body of the email and subject. I rarely open my email attachment to see the minutes used for a day, but if there was a dollar amount or # of minutes in the subject, it would make it easier to scan with the eyeball. I would have missed our recent hack completely if I didn't get returned calls complaining... which made me check my CDR in Asterisk, which made me look the next day in your report. It also happened on a Friday night (I'm sure on purpose) so I wouldn't have even attempted to look until Monday. I know that's a lot more horsepower needed than just attaching a text file. But I know it would be helpful to me. As well, could be useful to set an alert on DID for minutes used in a day... I think that's asking too much though. Regards, Chuck -----Original Message----- From: Chuck Mariotti [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2008 6:40 PM To: Simon P. Ditner; [email protected] Subject: RE: [on-asterisk] SIP hack attempts Simon, I ran into and was a victim of such an attack back in mid-august. I emailed unlimitel and this is the recommendations that Stephen had: Dear Customer, We're seeing a lot more hacking activities lately and here's a short list to do on your server to help keep it secure: 1- Change all your default passwords on the server (root, admin, maint). Never use easy to remember passwords like 1234,... 2- Never use passwords like 1234 for your any extensions on your server. There's a lot of hackers out there just scanning your Asterisk server to detect extensions (200 to 299 mostly) with easy passwords like 1234. 3- Block access to your server and just leave the RTP, SIP and IAX2 opened. Just leave the SSH and WEB access opened to your static IP from the office. You can do this by using the iptables from Linux on your Asterisk server. 4- Monitor your network and if you see some activities scanning your server, keep note of the source IP address and block it completely from your server. Hope this few tips can help you keep your server more secure and avoid big telephone bills. Stephan Monette Unlimitel Inc. -----Original Message----- From: Simon P. Ditner [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2008 6:00 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [on-asterisk] SIP hack attempts Not a single reply? It's very easy to disregard this message, but I think this is something VERY IMPORTANT that we should be talking about much more -- especially for those deploying systems for remote workers over a public network. There is a huge opportunity for toll fraud, voip spam, and such as this market segment continues to grow. Lability becomes an issue too -- who's responsible when someone is defrauded via your phone system? The phone companies have a record of you calling so-and-so; can you prove you didn't? These are the sort of scans I've been spotting hitting some of my systems the past week, trying to brute force. You'll see incremental scans like: [Nov 5 19:58:30] NOTICE[19408] chan_sip.c: Registration from '"0"<sip:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>' failed for 'EE.FF.GG.HH' - No matching peer found ... [Nov 5 20:20:21] NOTICE[19408] chan_sip.c: Registration from '"1000"<sip:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>' failed for 'EE.FF.GG.HH' - Wrong password ... We were discussing this around the office, particularly how sipvicious (http://sipvicious.org) works, and it was noted that you can find active SIP accounts easily, and then start a brute force against a known active account. I poked my head into #asterisk-dev, and asked if there were a feature in the works to automatically disable accounts after a number of bad auth attempts. It's been discussed, but so far no code. There are however some easy things you can do that are common across running any service on the internet. Inside of asterisk, you can cut down on your exposure by only allowing particular SIP accounts to be registered from remotely by putting deny-based ACL's on the other accounts, listing your local subnets as permissable: sip.conf [somepeer] type=peer deny=0.0.0.0/0.0.0.0 permit=192.168.0.0/255.255.255.0 You can also create automatic blacklisting of IP addresses that attempt too many SIP authentications per interval, such as this SSH example: http://www.mattiasholm.com/node/6 Thoughts? What are other people doing to protect their exposure? re, spd On Mon, 10 Nov 2008, Andre Courchesne - Consultant wrote: > Hi, > > Just to let you know that I see a proliferation is SIP hack attempts. Twice > today I happened to be logged in servers where I saw SIP discovery from IP > 212.12.148.109 and on the other server that same IP had actually gained > controlled of a SIP account (which was created with a weak secret by the > administrator). > > The call pattern indicated that calls were made by a dialer of some sort > and the SIP packets were originating from an Asterisk server. > > So be carefull about your server that you have to let unprotected on an > internet segment. > > Andre > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > To unsubscribe, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > For additional commands, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] For additional commands, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] For additional commands, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] For additional commands, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] For additional commands, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
