On 06/11/2015 11:59 PM, Giancarlo Razzolini wrote: > In the case of stolen/lost, it buy you a lot of time. Or you are aware > of some cryptanalisys development I'm not aware of.
I am not, but everything depends on your threat model. If you are targeted via an "evil-maid", or a cold-boot attack, FDE may be doomed. In addition to that, passphrase-protection on SSH keys has been weak for a long time, because a single MD5(IV || passphrase) is applied to generate the AES key used to encrypt the SSH key [1]. OpenSSL 6.5 introduced a new KDF [2] using bcrypt, enabled by default for ed25519 keys but not for RSA keys, so you may want to upgrade your keys to use the new KDF manually. > Now, if your machine is compromised, then I think that you might have > bigger worries than the keys used to publish some packages on AUR. Agreed :) [1] https://martin.kleppmann.com/2013/05/24/improving-security-of-ssh-private-keys.html [2] http://www.tedunangst.com/flak/post/new-openssh-key-format-and-bcrypt-pbkdf
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