How annoying. Fair enough they have new terms of reference, but from the original landing page it's not obvious there's a new enquiry.
To ensure the process maintains continuity, they need to link through to the new enquiry from the old landing page. Even APH staff seem confused where advice I had received from PJCIS 10/12 was call for submissions was yet to be determined. I've posted a support ticket so hopefully we'll see an update to the main page: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6195 Kind regards Paul Wilkins On Thu, 10 Jan 2019 at 01:42, Paul Brooks <pbrooks-aus...@layer10.com.au> wrote: > On 9/01/2019 11:18 am, Paul Wilkins wrote: > > Obviously this has been in limbo over the Christmas break. There's 2 > really important issues, on hold because of this. > > 1 - When or if the PJCIS will call for public comment on the Act as passed. > > PJCIS called for further comments on the Act as passed a few days after > the Act was passed - > > They opened a new page on the PJCIS as a new inquiry: 'Review of the > Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) > Act 2018 with specific reference to Government amendments introduced and > passed on 6 December 2018' > > > https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/ReviewofTOLAAct > > The Government amendments introduced and passed on 6 December 2018 are > available at this link > <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query%3DId%3A%22legislation%2Famend%2Fr6195_amend_2ef65c47-7a59-45e1-9427-cf3e7400ef4d%22>. > A Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum > <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22legislation/ems/r6195_ems_b832c54b-6091-41ca-baf4-35bb94a856e8%22>on > the amendments was also presented to the Parliament. > > The Committee will accept submissions on any new matters arising with the > passage of the Act, and will consider the need for further hearings as the > inquiry progresses. > > There are already two new submissions , from IGIS and Commonwealth > Ombudsman. > > They are specifically looking for comments on wording and construction, > suggestions on better definitions for 'Systemic Weakness' and on the > definitions used and passed. > > > > So we probably won't see any developments until Parliament resumes 12th > February. > > Kind regards > > Paul Wilkins > > > On Sat, 15 Dec 2018 at 11:44, Paul Wilkins <paulwilkins...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> I guess we should anticipate that the PJCIS will ask for further >> submissions. Probably they will give as little advance warning as possible >> to conform to their "accelerated timetable". I would think they'll announce >> their request for submissions as soon as the Labor amendments are dealt >> with. >> >> The Labor amendments are critical for: >> >> - Requirements for judicial review of TCNs/TARs, and avenue of >> judicial appeal for service providers >> - Strengthened requirements for necessity and proportionality >> - Definitions of system vulnerability and systemic weakness (which >> preclude mass deployment of patched code) >> >> These amendments are necessary and reasonable. However for me, the >> following issues still remain to be resolved: >> >> 1 - Granting the police EA powers (rather than the intelligence >> services - ASIO & AFP) goes too far where the police do not require EA. >> Rather the least intrusive powers that would still enable them to prosecute >> serious crime, would be Legal Intercept (basically enough powers to get to >> the clear text, where they are back to where they were before before the >> "going dark" due to encryption). This means that Police should get a >> different category of TAN - where there are no write or modify data powers >> (ie. read only). Any write or modify capabilities they require should be >> implemented under a duly authorised TCN. >> >> 2 - Once there is allowance for differentiation in Police vs Intelligence >> Services powers, there should similarly be differentiation for the >> seriousness of crimes investigated. The 3 years for Police services (but >> limited to Legal Intercept) would still allow the police to investigate >> cyber stalking, but also many other crimes some have suggested is like >> using a sledge hammer to crack a nut. Given the more intrusive nature of EA >> vs Legal Intercept, there should be a higher bar for the Intelligence >> Services to demand EA powers (say 20 years to life). If they need only >> Legal Intercept, then the bar could remain at 3 years. >> >> 3 - It's still not clear that anything doable under a TCN, cannot be >> compelled under a TAN's write/modify data powers. Hence, there ought to be >> exclusions of a TAN's powers from compelling the implementation of a >> capability for which a TCN can be issued. >> >> 4 - I'm still not seeing where a TCN, TAN, or TAR, is disallowed from >> serving as "authorisation" under s280 / s313 of the Telecommunications Act >> 1997, sufficient to demand mass access to carrier metadata/ metadata >> datastreams. There is also lawful disclosure of mass metadata under s177 of >> the Telecomms Interception and Access Act 1979. If the police and/or >> intelligence services get access to metadata streams, they will integrate >> this with their other metadata projects, including CCTV and facial >> recognition databases. Which is obviously something some in Law Enforcement >> are advocating for, though I think most citizens would regard this as an >> alarming move towards mass surveillance and a police state. >> >> 5 - Having one agency act as a clearing house for notices and warrant >> data, is still a preferable framework to access by multiple agencies, and >> would provide advantages for economy, efficiency, governance, and the >> secure custody of both warrant data and service provider confidential >> information. >> >> 6 - Journalists and media organisations ought to be able to mount a >> public interest defense against the issue of TANs. >> >> 7 - Any citizen ought to have standing to mount a public interest defense >> against the issue of a TCN. >> >> 8 - An audit trail be mandated for all TAN/TAR actions. >> >> Interested to hear if anyone has comments or other concerns. >> >> Kind regards >> >> Paul Wilkins >> >> On Sat, 15 Dec 2018 at 09:29, I <beatthebasta...@inbox.com> wrote: >> >>> GCHQ is going for the same thing >>> >>> https://www.lawfareblog.com/principles-more-informed-exceptional-access-debate >>> _______________________________________________ >>> AusNOG mailing list >>> AusNOG@lists.ausnog.net >>> http://lists.ausnog.net/mailman/listinfo/ausnog >>> >> > _______________________________________________ > AusNOG mailing > listAusNOG@lists.ausnog.nethttp://lists.ausnog.net/mailman/listinfo/ausnog > > >
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