In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within aus. Inferred improvements during Feb 2020: ASN Name Fixed-By 135132 DNI-PH 2020-02-10 137399 2020-02-17 17766 GCOMM 2020-02-24 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Feb 2020: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 24555 APRICOT-APNIC-ASN 2017-02-26 2020-02-20 4826 VOCUS-BACKBONE 2018-03-07 2020-02-20 45437 RWTS 2019-05-14 2020-02-01 136168 CAMPANA 2019-05-15 2020-02-27 45828 DIVERSEIT-AU 2019-07-09 2020-02-26 23686 ASN-EQIX-MEL-EE-AP 2020-02-11 2020-02-21 45177 LAYER2CO 2020-02-19 2020-02-19 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=aus&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-i...@caida.org _______________________________________________ AusNOG mailing list AusNOG@lists.ausnog.net http://lists.ausnog.net/mailman/listinfo/ausnog
