Greetings Authors, Med*, We have updated the document as discussed thus far (including using "Certificate Authority”).
*Med, as AD, please review the changes in sections 3.1, 3.2, and 5.1.6 and let us know if they are approved. The updates can most easily be viewed in one of the AUTH48 diffs: https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9887-auth48diff.html https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9887-auth48rfcdiff.html (side by side) The fully updated files are available here: https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9887.xml https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9887.txt https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9887.pdf https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9887.html Comprehensive diffs are available here: https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9887-diff.html https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9887-rfcdiff.html (side by side) All, please review and let us know if any additional updates are needed or if you approve the RFC for publication. Thank you, Sandy Ginoza RFC Production Center > On Nov 9, 2025, at 12:46 PM, Douglas Gash (dcmgash) > <[email protected]> wrote: > > Many thanks for the work to unentangle the document! > Please see our initial responses: > Authors, > > While reviewing this document during AUTH48, please resolve (as necessary) > the following questions, which are also in the source file. > > 1) <!-- [rfced] May we update this text for readability? > > Original: > While the content of the protocol is highly sensitive, TACACS+ lacks > effective confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of the > connection and network traffic between the TACACS+ server and client, > requiring secure transport to safeguard a deployment. The security > mechanisms as described in Section 10 of [RFC8907] are extremely > weak. > > Suggested: > The content of the protocol is highly sensitive and requires > secure transport to safeguard a deployment. However, TACACS+ lacks > effective confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of the > connection and network traffic between the TACACS+ server and client. > The security mechanisms as described in Section 10 of [RFC8907] are > extremely weak. > --> > > <Authors>Thanks, that makes sense</Authors> > > > 2) <!-- [rfced] Should "for test" be "for testing"? > > Original: > It is a connection without TLS, using the unsecure > TACACS+ authentication and obfuscation (or the unobfuscated option > for test). > --> > <Authors>Thanks, that makes sense</Authors> > > > > 3) <!-- [rfced] We recommend simplifying this sentence for clarity. Does > the connection persist until either a) the TLS TACACS+ peer closes it or b) > an inactivity timeout occurs? Please consider how the text may be updated. > > Original: > The connection persists until the TLS TACACS+ peer closes it, either > due to an error, or at the conclusion of the TACACS+ session, or, if > Single Connection Mode (Section 4.3 of [RFC8907]) has been > negotiated, when an inactivity timeout occurs. > > Perhaps: > The connection persists until the TLS TACACS+ peer closes it or > until an inactivity timeout occurs when Single Connection Mode > (Section 4.3 of [RFC8907]) is used. The TLS TACACS+ peer may close > the connection due to an error or because the TACACS+ session has > concluded. > --> > > <Authors>Having reviewed this change, and the relation to next paragraph, > we’d like to propose the following which replaces the Original quoted above, > and the next paragraph in the document: > TLS TACACS+ connections are generally not long-lived. The connection will > be closed by either TLS+ TACACS Peer if it encounters an error or > inactivity timeout. For connections not operating in Single Connection Mode > (as defined in > Section 4.3 of [RFC8907]) the TCP session SHALL be closed upon > completion of the associated TACACS+ session. Connections operating in Single > Connection Mode MAY persist for a longer duration but are typically > subject to timeout and closure after a brief period of inactivity. > Consequently, support for transport-layer keepalive mechanisms is not > required. > > Why a connection is closed has no bearing on TLS resumption, unless > closed by a TLS error, in which case it is possible that the ticket has been > invalidated. > </Authors> > > > 4) <!-- [rfced] "verification" does not appear in Section 6 of RFC 5280. > Would it be helpful to the reader to use "validation" for consistency with > the reference? > > Original: > The implementation of certificate-based mutual authentication MUST > support certificate path verification as described in Section 6 of > [RFC5280]. > --> > > <Authors>Thanks, that makes sense</Authors> > > > 5) <!-- [rfced] Is it correct to refer to the "TLS Resumption protocol"? > > Original: > The TLS Resumption protocol, detailed in [RFC8446], can minimize the > number of round trips required during the handshake process. > > Perhaps: > TLS Resumption [RFC8446] can minimize the > number of round trips required during the handshake process. > --> > > <Authors>Thanks, that makes sense</Authors> > > > 6) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.2 of [RFC5425] is titled "Subject Name > Authorization" and doesn't appear to mention any kind of obfuscation > mechanism. Also, is the obfuscation mechanism described in both RFC 8907 > and 5425 (or other)? Please review and let us know how/if the text may be > clarified. > > Original: > [RFC8907] describes the obfuscation mechanism, documented in Section > 5.2 of [RFC5425]. Such a method is weak. > > > --> > <Authors> > We propose: > The obfuscation mechanism documented in [RFC8907] section 4.5. Data > Obfuscation is weak > </Authors> > > > > 7) <!-- [rfced] We are having trouble parsing "for implementing protocols > that use TLS and their deployment." > > Original: > [BCP195] offers substantial guidance for implementing protocols that > use TLS and their deployment. > > Perhaps: > [BCP195] offers substantial guidance for implementing and deploying > protocols that use TLS. > --> > <Authors>Thanks, that makes sense</Authors> > > > 8) <!-- [rfced] The use of "MUST" twice in this sentence reads oddly. > Please review. > > Original: > Further, operators MUST ensure that the TLS TACACS+ servers covered > by a wildcard certificate MUST be impervious to redirection of > traffic to a different server (for example, due to on-path attacks or > DNS cache poisoning). > > Perhaps A: > Further, operators MUST ensure that the TLS TACACS+ servers covered > by a wildcard certificate are impervious to redirection of > traffic to a different server (for example, due to on-path attacks or > DNS cache poisoning). > > > Perhaps B: > Further, operators MUST ensure that the TLS TACACS+ servers are covered > by a wildcard certificate and MUST be impervious to redirection of > traffic to a different server (for example, due to on-path attacks or > DNS cache poisoning). > --> > > <Authors>Thanks, Authors have voted for option A</Authors> > > > 9) <!-- [rfced] Does the operator need to consider the impact of supporting > both TLS and non-TLS connections? > > Original: > * The operator must consider the impact of mixed TLS and Non-TLS on > security, as mentioned above. > > Perhaps: > * The operator must consider the security impact of supporting both TLS > and non-TLS connections, as mentioned above. > --> > > <Authors>Thanks, that makes sense</Authors> > > > 10) <!-- [rfced] The description of the service name in the first paragraph > differs from the what appears in the registration template below it and > what appears on the IANA site. Is the intent to relay that the service > name "tacacss" is commonly referred to as "TACACS+ over TLS" rather than > the description in the template? Or, should the descriptions be the same? > > Original: > IANA has allocated a new well-known system TCP/IP port number (300) > for the service name "tacacss", described as "TACACS+ over TLS". The > service name "tacacss" follows the common practice of appending an > "s" to the name given to the Non-TLS well- known port name. This > allocation is justified in Section 5.3. > > IANA has added tacacss as a new entry to the "Service name and > Transport Protocol Port Number Registry" available at > <https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers>. > > Description in the template and the IANA registry: > TLS Secure Login Host Protocol (TACACSS) > See > <https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-names-port-numbers.xhtml?=&skey=2&page=6>. > > If the text should be the same, perhaps the paragraphs could be combined as > follows: > IANA has allocated the following new well-known system in the > "Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry" (see > <https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/>). The > service name "tacacss" follows the common practice of appending an > "s" to the name given to the non-TLS well-known port name. See the > justification for the allocation in Section 5.3. > > Related: > Original in Section 3.1: > Given the prevalence of default port usage in existing TACACS+ client > implementations, this specification assigns a well-known TCP port > number for TACACS+ over TLS: [TBD] (Section 7), with the associated > service name "tacacss" Section 7. > > Perhaps: > Given the prevalence of default port usage in existing TACACS+ client > implementations, this specification assigns well-known TCP port > 300 for TACACS+ over TLS (see Section 7). > > Original in Section 3.1 - We believe this is intentional to align with the > line prior: > * for Non-TLS connection TACACS+: Port number 49. > * for TLS connection TACACS+: (TBD). > --> > > <Authors>Thanks, that makes sense</Authors> > > > 11) <!-- [rfced] This document used both "non-TLS" and "Non-TLS". We have > lowercased instances of "Non-TLS" for consistency and because > overcapitalization can detract from readability. > --> > > <Authors>Thanks, that makes sense</Authors> > > > Thank you. > Sandy Ginoza > RFC Production Center > > > > Cisco Confidential > On Oct 24, 2025, at 5:59 PM, [email protected] wrote: > > *****IMPORTANT***** > > Updated 2025/10/24 > > RFC Author(s): > -------------- > > Instructions for Completing AUTH48 > > Your document has now entered AUTH48. 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Dahm, J. Heasley, D. C. Medway Gash, A. Ota > WG Chair(s) : Joe Clarke, Benoît Claise > > Area Director(s) : Mohamed Boucadair, Mahesh Jethanandani > > > > -- > Gruß, > Thorsten Dahm -- auth48archive mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
