On 6/17/2010 9:29 AM, Jonathan Schaeffer wrote: > Hi all, > > I'm administrating a BackupPC server and I'm concerned about the security of > the > whole system.
It is based on controlling access to root and the backuppc user on the server. I don't see a way around that. > I configured the linux clients as unpriviledged users doing sudos for rsyncs > to > limit the risk of intrusion from the backupPC server to the clients as > described > in the FAQ : > http://backuppc.sourceforge.net/faq/ssh.html#how_can_client_access_as_root_be_avoided > > But I found a simple way to screw up the client when the backupPC server is > corrupted : > > It is easy to empty some (or all) files of a backup : > > r...@backuppc:/data/backuppc/pc/172.16.2.44/3/f%2f/fhome/fjschaeff# cat > /dev/null> f.bashrc I think this falls into the "if it hurts, don't do it" category. > And then, when the client restores the file, it gets an empty file. > > Is there a checking mechanism to ensure the integrity of the restored files ? > i.e. the server can check that the files he is about to restore is the same as > the one he stored previously ? If you are going to corrupt something intentionally and you have root access, you would also be able to replace/bypass any such check. Don't give anyone you don't trust root access... -- Les Mikesell [email protected] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ThinkGeek and WIRED's GeekDad team up for the Ultimate GeekDad Father's Day Giveaway. ONE MASSIVE PRIZE to the lucky parental unit. See the prize list and enter to win: http://p.sf.net/sfu/thinkgeek-promo _______________________________________________ BackupPC-users mailing list [email protected] List: https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/backuppc-users Wiki: http://backuppc.wiki.sourceforge.net Project: http://backuppc.sourceforge.net/
